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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

# Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-057

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26 September 1990

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### Democratic Party of Russia Viewed

90UN2578A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA  
31 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by Yu. Belkin: "The Symbol Is Not the Main Thing"; followed by commentary by political scientist V. Davydov]

[Text] The capital's Oktyabrskiy Rayon is becoming a center of public and political life. The rayon soviet's conference hall has been the site of one after another congress and conference of new parties and various associations whose emergence was unthinkable in just the recent past. The public statement by I. Zaslavskiy, chairman of the Oktyabrskiy Raysovet, about turning the rayon into a "free political and economic zone" has drawn all manner of people like a magnet to this corner of Moscow. Especially since in other rayons the local authorities continue to take an extremely restrained view of various proposals, attempting to soberly analyze them from the standpoint of "political profitability." In Oktyabrskiy Rayon, on the other hand, the doors have been opened wide to everything democratic, radical and progressive.

Recently the founding congress of the Social Democratic Party was held in the raysovet's conference hall. After that the Association of Independent Psychiatrists held an activity.

And after that came the founding conference of the Democratic Party of Russia. The party with which the USSR and RSFSR people's deputies N. Travkin, A. Murashov, G. Burbulis, I. Konstantinov and L. Ponomarev, world chess champion G. Kasparov and others have linked their names.

The conference went on for two days. At first in regional sections, and then in plenary sessions. Stormy debates developed over the party's program theses and its relations with the CPSU. "Toward political stability through Russia's economic freedom and state independence"—that was how the conference participants formulated their party's chief objective. The new public organization's top-priority goals include the consolidation of all democratic forces in the struggle for the constitutional parliamentary removal of the CPSU from its monopoly on power, and the creation of a new Constitution that accords with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One can list others, as well: decentralization of state administration on the basis of democracy; the development of various forms of local government; the impermissibility of party interference in the work of law-enforcement and other state agencies—the procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the army, and so forth; the deideologization of science, education and cultural institutions; the adoption of a law on freedom of conscience; the economic revival of the republic through the development of market relations, which must and can be implemented without lowering

the population's living standard; the drafting of a program of social protection for the poor; and assertion of the priority of universal human values.

The idea of the majority of speakers came down to the notion that the party's principal direction of work should consist in struggling for decent living conditions for Russia's citizens. The foundation of the rule-of-law civil society should be the working person's economic independence.

In the area of cooperation with other parties and movements, the following thesis was adopted in the program of the Democratic Party of Russia: the party is for the development of cooperation with all democratic parties and public and workers' movements, and independent trade unions—it is prepared to campaign with them in a single bloc.

The Democratic Party of Russia's draft program states: "The Democratic Party of Russia is a party of hope, resolute changes and the revival of common sense and moral principles, a party that delivers a challenge to the forces of reaction and totalitarianism and to the existing system of power. We are moved by a feeling of civic responsibility, compassion, involvement and desire to bring the country out of crisis."

In the declaration of the Democratic Party of Russia that was distributed to delegates at the conference, I discovered a paragraph that caught my attention: "We favor leaving personal political errors and ambitions in the past." It is no accident that I quote it. After all, declarations are declarations, but in ordinary political life, as we know, everything is more prosaic and simpler. The conference of the Democratic Party of Russia itself did not get by without conflicts and a struggle among ambitions. From the very outset, at the meeting of the future party's initiative group, N. Travkin set the condition: either he would be the party chairman, or he would remain a rank-and-file member of it. Other participants in the meeting objected that the party should have not one chairman but several cochairmen. They failed to reach a common opinion. They decided to submit this question to the conference. And at the conference the dispute over this problem erupted with new force. It grew into a conflict and, for all intents and purposes, led to a split in the party from its very first steps. Opposing rigid authoritarian tendencies in the party, a group of conference delegates consisting of about 50 people led by RSFSR people's deputies A. Ponomarev, I. Konstantinov, M. Salye and others left the hall. Another group of deputies led by G. Kasparov first decided to follow their colleagues' example, but after consulting among themselves they reached the common opinion that they would remain in the Democratic Party of Russia with the status of an independent faction.

Then elections of chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia were held. Two people ran for this office: USSR people's deputies N. Travkin and G. Burbulis. The votes were divided between them as follows: of 287 people



voting, 221 voted for N. Travkin (65 against), and 42 voted for G. Burbulis (244 against). Thus, Nikolay Ilyin Travkin, with 77 percent of the vote, became chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia.

The party's symbol became the subject of stormy discussion at the conference. In the two days of the Democratic Party of Russia's work, an incredible metamorphosis occurred with the symbol. At the opening, the republic's official flags were displayed. Most of the delegates demanded that the old tricolored Russian flag be established. To the applause of the hall, the new banner was hung in the center of the curtain. Arriving at the conference on the next day, I found neither the banner nor the flag. One of them had been removed at the insistence of the delegates present, and the other had been taken down by members of the Leningrad delegation—those who had refused to take part in the conference's work and left the hall.

Something similar happened with the party's name. Just yesterday it had the name "people's." But now that word has disappeared without a trace, and its place has been taken by the term "democratic." During the conference the abbreviation of the party was DPRF, which means Democratic Party of the Russian Federation. That name, hung on the hall's curtain, lasted exactly one day. On the following morning the letter "F," at the delegates' insistence, disappeared, and a three-letter abbreviation remained: DPR. What does that add in essence—does it give greater emotion and weight to the party's name, or clarify its sociopolitical shading? Or did its leaders conceive doubts as to the public organization's future mass appeal? The Democratic Party of Russia's chairman N. Travkin himself offered an explanation concerning such a casual treatment of the party's symbols: "The symbol is not the main thing," he noted. "After all, if necessary it can always be changed."

There is no doubt that the question of the symbol of any given party will doubtlessly be resolved. Today, however, when various parties with very similar programs are springing up like mushrooms, the far more important question arises: are they being established in the genuine interests of the people, or to satisfy the hypertrophied ambitions of their organizers?

#### Political Scientist's Commentary

The newborn Democratic Party of Russia occupies a unique place in the country's developing political spectrum. In point of fact, properly speaking it is not a party, since so far only its central structures have been created, and they are not supported by any existing lower-level organizations. But in any event they apparently will be created. The main thing is that even many of its potential supporters are shocked by the fierce anticommunism and antisocialism of the organization's main characters. What is more, these attitudes are directly expressed in the documents that the conference considered: the essence of the political part of the declaration consists in struggling for a constitutional overthrow of the power of

the CPSU party apparatus through elections at all levels. Nor is what is proposed in place of the CPSU any secret. N. I. Travkin spoke about it in his speech at the First Congress of the Labor Confederation in Novokuznetsk on 29 April: "...a party with a healthy anticommunist tendency that will reject that antihuman ideology and will fight those structures until they depart the political arena in our country" (NASHA GAZETA, 15 May 1990). That is, the very communist idea as a whole is rejected outright, along with the possibility and necessity of the existence of a socialist society."

And so, that is the viewpoint from which one must also assess the economic aspect of the Democratic Party of Russia's program documents. That same declaration states that in economics they are unequivocally for the market and free enterprise. In his report M. Ye. Salye stated outright the need to accord primacy to private property. The party's creed consists in those two positions—the complete removal of the CPSU from political power, and free enterprise. When this essence of it is revealed, it immediately becomes clear that we are simply being summoned to anarchy, since if the CPSU, even in its present form, departs the political arena and the removal of property from state control takes place, as is being proposed, by its being sold off, there can be no other outcome.

Obviously, there are few who can be attracted by such a prospect in either a political, psychological, or moral sense. It is scarcely an accident that such a proposal by N. I. Travkin was not supported by participants in the workers' forum in Novokuznetsk: it is hard to deceive the proletarians' class instinct.

And I would like to note yet another point. The party is called "democratic," and its documents make wide use of the epithets "humane," "universal human" and "free." However, in reality a great deal is otherwise. The impatience, arrogance and dictat that have already manifested themselves at the conference are a vivid confirmation that the democratic principles proclaimed in the documents are mere empty words.

Nonetheless, on the whole one can say that, despite all its shortcomings and drawbacks, the Democratic Party of Russia may, against the background of the general mistrust of existing party and political structures and discontent with the government's actions, and depending on the development of the political situation in the country and the possibility of its forming an alliance with liberal democratic forces, acquire more or less substantial weight on our society's political spectrum.

#### Astrakhan Obkom Chief Views Oblast Party, Soviet Roles

90UN2565A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 12, Jun 90 pp 19-25

[Interview with Ivan Nikolayevich Dyakov, Astrakhan Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies chairman and CPSU

Obkom first secretary by Stanislav Sendyukov, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN Magazine department editor, USSR Union of Writers member, and candidate of philological sciences: "Power to the Soviets, But What for Itself?"]

[Excerpts] [Sendyukov] Ivan Nikolayevich, you are newly arrived in Astrakhan Oblast. You were selected for the post of obkom first secretary with the position of CPSU Central Committee inspector. These "strokes to the portrait" of Party workers are not often taken as positive but rather as negative today. All the more so since rally opponents of the Central Committee and the Party have become highly skilled at speculating about "partocracy." You managed to obtain the trust of the oblast's communists and population. I am a native of that area and I know my countrymen well. Astrakhan residents are a straightforward people and they do not know how to be silent. Here it is very important that they accept not only you personally, but your family, too.

[Dyakov] As you said, I just arrived. There is also another concept: A man from the outside. There is also a play about that. Let us look into these concepts. Let us take this case. A man lives in a village where everyone has known each other for seven generations. He was born here, went to school, settled down, and he works in the local kolkhoz, sovkhoz, or whatever is here. But... he has used a sturdy fence to fence himself off, he pilfers everything that is laying out in the open, and he is ready to extract the last half-kopek from a fellow countryman's pocket. As you say, whom has he become for his fellow villagers?

[Passage omitted]

[Sendyukov] You arrived in an oblast where matters are far from bright in the economy and a large number of acute, urgent social problems has accumulated. And the ecological situation? The critical state of the Volga and its delta? This is a nationwide problem. The Volga is everything, life itself for Astrakhan residents. You have obviously clearly understood what the demand will be from the very first day. Did you not waver when they suggested that you come here?

[Dyakov] I will now show you one job. I did it myself. Here, look, it is handwritten. It is an analysis of the oblast's economic situation for 25 years. I think that not just economic [leaders], but every Party and Soviet leader should know how to perform an economic analysis himself. Then he will know the problems not from presentations by subordinates or through summarized information, but he himself will have thoroughly looked into it. And, in the event that you are describing, he will not act blindly but he will know where he is going. In general, my analysis covered nearly 60 pages of type-written text. There was sufficient cause for alarm. But that is not the point. Would another man in my place not encounter problems? Just how do I retreat to a safe place, but what about him? Do you not find that there is an ethical factor here?

[Sendyukov] That is exactly what I am interested in.

[Dyakov] An anonymous delegate posed this question to me at the Ikryaninskiy Rayon Party Conference: "How much meat was allocated to the Urals from Astrakhan Oblast and what was it based on?" Well, none was allocated! They eliminated purchases for the union fund from us since the oblast cannot feed itself. But it could have. And milk, too. And we could have helped the Urals if it had come to that. The Russian [Federation] is ours. But we need to radically change the whole cattle-breeding structure to do this. Let us say that a local cow gives less milk than a good goat. This means all head of livestock should be replaced with more productive [livestock]. Now two plemsovkhozes [state breeding farms] have been established, Yubileynyy and Marfinskiy. There three cows give as much milk as 20 local ones. My dream is that farms will have their own processing shops, like at the Druzhba Kolkhoz, for example. The farm itself will produce 12 types of sausage. If it were like that everywhere, questions about how much meat Astrakhan residents provide Ural residents would not arise.

[Passage omitted]

[Sendyukov] Such is the burden of the obkom first secretary, to carry and carry. But you have taken on an additional load. And it is chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies at that. Naturally, if the "arguments" of the already well-known implacable critics of the Party are used, everything is very simply explained; it is thirst for unlimited specific power. But if I put it simply, what do you need it for? And if you do not, then who?

[Dyakov] Remember that the idea about the possibility, I stress, the possibility of soviets of people's deputies chairmen selecting Party committee first secretaries was discussed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Both advocates and opponents were found. There were more opponents. I thought that this was a rational combination. But now I am convinced that it would in reality not complicate but alleviate the first secretary's life. This combination would be useful at least today and in the near future. Really what will turn out otherwise? I said how many people are entering the Party committee even now and how many are entering the Soviet. As a deputy, I receive the electorate every first Monday of the month and daily as first secretary.

You do not need a great intellect to attack Party committees and to accuse them of seizing power, forcefully suppressing Soviet organs. All the more so since people do not profit from that in any way. Until I was elected Soviet chairman, I tried to explain to visitors: The Party has given all power to the Soviets, go there. Just what did I not hear! I told a man that the Soviet of People's Deputies is across the street, and he asked: What do you mean, is the Party no longer communist? Do you now no longer give a damn about the people? What, do you no longer want to defend the people? You need to concern yourselves with everything that the people live with! That is it.

Just today in the Soviet Presidium—in an elected organ that is not subordinate to either the obkom or the ispolkom, we are working on that very thing that the people are living with. And there is neither confrontation nor free-loading. But in those locations where raykom first secretaries are not selected by soviet chairmen? I will frankly state that matters are not proceeding in the best manner. For example, in Narimanovskiy Rayon, the soviet chairman here selected now former Pobeda Kolkhoz Chairman V. Skvortsov. Raykom First Secretary N. Ryaskov "lost" to him. Well, it seems a man should learn from this lesson and everything should be done so that a young leader of Soviet power in the rayon can more quickly stand on his own two feet. From the first days, the soviet chairman began to experience various types of pressure. Naturally, the opposite reaction is also being manifested. What kind of harmonious work can you count on in this situation?

[Passage omitted]

[Sendyukov] How perestroyka is implemented in the life of the oblast Party organization, how its practical work style changes, and how its influence is strengthened under new conditions largely depends on you, the obkom first secretary. In your opinion, how will this combination of higher oblast Party and Soviet positions impact on this?

[Dyakov] As I understand it, we have reached the main point in our conversation. I have heard the questions becoming more specific. This, for example: "Power to the Soviets. But what for itself?" There is both confusion, a lack of understanding of the changes that are occurring, and nostalgia for the time when power was synonymous with the Party on this issue. Fears have been expressed that combining two appointments high in the oblast could result in a new form of command-party leadership. And on the contrary, that now the chairman of the soviet "will crush" the first secretary.

As you see, everything is complicated here. I even think that putting this problem up for discussion would not interfere. It really is multifaceted. But is it not strange that there seems to be a conspiracy of silence around it in the press. If it is touched upon, it is in the general plan. The magazine would lead the conversation. I am confident that all Party committees are deeply contemplating all of this. Something is being found, something is coming about. Experience could be shared: How to more appropriately divide functions and how to prevent, let us say, duplication of Party and Soviet staff work?

[Sendyukov] Maybe that question should be carried in the headline of our meeting?

[Dyakov] Well, it might be. Although, naturally some people will perceive it frontally: Well, they say, how we long for power! But we do not long [for power], we seek forms and methods of Party work, its organization, and all communists under new conditions.

The task has been clearly defined. The methods of influence are only political. The Party rules out direct interference in state and management-economic spheres. Reorganization and reduction of Party committees are closely tied to this. The obkom staff has been reduced by a third. Eight departments have been abolished and five have been restructured. By the way, this reorganization clearly shows what has been given to the Soviets and what "has been kept for itself." Sector departments have been abolished and with them, consequently, direct interference in the oblast's economic affairs. Already in Astrakhan it seems that the department associated with fishing needs to be maintained. It does not exist today. And what are the "restructured" departments doing? Briefly, strictly with Party affairs, primary of which are—deepening and broadening democratic processes in the oblast Party organization and increasing the quality of political work among the population. As a result of this, subdepartments have been established in the Party organization and cadre work department that are engaged with problems, charter issues, and work methodology with Party personnel. This is very important—up to half of leading and shop Party organization secretaries were chosen on an alternative basis during the last election campaign. New Party personnel have arrived who are competent in workers collective matters but they did not have, as a rule, knowledge or experience in political work with people. But Party organizations do not need pairs of directors, shop chiefs, and team leaders. That has already happened. Today, we are repudiating precisely that.

An important place in the ideology department is being devoted to the study and formation of public opinion; in the socio-economic department—to the study of progressive experience and social issues. Five commissions have been formed in the obkom. Three hundred communists work in them. In addition, creative groups of competent people are being formed to work out a specific solution. What are they engaged in? Today we can objectively talk about them. For example, based on their recommendations, substantial changes have been made in open and public personnel reserve formation practices, the study and formation of public opinion, and improvement of interethnic relations; Astrakhan Oblast is multinational. This is what the Party committees and oblast Party organizations have left "for themselves."

But state, industrial-economic, and other issues are now within the power of the Soviets. Under this distribution, the Party-command style has become an anachronism. And this is why. At the Soviet Presidium which I head, it is the people's deputies. There are thousands of voters behind each one of them. The deputies carry out the voters' mandates and they answer to the voters. Here you try; you command. I personally do not dare. And not because of that. There are so many problems to be solved through common efforts, common reason and common will. This is what the people expect.

Here, let us say the problem is housing. It is a very acute problem and a very unfavorable situation. It is true that



last year the waiting list for housing was reduced by 2,100 families for the first time. Construction is proceeding very well in oblast rayons. But there are still more than 60,000 families on the list of which 50,000 are in the city.

Or take the food issue. There are changes for the better here. Meat consumption has risen by eight kilos and milk by five during the past two years. There have been changes in egg and fish consumption but the acuteness [of the crisis] has not been eliminated.

Well now, while solving the most serious problems, will we compete, who is more important? Whose worry is it, Party organs or Soviet organs? Yes, then people simply urge us on, both me, the first secretary and a communist, and Soviet Presidium Member Yu. Kolesnichenko and Soviet Member N. Pogantsov, both of whom are unaffiliated. And the communists, as they say, will side with them. And they will be correct. I personally am close to the President's Decree on housing issues. We have already made several attempts in that area. We offered to buy housing. We decided—according to the residual value. The matter did not budge. About eight people responded. The question was sufficiently complex. Well, they bought the apartment and worries about repairs and other things were immediately dumped on them. But when it was proposed that they pay half or leave another part on the housing bill, greater understanding was found here.

Or take this problem. Each of us, deputy, Party member, and nonaffiliated, were given mandates to be concerned about individuals. The question was raised in the traditional manner—secure new benefits. But something had been done previously and the situation for disabled persons had not changed. It is impossible to forget the psychological side. You see, the disabled person wants to occupy a worthy place in society. He does not need pity, but help to find himself. But if society gives disabled persons small enterprises, even factories, such as, let us say, a factory producing metal items, or rental centers and commission stores, having taken them away from healthy men? In any case, the idea found support among deputies and it was proposed here in the obkom. On the whole, deputies work together, arguments are business-like, and they all think about the main thing, about their voters.

[Sendyukov] Sometimes I get the impression that the very power which the Party is placing into the Soviets hands is not being borne very joyfully. One rayon soviet chairman explained this somewhat rudely but very expressively, "To become chairmen today—a smart man blesses himself and a fool will not be elected." How is it in the oblasts?

[Dyakov] I can understand the person you talked to. Now we do not really need to explain [this] to anyone: Transferring absolute power to the Soviets is a very complicated matter. The Party announced that it would surrender this power but not all Soviets proved to be

ready to assume it. Besides other reasons, one is very important in my view—the personnel [issue]. Competent, sensible workers must receive the power. But first of all, such people, as a rule, do not hang around. Second, they themselves well imagine that work in the Soviets. It is not necessary to say a word or point a finger here, is to work and to not wait for gratitude because most of the blame comes here. In our obkom, the gorispolkom deputy chairman of trade position remained empty for six months. According to the old concept, the concept of careerists and amateurs that was attached to it, it is a lukewarm position. But you see, the gorsoviet needs a good worker. But they were not coming around. They are in positions everywhere.

I have already spoken about Narimanovskiy Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman V. Skvortsov, the respected, young kolkhoz chairman. During three years, profits rose from 230,000 to 3,200,000 rubles and earning capacity from 4.7 to 56 percent. During that time, the farm obtained two million [rubles] worth of various equipment alone. Social issues were resolved satisfactorily. Housing was a problem in other places but he had a surplus. Every year village residents build up to 15 individual homes. I could say even more about this kolkhoz and its leader. Respect and challenge red banners... Its quality homes and excellent wages. No, Vladimir Petrovich did not rush after power. But, they elected him soviet chairman and how could he reject this trust? When the kolkhozniks found out, they would not hear of it. They declared, "A hundred men at the session elected him, but in the village we have 1500. We will not permit it." By the way, mainly Tartars and Kazakhs work at Pobeda Kolkhoz and Skvortsov is a Russian. But how the collective supported him! This is my reply to the question about interethnic relations.

[Sendyukov] By the way, I talked to a soviet chairman and he is convinced that the Soviets will not get down to serious work without the Party's attention and assistance. He thinks: "Those people who are attempting to eliminate the Party in the Soviets in the best case are amateurs who do not understand all of the complexities and depth of Soviet work." But nevertheless, we will return to our conversation about what is being left for whom. Will it not occur that, let us say, Party committees will change their office style along with the assistance? Really, like you said, people prefer to go to the obkom, gorkom, and raykom first secretary with their complaints, requests, and suggestions as they did before. Right now they will go to the first secretary as to the chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies. The chairman is drowning in a sea [of paperwork] and the Soviet staff is tied up in paper and deafened by ringing telephones. Will the times of just meeting with the people locally and with people's deputies and commission members not return?

[Dyakov] That question bothers us too. There is no doubt that the Party must help the Soviets to do that. No matter what critics say about it. Neither communists nor nonaffiliated politicians will leave them to the mercy of

fate. It will be another story when the Soviets become firmly established. Incidentally, a bit more specifically about just what the Party is leaving for itself? Neither the Soviets nor the electorate will allow Party committees to command. For example, this is the type of help and cooperation Astrakhan residents have approved. Comprehensive two-year plans were developed in each rayon. The Soviets assumed responsibility for the socioeconomic portion. The APO [agroindustrial association] assumed responsibility for technology. Raykoms assumed responsibility for political and intellectual support. But maintenance was worked out based on leading Party organization and worker collective proposals. Public defense of these plans was organized before rayon activists. Rayispolkom chairmen, APO chairmen, and raykom first secretaries defended them. Discussions lasted for 7-8 hours. I will demonstrate what was done to realize the plans based on the example of Volodarskiy Rayon. Here they will build one-fifth of all individual housing in the oblast, construction of schools, stores and hospitals has progressed, that is, they have been actively solving problems that are very close to the population—social problems.

When we talk about the Party's attitude toward Soviets, we need to recall Lenin's precepts: Influence and help them through communists who are working in them. But there are communists in rural, rayon, and oblast soviets. They did not enter them through the back door—they were elected people's deputies. And the main form of their influence on Soviets' activities is the worthy fulfillment of their duties as deputies and carrying out the will of the electorate. Communists must be the advanced guard in the Soviets. They really represent the advance guard party and they conduct its policy whose primary content is service to the people.

We are creating Party groups in Soviets which, by the way, are ready to get in contact with everyone who intends to serve the cause of perestroika. Experience suggests new forms. The Party staff has no relation whatsoever to Soviets. But even if some Party worker gravitates to the office style, this does not mesh with the Soviets' work style. Here everything is concentrated in the hands of the commissions. They develop strategy and tactics for their work and bear full responsibility for it. Incidentally, commission members who are people's deputies are now meeting with voter appeals on their own [voter] profiles. Thus, Soviet chairmen have someone to be guided by.

[Passage omitted]

[Sendyukov] Ivan Nikolayevich, today it has become fashionable to criticize the center. This does not require courage in our time and political observers are increasing. You are a practical worker with responsibility for everything that occurs in the oblast and what will happen in it tomorrow: What problems would you direct the center's attention to on the threshold of the 28th Party Congress?

[Dyakov] I am getting the impression that the USSR and RSFSR Councils of Ministers are reorganizing their work more rapidly than the CPSU Central Committee. In any case, it has become easier for us to work locally. Today, if you called about a question but, let us say, there were Council of Ministers leaders, I am certain: When they returned, they would return your call and ask about what was troubling you. Previously, you could only dream about such contacts. They are helping to resolve many of the oblast's most important problems. I will cite an example. It was vitally important for residents of settlements located in the Astrakhan Gas Complex sanitation zone to be resettled outside of it. And this was decided, not at a rally, but by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Rally euphoria is abating and people are trying to make a sober choice. The question "Who is who?" has become the main one. They pose it at meetings, at obkom and oblispolkom receptions, and in letters. Who is who in the Supreme Soviet? Who is who in the mass media? Everything should be talked about openly and clearly. Do not be late, do not lag behind, and do not stop under any circumstances. Just keep moving forward. That is the people's mood that I communicate. And I totally agree with them.

This is a sweet life. I. Dyakov more precisely defined tomorrow's program with his assistants. Outside twilight had fallen long ago.

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#### **Armenian Council of Ministers Views Refugee Issue Progress**

90US1265A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
21 Jul 90 p 3

[Unattributed article under the rubric "In the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers": "On Measures for Extending Assistance to Refugees"]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Council of Ministers has approved a new document that encompasses a broad complex of measures for extending concrete assistance to refugees, establishing additional benefits, and normalizing their situation.

It was issued in light of the decision of the all-union government "On measures for extending assistance to citizens who have been forced to leave the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSRs" and is aimed at a fully guaranteeing the rights of refugees, their security, and the inviolability of their property, reimbursement for the dwelling and other property they have left behind, and also payment of the costs of travel and transport of baggage, provision of equivalent employment, and solution of a number of other problems.



Solution of the housing problem stands among the first-priority tasks. In this connection, executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies have been instructed first of all to ensure the sale to the refugees, in accordance with established procedures, of apartments from state and public housing reserves, the allocation of plots of land for the construction of individual homes, and their acceptance into housing and home-construction cooperatives. They have also been instructed to create conditions for finding employment for refugees taking account of their specialties and qualifications, for the upbringing and education of their children, and for medical and everyday services, as well as other conditions related to the fastest possible adaptation of such citizens to their new places of residence.

The executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies have been directed to permit the registration of these citizens at the place of their new residence, independent of the size of living area.

Reimbursement to refugees of expenditures for the acquisition or construction of individual or cooperative housing and the purchase of apartments will be calculated on the basis of 210 rubles per square meter of the total area of an abandoned apartment within the state housing fund, but not more than for 16 square meters of total area per person. For persons living in apartments occupied by several tenants, reimbursement will be in accordance with the same norms, based on the living area they occupy and a corresponding part of the area of secondary premises.

The purchase from citizens of houses (apartments) and other structures owned by them, which they have been forced to abandon, will be accomplished as follows: of houses (apartments)—based on a calculation of 210 rubles per square meter of total area; of dachas, garden houses, garages, and economic structures—on the basis of the evaluation norms for obligatory state insurance that were in effect within the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR as of 1 January 1990.

Here, compensation for the costs of acquiring or constructing individual or cooperative housing, for the purchase of apartments, and also for redemption of houses (apartments) and other structures will require a written rejection by citizens of their rights to the housing and other structures and will take place after they have settled in their permanent place of residence. The amount of compensation or redemption (not counting dachas, garden houses, garages, and economic structures) must not be less than 7000 rubles.

Compensation of refugees is made:

- for the value of agricultural livestock subject to obligatory insurance—in the full amount based on an evaluation determined by insurance documents for obligatory and voluntary insurance;
- for the value of household property and fruit and berry plantings, and also for uninsured agricultural

livestock—at the rate of 1200 rubles for single citizens, 2000 rubles for families consisting of two persons, and 500 rubles for each subsequent member of the family. Payment of this compensation is made without taking into account the amount received on the basis of voluntary insurance of household property.

- for the value of private automobiles and other means of transportation—in the full amount taking account of sums received on the basis of state voluntary insurance. The value of these means of transportation is determined on the basis of effective state retail prices, taking account of depreciation.

In connection with the fact that the forced departure of residents from the Azerbaijan SSR was a product of illegal actions committed within the territory of this republic, compensation of material damage to citizens will correspondingly be accomplished at the expense of the budget of this republic.

The executive committees of local soviets in the Azerbaijan SSR must take measures for the return by housing, home-construction, and other consumer cooperatives of monetary contributions to citizens (based on their written application), who have left the cooperatives in connection with their forced move to another permanent place of residence.

In the case that the amount of monetary contributions subject to return to citizens is less than 7000 rubles for one apartment (home-ownership), compensation of the difference between the indicated amount and the monetary contribution is accomplished from the budget of this republic.

Citizens forced to leave places of permanent residence are authorized to carry out an exchange of housing owned by them as their personal property with tenants of apartments in buildings of the state housing fund.

By the government decision, the Armenian SSR State Agroindustrial committee (Gosagroprom), the Armenian SSR Ministry of Finance, the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Reception and Settlement of Returning Armenians, and the executive committees of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies are directed to acquire homes that have been vacated and to make these available to the families of refugees, having carried out preliminary repair and restoration work.

The executive committees of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies, other than in the city of Yerevan, are directed by the end of July to provide the Armenian SSR with information concerning additional allocation of parcels of land for the construction of individual houses with personal garden plots and of cooperative houses for refugees registered in the given rayon and city. They must take urgent measures to organize housing construction cooperatives for refugees registered in the given rayon.

The Armenian republic bank, the USSR Savings Bank, and the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies have been directed to ensure the provision to refugees of long-term credits for individual housing construction on a first-priority basis, within the limits established for these purposes.

Instructions have been given to the Armenian SSR Gosplan, the Armenian SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab), the Armenian SSR Ministry of Trade, and the governing board of Aykoop [expansion not provided] concerning the allocation of supplementary market funds for construction materials and articles to individual housing construction for refugees. The "Armpromstroyaterialy" production association (PO), together with the executive committees of rayon and city soviets, must take concrete measures for the organization of centralized deliveries of construction materials and articles to individual construction sites.

In rural areas, the Armenian SSR Gosagroprom and, in cities, rayon centers, and urban-type settlements, the Main Administration of Capital Construction under the Armenian SSR Gosstroy have been designated customers for construction building plans.

The executive committees of the Araratskiy, Idzhevan-skiy, Masisskiy, Oktembryanskiy, and Tumanyanskiy rayon and the Dilizhan City soviets of people's deputies have been directed, jointly with the Armenian SSR Gosagroprom and the "Armgirozem" institute, to examine and, in June, to submit to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers information concerning the allocation of plots of land for cooperative housing construction within the given rayons and city.

The Armenian SSR Gosplan has been directed, jointly with the executive committees of rayon and city soviets, to review and submit to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers proposals concerning the allocation of necessary quotas for the organization of housing-construction cooperatives.

The Main Administration of Capital Construction (GlavUKS) under the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction has been directed to ensure the timely preparation of planning and estimate documentation for carrying out the construction of 221,600 square meters of living area during 1991-1995 within the cities and rayon centers of the republic, while the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction, the "Armagropomstroy" RGKO [expansion not provided] and the "Arm-gazprom" production association are directed to take necessary measures to ensure, unconditionally, that they are placed into use within the set time periods.

Using the funds of housing-construction cooperatives, these same organizations must open 10,800 square meters of living space for use in Abovyan, Charentsavan, Razdan, and Bagramyan during the current year and 2,200 square meters of living space in Ashtarak during 1991.

Within the limits of total amounts of capital investments in housing construction envisaged for GlavUKS during 1990, authorization has been given to prepare planning and estimate documentation for the construction of apartment houses in the rayon centers of Bagramyan, Krasnoselsk, Vayk, Vardenis, and Kalipino and, as this planning and estimate documentation becomes ready, to set about housing construction.

The Armenian SSR Ministry of Justice has been directed, together with the Armenian SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services, the Armenian Trade Union Council (Sovprof), and the State Committee for Reception and Settlement of Returning Armenians, to develop and submit for approval by the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers temporary regulations concerning procedures for registering and providing housing to refugees from the Azerbaijan SSR.

With the goal of heightening the interest of refugees in settling in villages with declining populations in the mountain and foothill rayons of the republic by offering appropriate benefits, the Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, the Armenian Gosagroprom, The Armenian SSR Ministry of Finance, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Justice, and the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Reception and Settlement of Returning Armenians are directed, jointly with the Armenian Trade Union Council, within a month to develop and submit appropriate proposals to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

Instructions have been given to the ministries and departments of the Armenian SSR and to enterprises, associations and organizations of all-union subordination situated within the territory of the republic, on the basis of data from appropriate departments and executive committees of local soviets, to submit to the Armenian SSR Gosplan proposals concerning the organization at population centers where refugees have densely settled of the necessary number of working places, with the aim of providing employment for them.

The Armenian SSR Gosplan has been directed, jointly with the ministries of Internal Affairs and Finance and the Armenian SSR state committees for Labor and Social Questions and for the Reception and Settlement of Returning Armenians, and the republic Academy of Sciences, in accordance with the Concept for the Economic Independence of the Armenian SSR and with the goal of a radical reconsideration of the policy of concentrating scientific and technical potential within the Yerevan agglomeration and its dispersal throughout the regions of the republic, before 1 August 1990, to develop and submit for the review of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, a detailed program for the resettlement of refugees. It should be aimed at the creation of favorable demographic conditions within all the regions of the republic and at effective utilization of its territory for the development of small cities, population centers, and urban and rural settlements and the creation here of favorable conditions for meeting the social and everyday

needs of refugees and for the extensive development of cooperative and individual labor activity.

The Armenian SSR Ministry of Social Security must, together with the Armenian Trade Union Council, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Finance, and the executive committees of rayon and city councils of people's deputies, develop and carry out additional measures with regard to the resolution all questions of providing pensions, payment of benefits, maintaining work seniority, and other questions of the social protection of refugees.

At the same time, it will be necessary to turn special attention to the timely solution of the social and everyday problems of war and labor veterans, invalids, families with many children, and elderly people living alone.

The governing board of Aykoop, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Trade, the Armenian SSR State Committee for Population Services, and the executive committees of rayon and city soviets have been directed to fundamentally improve work connected with the provision of trade services, the supply of industrial and food products, and the expansion of the types of everyday services at places where refugees live.

The executive committee of the Yerevan City Soviet of People's Deputies, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Armenian State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, and the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Reception and Settlement of Returning Armenians have been directed, within one month, to examine accumulated questions connected with registering and finding employment for refugees living in the city of Yerevan and to determine ways for their further solution.

Before 1 September, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the executive committees of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies must complete work connected with registering all refugees at their place of residence (in accordance with existing rules of the passport system) and also their receipt of new passports to replace the ones that have been lost.

#### **Mutalibov on Azerbaijani Party Tasks After 28th CPSU Congress**

*90US1244A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
28 Jul 90 pp 1-2*

[Speech by A.N. Mutalibov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of Azerbaijani CP Central Committee: "On the Results of the 28th CPSU Congress and Urgent Tasks of the Republic Party Organization;" speech was made at the 27 Jul 1990 at the 32nd Azerbaijani CP Congress and is published in abbreviated form]

[Text] Comrades! Time and events have shown that our decision to hold the 32nd Congress in two stages was

justified. In terms of the periods of time and the character of the questions and tasks of the 28th Congress was perceived, and not only by the Azerbaijani communists, as extraordinary. The situation in the country and in the party reached such a critical mass where the main thing is decided, which determines—whether perestroika will take place, whether there will be a unified Communist Party, and how the historical destinies of the Soviet socialist federation and the multinational Soviet state will develop. This is why, in my view, the 28th Congress ranks with the most important events in the history of the party, which have determined the turning landmarks of the movement to the socialist choice. The congress took place in an atmosphere of open judgments and a critical mood. In this sense, one can be of the opinion that the 28th Congress has become a congress of revival, which has returned the spirit of democratism and relaxedness lost by communists long ago. It became the congress of reformers, for it summed up the first results of a unique social experiment—the revolutionary restructuring of socialist society.

For the fifth year the difficult, agonizing process of breaking the dogmatic consciousness, the pseudo-socialist myth creation, and rigid political and economic structures has been under way. Before our eyes, one historical epoch is replacing another.

The most important task of the congress was seen, above all, in honestly, courageously and objectively illuminating—with the powerful searchlight of Marxist thought—the path traversed by communists during the five perestroika years. We succeeded in collating our vision of perestroika, the future of the CPSU and the future of the Union of sovereign republics, in short, of the fundamental problems that concern communists and the people, with the views of the comrades in the party, and in openly and fundamentally setting forth our judgments. We did not want to conceal anything, and, in criticizing, acted within the framework of adherence to principle and constructivism. I will speak frankly—we did not like everything at the congress: Some of the delegates lacked political culture, party ethics were not always observed, in essence insulting attacks were permitted against the General Secretary, and the constant noise in the hall made the work difficult. All this has nothing in common with openness and pluralism.

There are also other and more fundamental questions: Did the congress always proceed democratically? Why was a central quota list introduced so carelessly and without sufficient consideration? There were quite a few such situations, and they put us on our guard.

When necessary, we acted with toughness, and we were not hesitant, as this was the case previously, but everything—on the whole within the framework of political culture. This manifested itself also in the work of our representatives in the Mandate Commission and in the tense hour of the adoption of the declaration on the incident in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. And, in a word, let us note that in all questions the



Congress was true to the spirit and letter of the CPSU Statute and decided difficult firmly, democratically, and objectively.

Our delegation worked fruitfully and resolutely at the congress. The Azerbaijani delegates took the floor in sections and plenary sessions, and they worked actively in the commissions. The delegation transmitted to the Presidium and Secretariat of the congress a number of declarations: On the tragedy in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, on Sumgait, on the demilitarization of Armenia, and on the strengthening of inter-republic borders. They were also signed by the delegations of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Rostov Oblast.

The activity of the delegation was distinguished by self-discipline (*sobranost*), purposefulness, and aggressiveness. And now one can say with satisfaction: The congress of the republic party organizations delegated worthy comrades to the forum of Soviet communists. It is important to preserve these qualities in practical work, in one's rayon, city, and primary organizations.

One should state the fact that for the first time our Communist Party was represented so broadly in both the Central Committee and in the Central Control Commission—14 people.

Someone called the 28th Congress the hour of truth. Yes, this is so. But for us, this was also the hour of political firmness, the hour of the consolidation of our independence. And let someone not like it, this position, someone caught in it the faint notes of voices from the right, but some search for centrist accord or excessive leftism. For some reason, it has become once again fashionable to pin labels on people. A revolution is under way, a revolution from above, somebody wants to appear before the public as such an ultrarevolutionary, and he at once hangs the label of conservative on those who do not agree with him. And vice-versa. An official (*deyatel*) who still yesterday did not want to deviate one iota from dogmas, is now dashingly beating the democratic drum.

The Azerbaijani Communist Party set itself the goal of declaring its adherence to the great creative reformation of the party and Soviet society. And we did this. But our peoples endured and carried away from the preceding social shocks the great and, perhaps, the most important lesson—the costs of the revolution. And we are not talking about the arithmetic calculation of the losses and achievements of restructuring. We are talking about moral responsibility for every broken-down fate, not to mention the fates of whole peoples, drawn into the maelstrom of the contradictory restructuring processes. We are talking about political responsibility, where in the course of restructuring the essence of the socialist ideal is dissolving and gradually disappearing as the deliberate choice of a significant part of mankind.

We have not closed and do not intend to close our eyes to the fact that the international conflict, which has

broken out at the height of perestroika and the threat of insecurity of the Azerbaijani people, is the result of gross political miscalculations. Those who in February 1988 did not find antidotes against the handfuls of nationalists voluntarily or not sacrificed to their the peace and well-being of the two peoples. Such an approach could spring from erroneous logic, they say, it is impossible to sacrifice a great idea because of some territorial disputes somewhere there in the Transcaucasus. Life has repeatedly meted out severe punishment to the adherents of the fallacious wisdom "You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs!" Nothing can compromise perestroika as much as indifference to the fates of peoples. I am talking not only about the Azerbaijani people, which has endured and suffered so much during the past two years.

The political wisdom of power should also consist in the fact that any crisis situations and contradictions, as well as qualitative leaps to progress, should be decided with the minimal loss for society. This is the only way to return the lost confidence of the masses to the new course of the CPSU!

But to conquer the confidence of the masses is becoming a vitally important question for communists. Having recognized that the crisis in the party is taking on an already threateningly protracted character, the congress designated also a way out from it. This is the reformation of the CPSU, its immediate and inevitable renewal.

Immediate [renewal]! Because delay is similar to death. Inevitable [renewal] because life all the same compels us to do this.

If one looks at things without being prejudiced, it must be acknowledged that in essence the initiation of perestroika from above, from the upper echelon of the party was, strictly speaking, the first and the most important reformist step.

But another reality must also be acknowledged—the reorganization has gotten bogged down in the conservatism of a significant part of the party mass and, above all, I would say, and more precisely, in the main, of the party apparatus.

In this lies the basic reason for the braking of the process of the party renewal. The time and restructuring, however, made it possible to approach in a new way the position of the CPSU as a ruling party. As a political structure, as an organized force, the CPSU is set so firmly into the social system, that even with all its unpreparedness to self-renewal it continues to play the leading role in society. This is evidence of its potential possibilities. But the congress also brought to light that the self-renewal of the party is proceeding with great difficulty. This is manifested also in the fact that in the provinces one can frequently encounter the aspiration to preserve the authoritative powers of the party apparatus, not taking into account the actual reality, which, alas, frequently is successful. Some even regard this as a sign of the inexhaustible possibilities of the party. In our

view, this is nothing else than the result of its active opposition to renewal and democratization. And this calls forth vehement criticism from the left and the right, which has but one goal—to break the party, to erode its structure, to prepare for it the fate of a discussion club or a political organism divided into hostile factions and never unified.

The 28th Congress said unequivocally and resolutely no to all such, and we will put it directly—sufficiently powerful—attempts. Yes, this was the congress of various approaches, positions, and judgments. This is precisely what predetermined the dramatism of its many sessions. And all the same, in the chief question for communists—what kind of party should there be—broken or united, the spirit of consolidation prevailed. And it was not the instinct of self-preservation which operated, as some people now try to explain, but sober political consciousness and the feeling of high responsibility, which has always distinguished the party of communists, regardless of the overfalls of public sentiments it was subjected. At sudden turning-points of history, the party always found in itself the strength to stand up, to find a second wind, and to move forward persistently. In this sense, the 28th Congress can be called the congress of consolidation, the congress for the search and approval of the new course. To think, however, that the congress solved everything and now, as in previous years, will go by what was written down—that means to fall into a dangerous error. Even in our midst, it seems, it is not at all superfluous to underscore this circumstance. Many, too many of us, still hope for the command style and, we will be frank, even with melancholy long for the old times. This time has come to an end, comrades! Outside is the year 1990, with its pluralism, its intolerance of opinions, the multitude of opinions, groups, public organizations, and movements. Beyond the confines of this building, there is not the former, obedient people, ready to carry out any, even the most absurd order. Outside the window is a people whose cultural level was raised by Soviet power, which gave it an education, whose consciousness was awakened by perestroika, which gave it the right to speak and be heard.

Thus, to the chief question of the present moment—who and what can become the guarantor of perestroika, the congress gave an unequivocal answer: The communists, the CPSU. At the same time, the congress showed that this mission can be carried out fully only on the condition of the transformation of the CPSU into a genuine democratic, flexible party structure. In connection with this, the very time to say how we understand the reformation of the party.

By renewal we mean the pulling down of the centralized, rigid Stalinist structure, the distinctive order of sword-bearers, and the construction of the kind of party whose ideological-political character would not exclude, suppress, and level the independence and equality of all its constituent parts. In fact, we are moving in the direction of the creation of a union of communist parties, as the

new organizational embodiment of political movement within the framework of an enormous multinational state. With the commonality of goals and fundamental ideas, independence is initiated in the choice of the means, forms, and ways of their attainment.

The practice of mutual relations and interactions in the new conditions will make it possible to adjust the combination of the principles of ideological unity, political union, and organizational independence of the republican communist parties that go to make up the CPSU.

The question is legitimate: Will such a structure not lead up to the loss of the unity of the CPSU? The CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo, which are formed on an absolutely new basis—on the principle of republican and regional representation, in our view, are the prototype of the ruling form which in the end will make it possible to combine the aspiration for independence and equality with the spirit of collectivism and collegiality, pushing aside the dictate of the rigid centralism that has become implanted.

The very democratism of the 28th Congress and the innovation undertaken by it in conjunction with the programmatic documents are indicative of the ability of the CPSU to correlate the positions of various currents in the party, to integrate fresh ideas, and to move even further along the road of modernization and to the side of greater receptivity to the conditions of a changing world.

Under reformation of the CPSU, we thus propose its complete democratization—from the foundations of the structure even to daily activity.

The party members, as our entire people, must be convinced that the decisions that are proposed by the republican parties are not imposed by the central leadership of the CPSU through the use of the mechanism of intra-party discipline, but are the deliberate and free choice reflecting the will of the people of the republic and take into account the general interests of the country.

The independence of the republican communist parties is one of the most important elements of the democratization of the CPSU. It begins with the formulation of a new conception of its Program and the Statute of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. These are important questions, which concern the ideological and political foundations of the activity of the Azerbaijani communists. A program of action for the long term must absorb the fundamental questions of national development. In its absence, the Communist Party will be guided by the platform adopted by the 32nd Congress.

The Party Statute adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress represents an important step in the cause of restructuring and the democratization of intra-party relations. The draft of the new Statute was broadly discussed among the republic's communists, at the report and election party meetings and conferences that were held, and at our congress.



The high tension of the passions around this document was transferred to the 28th CPSU Congress. In the course of the debates and discussions, practically every word and every phrase of the documents were discussed. From paragraph to paragraph the number of suggestions, notes, and corrections increased. The importance of the document and the tenseness of the situation are also characterized by the fact that the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade Gorbachev, headed the commission for the revision of the Statute.

As a result, the congress developed a CPSU Statute which resolutely repudiated excessive organization and needless prohibitions, having created a maximum of possibilities for the independent creativeness of party members, for new political thinking, and bold practical actions.

The new Statute will be conducive to the enrichment of party life, it will increase the role of the CPSU as a vanguard-type party, the guarantor of the development and strengthening of the Soviet federation. The urgency and the novelty of the CPSU Statute propose the serious study of this document.

An important factor in the renewal of the CPSU and the perfection of democratic principles in its structure and organization is the strengthening, in the Program declaration of the 28th Party Congress and the Statute adopted by it, of the provisions concerning the independence of the communist parties of the union republics. The communist parties of the union republics will henceforth have their own program documents, in accordance with which they themselves will decide political, organizational, and personnel questions, carry out party policy in the sphere of state construction, socio-economic and cultural development of the republic, and implement relations with other, including foreign, parties and social and political movements.

This found reflection also in the draft Platform of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. I suggest that a commission for the preparation of the Program of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan should be established at the congress.

As far as the organizational and statute principles of the Communist Party are concerned, it seems, let every party cell express itself on this score.

Today at the congress a commission may be formed which will head up the responsible work in regard to the generalization of the proposals of all Azerbaijani communists. At a regular plenum, the Central Committee will examine the document, which will be the basis of the consolidation of the independence and the regulation of the vital functions of the republic's Communist Party.

The Statute, as well as the Program, should become the fruit of the collective creativity of the entire party. They must receive confirmation by a general party referendum. This is precisely the missing link, which in the past brought the communist party down to the level of a

leveled party organization. I would now like to seek advice already with respect to the name of the communist party: Perhaps there is sense in returning to the sources? "The Azerbaijani Communist Party" is a significantly broader concept, reflecting the national-republican character of its structure, and not only the administrative-territorial character.

In accordance with the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress, the Azerbaijani Communist Party, on a level with the communist parties of the union republics, finds independence, freeing itself from the tutelage of the central organs, and is being organized as an independent socio-political organization.

Convincing evidence of the fact that the provision on the independence of the Azerbaijani Communist Party is being filled with real content is the fact that, in recognizing the Program and Statute of the CPSU, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan will act on the basis of its own program and statute documents that are being developed and that define its status, taking into account more fully and precisely the distinctive nature of local conditions, traditions, and priority in the solution of the problems of national development.

On behalf of the Buro of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, I am introducing for consideration of the delegates of the congress a proposal on the adoption, at the congress, of a decision "On the Development of the Program of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan."

Our congress is faced with adopting the Platform for political activity of the Azerbaijani Communist Party "Toward Real Sovereignty of the Republic, Toward Renewal of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan." As you know, in the first stage of the work of the congress, the decision was adopted to continue the discussion of this party document in the primary party organizations and labor collectives. The discussion of the draft Platform has been completed, its results have been summed up by the Editorial Commission that we formed. I suggest that the delegates of the congress in their speeches express their attitude to the draft Platform and, if necessary, supplement it with constructive proposals.

The goals and tasks of the Azerbaijani Communist Party that are set forth in the Platform must become the basis for the practical activity of every communist, the party organizations, and the party committees. They coincide with the goals of the republic's democratic and patriotic forces.

To be able to carry the ideas and content of the decisions and materials of the 28th CPSU Congress and the goals and tasks of the program documents adopted at the congress to the consciousness and heart of every man and to involve all communists in active work for their realization—at this should be aimed the organizational-political work of the party organizations and the party committees of the republic. The Buro of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, in July of this

year, approved the developed plan of measures for the explanation of the decisions and materials of the 28th CPSU Congress. We are counting on the active and interested participation of the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the republic party organization in this work. We suggest that the documents of the 28th CPSU Congress should be widely used political work among the masses connected with the holding of the election campaign for elections of people's deputies of the Azerbaijani SSR and deputies of the local Soviets.

Our party press, too, has something to work at. In the near future, we will talk again about the special features of its position in the new conditions, the defects, and, more precisely—its lag. At present I would like to give notice—the information and explanatory work must be conducted absolutely in a new key: Of no fanfares. We held a quite businesslike congress and it is necessary to bring its decisions to people in a businesslike manner. The task consists in helping people to come to an understanding of the complex tangle of the problems and the political nuances of the critical stage. It is necessary to help many party members to rouse themselves, to overcome apathy, and to inspire hope and confidence in those who have lost their head. In short, more analysis, depth, courage, and initiative are required from party journalists. Everyone of them should have a first position. No playing to the gallery of any kind, no desire to please someone.

Comrades!

The new structure of the CPSU and the finding of genuine independence, figuratively speaking, represent supporting constructions for the democratic mechanism and the most important instruments for the restructuring of the party. But there is a need for renewal, if you like, of the very party-political thinking of the communists, of the certain type of psychology of the party official that has formed after many years. And this cannot be corrected by any decree, by any congress, be it the most archrevolutionary one.

We have to do things so as for the spirit of party comradeship, collectivism, and everything that has always distinguished communists, that has united them and created authority for them, to prevail. The habit of giving commands that has become implanted has given rise to the passiveness of the party mass. In this lies the root of the political crisis of the republic's party organization, its passivity. In the new conditions, where the CPSU consciously repudiates the undivided use of the levers of power and the duplication of Soviet and economic organs, the fate of the party depends on its ability to revitalize its intellectual and moral-political leadership through practical deeds. In replacing other structures, it considered itself free of criticism. Hence the excessive organization, careerism, the flouting of the laws, and communist arrogance, which already worried Lenin, and which like a magnificent flower flourish until now, even this time of restructuring! Now these "birthmarks" have become a perfect target for our opponents.

They are accurately and painfully striking at our weak spots. Why, for the long years of political comfort and tranquillity we have to pay dearly. The time has come to realize that the communist party is a political, not an administrative vanguard. With this, it seems, all are in agreement. And, nevertheless, only in the fifth year of the perestroika five-year plan are we beginning with a fundamental restructuring of the party.

As soon as the communist party lays claim to the role of political vanguard, restructuring must begin with it and be realized at overtaking speeds. In other words, more and more fundamental things must be done in the democratization of the party than anywhere else. However, it is precisely in this that there is no forward movement in our republic. It is clear that nothing can be done here with appeals, slogans, and invocations. And, by the way, we will also not achieve anything with the endless repetition of the word "perestroika" at party meetings. The question is still how to restructure, what to restructure, and who will restructure, and what concrete results we will have from restructuring. The party is not only the party committees and their apparatus, as the orators of the Azerbaijani Communist Party who debate, but do not act, are trying to introduce into the consciousness of the masses—it is its almost 400,000 members, driven by the leading elective party organs—from the plenums of raykoms to Central Committee plenums and congresses. And only then will everyone of them feel himself to be an equal member of the ruling party when he will acquire real rights to direct and active participation in party life. These can be realized through the fundamental restructuring of the party organizations themselves, through a sharp increase in the level of self-government, and public principles in party work.

At the same time, as the course set for the self-government of the people gathers force in the country, in the party itself the public self-government principles have practically been reduced to zero. And this—in the conditions of, in depth and scope unprecedented, politicization of all strata of the population.

Thus, the development of public principles in the party and the direct inclusion of all communists in its diverse political, ideological, and organizational activity is one of the chief sources of the development of intra-party democracy and the restructuring of all party work. At the same time, this is also a question of the growth of political influence of the communist parties on the state of affairs in society, on the frame of mind of the masses.

You must admit that the communists in our republic are nevertheless alienated from the party committees and the raykoms. Such alienation is taking revenge on us for the passivity of the rank-and-file party members, it was painfully reflected in the party consciousness in our republic during the dramatic days of January.

The party mass and the party apparatus are not antipodes, as the latter-day democrats are suggesting to the masses. They are comrades with respect to the common

work. So let us together create and strengthen the life-giving threads that link the communist party!

It is also important to realize the fact that, proceeding along such a path, we are creating a new type of interrelations in our ranks. In finding new forms of work and leadership, we are developing the independence of party thinking and our own paths of social development. Independence in the large and the small, independence not only in declarations, but also in concrete actions, in daily occurrence itself and in concrete politics—this is our path, this is our credo!

Comrades!

As you know, at the 28th CPSU Congress, in accordance with the new Statute, the CPSU Central Control Commission was created, with the CPSU Auditing Commission and the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee being eliminated.

At the first session of the congress, we elected the Azerbaijani CP Auditing Commission and even the Commission of Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee was preserved. However, communists are speaking in the spirit that a new mechanism is needed for the activation of the role of the rank-and-file party members and the primary party organizations. Proceeding from this, we have recommended to include in the agenda of the concluding session of the congress the question of the creation of a Control and Auditing Commission of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. In so doing, we have in mind the transformation of the Auditing Commission into a Control and Auditing Commission. In accordance with the provisional Regulation, its task includes the execution of control, on the part of communists and party organizations, of the activity of the central organs of the party and their apparatus, control of the implementation of the program documents and the Statute, and the decisions of the congresses and conferences, and of the observance of collegiality, glasnost, and other democratic principles in the activity of the Communist Party Central Committee and its executive organs.

Comrades!

It would be political naivete or the return to dogmatism to proceed from the fact that the 28th Congress has given answers to all the questions, has written out, as they say, prescriptions for all of our pain, and has offered recommendations for all cases of our swift-flowing life. Yes, many questions have remained without answers. But in one of the most important, for the sake of which, as a matter of fact, forums of communists were always assembled—the determination of the prospects for further advance along the social progress—the congress, in our belief, proved to be equal to the task. It confirmed the course of the socialist choice and the communist perspective as the chief socio-political reference point of the CPSU. This signifies a serious correction of the former program directives. The adherence to the socialist ideal

reflects the political views of the majority of communists and expresses the will and sentiments of the main part of the Soviet people.

This must be especially underscored in connection with the after all frank and furious—you will not choose another word—criticism to which the CPSU and its conception of the construction of a democratic socialist society have recently been subjected. Why, it is not for the first time that communists have had to repel attacks on socialism. From the first moment when this word was pronounced, socialism was buried, damned, and anathematized. Already in the Communist Manifesto reference was made to this. And nevertheless the objective course of history has brought mankind to the creation of societies, whose socio-economic and democratic development was implemented on the basis of socialist principles and principles close to them. Only blind men can deny the fact that the very idea of socialism and its realization in the form of Soviet power, even with all the mistakes and deformations, has exerted an enormous influence on the self-development of the capitalist system of states and on the whole course of human civilization. The ideas of socialism have fundamentally changed the world. And capitalism itself has changed, having absorbed quite a lot of what has served the forward movement of civilization. And now some people propose to throw overboard both the idea and, with it, the entire history and its indisputable achievements and make a dash for new and unknown shores! The only thing is, which ones? We do not hear from our critics what society and how they propose to build it. To break and to smash—of this they have an excess. But we ourselves have practiced destruction to our heart's content during the past 5 years.

The deformations that have taken place in society must not overshadow the main thing—the idea of building a society of social justice, humanism, and democracy. The socialist society and its fundamental principles have not lost and cannot lose their magnetic force. This was confirmed by the discussions which developed at the congress.

It is another matter that in all of these years the feeling of proprietor, master of the state and its wealth did not gain a foothold. And this means that the Soviet people have not become aware of their responsibility for everything that takes place in our Fatherland.

Now a number of economists and politicizing unofficial groups have flung themselves into another extreme, proclaiming private property as almost the panacea for all misfortunes. It, private property, can do this and that. Are we not falling into the next error? Is there not here an inclination to make a fetish of and to oppose one form of property to another? At the same time, it is impossible not to regard as a deviation from socialist principles the transition to mixed ownership, in as much as people will be included in reproduction who can use their abilities and capital.



Some people accuse us that we are restoring capitalism in our country. But this is not so. We are talking about the restoration of genuine socialist principles, presupposing space for initiative and acting on the basis of the main socialist slogan "From each according to his abilities."

We will build our own path to a humane socialism. The achievement of this great goal has many variants. We have our own country, which is distinctive in many respects, and our distinctive republic. In absorbing the experience of other countries, taking into account the mistakes and errors of previous generations, we must keep in mind the national and geopolitical peculiarity and level of social development. Not copy blindly, but find our own way. And let no one be confused by the economic disorder and the crisis of values. The Great Depression in the United States broke out in the presence of a developed democracy, private property, and a high level of productive forces. And this was also a crisis. So that the cries to the effect that only the communists, having created their totalitarian model of socialism, are guilty of all misfortunes, lead away from the truth. The cyclical nature of social crises is not the invention and idea of the communists. But the idea of socialism, you see, is their historical merit.

The idea itself was potentially so strong, its magnetic force was great, that the deformations could not conceal its influence on the course of progress and social development.

Today we can talk about the necessity of the clear-cut determination of national goals and national priorities of development, to which both the policy of the communist parties and the activity of the state structures must be conformed. In connection with this, the question arises to what extent the vital programmatic goals of a number of social movements that are springing up in our republic are real, how much they answer the national needs and interests. The political pluralism, which is increasingly becoming firmly established in public life, must not lead to a social zigzag fraught with a deviation from the strategic course.

Speaking more simply, we are moving toward the creation of a multiparty system, the outlines of which have already become distinctly apparent. This is a fact of evolution. But does it mean that the appearance of a new party in the political arena must threaten society with the shaking of its basic foundations? Not a single one of the democracies knows this. It is impossible to strengthen and to develop the democratic institutions and achievements without the society in which we live becoming a law-governed society. The whole experience—the bitter experience of totalitarianism and the five years of restructuring indicate that a person only then feels real freedom when he is reliably protected by the law. If we look at our laws from this point of view, we must recognize that they are in need of improvement. This process should be implemented so as for the law to operate, guaranteeing the functioning of a multiparty system. In this connection I would like to note that the

ideas of deideologization, and now also of departicipation, that are being insinuated make one prick up one's ears. As they say, it is evident to the naked eye that they simply want to push aside the communist party and force it out of the political structures. Some political movements are inclined to interpret the rule of law state in precisely this way. Others continually threaten with pressure and are playing with their muscles. Now they threaten with a strike, now they announce their intentions to boycott party and state actions. What is the point of these intimidations? Strikes only exacerbate the, as it is, difficult socio-economic situation of the republic. Boycotts and the endless claims of a number of new political groups and movements only complicate relations. Serious political figures, and some of the organizations claim to look like such, must always be prepared to interact, to influence, and to search for unity patiently and persistently on a reasonable democratic basis. Our unofficial organizations, having done absolutely nothing for the people up to now and not having acknowledged their political strength, it is quite evident, do not object to playing with the fates of peoples. Is it not time to become mature? Is it not time to extract the lessons from the recent past? I don't think that it is evident from the declarations, what is more from the behavior of our opponents, that they have taken a critical look at themselves. Severely criticizing the communists for the fact that they for decades did not want to take a critical look at their doctrine and politics, the present-day unofficial organizations are ready to tear to pieces anyone who dares to say an imprudent word about them. And, you know, they are still at the pedestal of power! What degeneration awaits them during a difficult political ascent?!

People with concern call attention to the fact that in socio-political life the attempt is perceptible to replace one formula of ideological monopolism with another.

It seems, by no means accidentally MOLODEZH AZER-BAYDZHANA recently stated with bitterness: "If previously party functionaries spoke on behalf of the people, now populists of both the left and the right speak on its behalf. Leftist inclinations are no less dangerous than rightist, conservative ones. . . . How long will we talk, instead of working by the sweat of our brow?"—the newspaper further inquires with justification.

"To work for the people and to talk less on its behalf—this is what must be the main thing for the every decent, honest, and free man!"

I am in complete agreement with such a formulation!

The development of its policy, tactics and strategy of action is the internal matter of every party. We do not intend to teach anyone and, God forbid, to interfere in anyone's affairs. But to sow discord, to intentionally lead things to destabilization, driving the people into the abyss of despair, and the republic into chaos, we, as the ruling party, will not allow anyone to do! We will not allow anyone to return to the language of dictate, as soon

as the flowering of democracy begins to dawn outside. There are and will be contradictions, but in the name of the future of the people, we can and must come to a national consensus. I speak so firmly and confidently because no matter what conclusions the opponents of national unity draw, they do not persuade us. For in the existing differences and contradictions separating the communist party from the other political organizations, there is no hopeless antagonism. There are no antagonistic contradictions because there is a broad platform that unites us all—the national-patriotic task of a way out of the spiritual, economic, and political crisis, and the guarantee of a national restoration!

Some consideration concerning the economic state of the republic. What situation is taking shape in the national economy, you know. There has been an appreciable reduction in the dynamism of the economy. Today whole sectors are working with a lag both behind the plan and behind the level of the past year, in essence there is no improvement in the financial indicators of enterprise activity, and the economic and industrial relations with other regions are being destroyed.

Serious concern is called forth by the breakdown of the consumer market, the weakening of the purchasing power of the ruble, the disruptions of the programs of housing construction, the food supply, and the health care of the population. The demographic situation is becoming more complicated, there is an increase in the number of unemployed in public production, especially among young people.

There are, of course, also those collectives which have succeeded in overcoming the lag that was allowed. But this, alas, has not become the general trend.

The transition to market relations can exacerbate the situation still further. The level of our economy is far from the world level. I have in mind the production apparatus, the producer goods, and a technical level. Hence also the low efficiency of all sectors and the high expenditures of material resources, which is the reason for the deficit. The way out is seen in the restoration of the production apparatus and the modernization of the engineering foundation. This is a complicated and large task. It is possible to solve it, being guided by our own strength and world experience. But for this, additional financial resources and foreign exchange are required. This task stands before the entire structure of the national economy. Every sector must be equal to this. Today many enterprises have received freedom of action. But spontaneity and lack of coordination are present, there is no vision of a perspective and coordination.

We connect great hopes with the new union treaty. Already by the end of the year, we, basing ourselves on sovereignty, must proceed to attract foreign capital and investments, and create for them most favored nation treatment. To this end, the government of the republic is

developing a normative document. Interest in the Azerbaijani market is great. Well-known firms of the United States, Japan, and Italy are ready to create joint enterprises. The first steps are already being taken. But now it is becoming clear that we need to correct foreign economic activity and to increase its resultiveness, to orient it, first of all, to the solution of the republic's social problems.

It is necessary already now to make the transition from the simplest commodity exchange and barter to the creation of joint enterprises which turn out products that are competitive in the world markets. We must follow the path of the more active involvement of foreign investments in the development of the republic's economic potential, as well as our capital, in the creation of mutually advantageous enterprises abroad and the conduct of commercial and financial operations.

In this connection, the contract deserves attention and support that was signed by a group of our specialists on the creation of a joint Soviet-Italian enterprises in the republic for the output of prefabricated houses, brick, ceramic, sanitary, aluminum, window and door products, in short, everything that is necessary for construction and the delivery of "turn-key" projects. What is important is the fact that for us fundamentally new elements of private enterprise based on the laws of the market will be put at the basis of the future firm. The products will be sold both in the republic and abroad.

Every economic unit that wants to expand its business can count on most favored nation treatment. It simply must be understood how desperate our situation is. The public coffers, as they say, are empty. Meanwhile, the results for the [first] six months show that the financing of social programs is threatened. At the expense of what increase the wages of those who are being paid little, finance science, culture, education, and public health care?

The latest Ukases have been met with approval by the population. But every one of them requires financing. Beginning next year, the center will not finance the republic's budget. This is already the republic's own business. Meanwhile, the growth rates of industrial production are falling. There has been a reduction in the receipts of payments into the budget from profit and the turnover tax. As before, the state of affairs in agriculture is unsatisfactory.

And, you know, the people expects changes, above all at the counter. That is why, when we say: We need to work hard—this is not a slogan, but a vitally important condition.

I would like to underscore—the market is no panacea. I have already had the occasion to talk about painful consequences to which it can give rise. In such a case, the question arises: Why then set hopes on the introduction of the market mechanism?



Let us begin with the fact that it will make it possible to put an end to the levelling that has been carried to the absurd, is destroying the initiative of the enterprising, and is impeding the development of the productive forces.

Now those who have an entrepreneurial vein can receive capital, lease, or create their own enterprise and to compete, let us say, with state enterprise. How is this proposed to be implemented? In stages, gradually, and only in this way.

The assets—land, production equipment, and the trading network—can be handed over for lease. Another direction—state enterprises are transformed into joint stock companies. The state can retain for itself a part of the stocks, and the remaining part must be sold to workers, state funds, and even foreign investors. In order for entrepreneurs to be able to react quickly to the opportunities that are opening up in the free market, they need official investors capable of attracting the savings of enterprises and individuals and directing these funds into the private sector. However, we virtually do not have commercial banks in the sense in which they are understood in the West. In creating commercial banks, we must base ourselves on the assistance of foreign banks and firms, including through the creation of joint enterprises.

We must give special attention to protective measures against the growth of prices and be concerned about the poor and unemployment. We will have to come to grips with the problem of billions of unexpended rubles, which are being concealed in the shadow economy and the savings of the population. Possibly it makes sense to try to absorb them, having sold into private hands such assets in state ownership as land, houses, and shares of state enterprises. All of these innovations require legal protection.

And the last thing. The transition to a market should take place with regard to the specific nationality and republic features. I would very much like to caution, above all our fairly zealous merchants, who are ready to pay for consumer goods in short supply with expensive raw material which, in essence, is national wealth. We must proceed to the creation of a closed circle: Raw material—final product. Only this is the economic foundation of independence.

Comrades!

Now all of our plans for the creation, renewal, and democratic development rest on the main destabilizing factor—the inter-national conflict with a neighboring republic. As we move away from February 1988, it becomes increasingly clear that these are not an inter-ethnic struggles. This is the result of territorial claims that have been nurtured by certain circles, by political figures of the neighboring republic of a quite certain type, who have pushed their people into the abyss of inter-national conflict.

Unfortunately, the territorial claims have been elevated to the level of state policy of the Armenian SSR. I have spoken about this in my speech at the congress.

Our position, as before, is clear and unequivocal. No one has the right to encroach on the integrity of the territory of our republic, its constitution, and its sovereign rights. Force, too, will not help. The Union and the leadership of the country and the republic must put a stop to militarization in general.

The Ukase of the president of the USSR: "On the Prohibition of the Creation of Armed Formations Not Stipulated by USSR Legislation and on the Removal of Arms in Cases of Their Being Kept Illegally" is creating good preconditions of for the solution of this task, the stabilization of the situation in the region, as well as in the entire country. The measures set forth in this document have become urgent a long time ago and were perceived with great satisfaction by communists, the workers, and the entire Azerbaijani people. They also fully correspond to the basic national interests of the Armenian people as well. Now it is very important to secure the strict realization of this Ukase and to embody in concrete deeds every point, every provision, and every letter and spirit of this document, which is undoubtedly vitally important for the further development of perestroika.

The security of the Azerbaijani people and the peace of the Azerbaijani land, which are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Soviet federation, must be secured. In the contrary case, federalism is deprived of all political meaning. This everyone must understand who intends to sign a new union treaty.

We also must do everything in order to strengthen our internal boundaries. Here, too, order will be established. Only there is no need to sow panic, as some people are doing, playing on the as it is highly-strung nerves and passions of people.

We will act in accordance with our policy—Karabakh is a primordial part of Azerbaijan. We must respond to the provocations—and there will be quite a few more—without panic. We are told: Good will is needed. We, the Azerbaijanians, do not have to secure it. And there are already signs of how people in Nagorno-Karabakh are finding a common language and want to end the quarrels and live, as they lived previously. Simple people understand this. This must be understood by all, especially by the members of the intelligentsia and the politicians. International experience, as well as our own experience, indicate that the confrontation, in whatever strict limits it might proceed, is not a historical predetermined fact of life for these or those peoples. From the bloodiest wars, the Europeans—the Germans, the French, and we, the Soviet people—have drawn the lesson of peace, and now the consciousness of our people is free of hatred. What are we, who are ancient neighbors, to do: To look back, accumulating clusters of anger, or to turn the peoples, no matter how hard this would be, to a better and worthy

future? I am convinced that the future is for those who will steadfastly search for a path to mutual understanding and reconciliation.

Will this opposition last for a long time? One thing is clear—the people have grown tired. And things cannot go on like this.

Today the political situation in the Transcaucasus, as well as other regions, absolutely does not correspond to the spirit of the peaceable processes that are progressing in the world community. The Communist Party of Azerbaijan proceeds from the fact that in our interdependent world common sense, the taking into account of interests, and the development of dialogue are becoming the main thing. If we do not show political realism, if we compromise with falsely-understood national-patriotic interests, we plunge our peoples into the abyss of rigid opposition, which acquires an ominous inevitability.

It is difficult to believe, but it is a fact that neither the neighboring nor our republic, during the years of perestroika, has advanced a single step, but, on the contrary, has been thrown back in its democratic and socioeconomic development.

We must enter the international community, helping one another, through joint efforts.

From world history we must take not the experience of the introduction of war, but the ability to overcome inter-national crises. The historical destinies of our peoples have known quite a few pages of resistance. And all the same—only pages! There are many more chapters of good neighborliness and human relations in the book of the destinies of peoples. To what should we orient ourselves? It is clear that there is a prospect only after an inter-national agreement and mutual respect: No, it is no coincidence that the idea of the "Caucasian home" is forcing its way through. We perceive it as a stage by stage drawing together of all the peoples who inhabit our common home, the removal of obstacles, and the gradual arrangement of economic and state-political relations on the basis of mutual respect, sovereignty and rights. Where to begin? Let us think. And this in view of the fact that we have quite enough reasons for grievances and reproaches.

From the platform of the 28th Party Congress, we affirmed our readiness to walk our half of the way in order to make the transition from confrontation to the formation of a new type of inter-national and inter-state relations, without which it is impossible to achieve mutual understanding and trust. Only in that way is it possible to begin with the creation of a regional security system with all the necessary mechanisms of the regulation of conflict situations. Only in this way can we bring peace into our common, hospitable Caucasian home.

Comrades! The most important practical question today is the preparation and conduct of elections to the local Soviets and the Supreme Soviet of the republic. The elections will reveal a great deal and will answer many

questions. This will be a distinctive referendum on perestroika, on the communist party, on the multiparty system, and on the market economy.

This is also the first opportunity for the real consolidation of the healthy forces, not in words but in deeds, in the course of the political struggle. We will be able to conduct elections, observing full glasnost, and the equal rights of all—thus we will strengthen the faith of people in democracy.

I would like to hear your opinion and to consult with the congress on the question of the time periods, as well as the other arguments interrelated with them, for example, the repeal of the "state of emergency".

The preparation for elections, in contrast to the previous such actions, is developing in full force at the place of residence. Are we ready to take up vanguard positions there? This question we address, above all, to the aktiv of the cities of Baku, Gyandzhi, Sumgait, Ali-Bayramly, and Mingechaur.

The entire law enforcement complex must guard the law on elections. Not to allow the dictate and pressure of destructive forces and to secure public order during the election campaign is the duty of communists working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the procuracy, and the legal system.

Anticipating the questions of the opposition, I once again emphasize, elections are an open field of pluralism for all social groups and organizations. Let reason, arguments, and intellect be victorious. I hope that this subject will become the leading one in today's discussion.

We regard the significance of the present election campaign and the formation of the new composition of the Supreme Soviet, above all, from the standpoint of its qualitative renewal. Let fresh forces come into the Soviets. Will this become the result of the creation of a bloc of leftist forces, communists, and independents [bespartijnnyye]? The main thing is for them to represent in a fitting manner the people and its interests. The special features of this most important political action lie in the fact that the foundation of parliamentarianism in our homeland is being laid. And we must the utmost to form an energetic and intellectual corps of deputies representing the broad social, political, and international [internatsionalnyy] spectrum. It can be expected that in the conditions of compressed time periods, of old approaches and stereotypes that have not yet been finally overcome, we will not succeed in everything. Why, the school of democracy is difficult and lengthy. And all the same, we are taking a significant step in our democratic evolution, in the strengthening of genuine sovereignty. And thus we are consciously and purposefully reducing the sphere of the command and bureaucratic methods of government. In this lies the political innovation and the enormous significance of elections.

We are convinced that through national renewal, through the implementation of republic [natsionalnyye] programs of state political and socio-economic development we will be able to overcome the centrifugal tendencies, and we will advance to a new and higher level of inter-national unity.

Comrades!

In finding a qualitatively new democratic status, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan will increase its efforts to solve the questions that trouble society. We are talking, above all, about the state sovereignty of the republic, about finding full political, economic, and cultural independence. Now, as is well known, an irreversible process of liberation from the dictate of the command-administrative system and the restoration of national state sovereignty is under way in all republics. Unfortunately, this process is proceeding with contradictions. It has set into motion centrifugal forces which believe that the disintegration of the Union is the single way out from the situation that has been created. The are opposed by another, healthier, and realistic idea, based on the necessity of the creation of qualitatively new Union of states.

Our position, which we expressed in the Council of the Federation, reduces itself to the following: It is necessary to repudiate the rigid federal structure, which, as life has shown, has fully discredited itself in the eyes of all the peoples of the country. As we see it, a new union agreement should define the status of the Union of states, but not of a unified federation of states. In it should be embodied and realized the idea of the full independence of the states, which voluntarily enter the Union in order to solve the problems of their national development jointly, on the basis of cooperation and mutual understanding.

The members of the Union cannot and must not oppose each other. Their interrelations should be built on the principles of equality, the mutual respect of sovereignty, and the solution of disputes by peaceful, political means, that is how it is accepted in civilized society.

The guaranteed securing of the needs of socio-economic, political, and cultural development of all the nations and nationalities of our country must become one of the main provisions of the Treaty. For our multi-national republic, which has ancient and strong traditions of internationalism, this means that Azerbaijan, in independently solving the questions of its national-state organization, takes upon itself the defense of the interests not only of the Azerbaijani population, but also of all other citizens of the republic that have linked their fate with the Azerbaijani people.

The deep crisis does not yet mean that the CPSU has exhausted its revolutionary potential. Otherwise, there would be neither perestroika, nor its indisputable achievements, nor today's congress.

The historical impulses from the right and the left must not, and, it seems, will not lead the party away from the reference-points that have been outlined, from the socialist ideal that has been achieved by many generations of Soviet people. And let them say what they like—we, the communists, will follow our own road! The road of humane, democratic socialism.

#### Deputy Assesses Work of Estonian Supreme Soviet

90UN2587A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
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[Article by S. Sovetnikov, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet's International Relations Commission: "Parliamentarians Learn to Work: Reflections After Three Months of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet's Work"]

[Text] Behind us lie three months of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet's work. Its 12th session turned out to be the longest and busiest. At the same time, it became a kind of report showing what our parliamentarians had learned and what they had done during those three months of work.

Let me say frankly: A good deal was done, yet not very much was learned.

In 12 sessions more than 20 laws, decrees, appeals and other fundamental documents of the Estonian Republic were discussed and adopted. Could more have been done? I think that, given the present makeup of the Supreme Soviet, of which nearly 90 percent of the members were new, and given the political situation in the republic and country as a whole, a situation which influenced the course of the sessions, it was probably impossible that more could have been done.

Looking back at the first session of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet, which opened on 29 March, one can admit today that certain mistakes were made at the beginning of our deputy corps's work. We hurried unjustifiably in adopting the decree "On Estonia's State Status" and the declaration "On Cooperation Between the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and Estonia's Congress." These hastily adopted documents complicated the already tense political situation in the republic and became a significant obstacle to negotiations with Moscow. The adoption of the 8 May Law on Estonia's Symbols and the Law on the Principles of Temporary Procedures for the Government of Estonia placed the Supreme Soviet, the government and the people of Estonia in an extremely unclear situation.

Today no one can answer our constituents' most common questions: "In what sort of state are we living? In a socialist or a capitalist one? How long will the transitional period that has been declared extend?"

These questions might not exist if the Supreme Soviet, in adopting the laws in question, had also taken into



account the opinion of the minority—of the For Equal Rights and Virumaa deputy groups and the Communist faction. After all, in our parliament both the "majority" and the "minority" favor a unified and sovereign Estonia that is economically and politically independent. The goal is the same, and only the means of attaining it differ. In other words, we have fundamental differences only in terms of the strategy and tactics for moving toward sovereignty. It would be unnatural if the complete unanimity that was characteristic of recent times existed among 105 deputies with regard to such important political and state issues. Correct decisions cannot be taken without an intense clash of opinions and without the thorough and reasonable consideration of those opinions. Unfortunately, we have not yet learned that art.

Granted, the deputies' studies got off to a good start with the interesting seminar on questions of economic policy that was conducted 27-28 April by our northern colleagues and specialists from Finland. With that our studies also ended. Let us hope that they will resume after the holidays, but in a definite and systematic form.

In one of my speeches at the second session of the Supreme Soviet I said that it could well be that good writers and artists, scholars and teachers, doctors and engineers, and agricultural and industrial workers had gathered in that hall, but that I regrettably had to admit that we had few good and wise politicians among us, politicians who were looking from present-day realities at least five or ten years ahead. And today I would not renounce those words.

In looking over the lists of Supreme Soviet deputies and listening to their speeches, questions and replies in the sessions, you cannot help singling out a group of intelligent and promising parliamentarians and politicians. With unconcealed interest, admiration and good feeling, I have followed the work of the following deputies: Tonu Anton (chairman of the Law Commission), Indrek Toome (chairman of Foreign Affairs Commission), Yuio Uluots (chairman of the Independent Democrats group), Deputy Speaker Marju Lauristin, Mikk Titma and Yaak Allik, Tiit Made and Ants Paya, Vladimir Malkovskiy and Nikolay Zakharov, Sergey Volkov and Aleksandr Labasov, Lembit Annus and Genik Israyelyan, Yevgeniy Kochegarov and Anatoliy Novokhatskiy.

I like the political activeness, persistence and consistency in defending the interests and rights of the "minority" of deputies and their constituents that have been shown by my colleagues Sergey Petinov and Vladimir Lebedev, Aleksandr Gusev and Pavel Panfilov, Nikolay Aksinin and Viktor Yermolayev. I am profoundly impressed by the calm and sometimes inconspicuous businesslike manner in the work of the deputies Enn Leisson (chairman of the People's Front group) and Ants Veetousme (chairman of the Economics Commission), Villu Jurjo (chairman of the Commission on Deputies'

Ethics) and Rein Veidermann (chairman of the Commission on the Press), Rein Tamme (chairman of the Commission on Defense) and Andres Tarand (chairman of the Commission on the Environment).

It seems that the chief shortcoming in the work of the present Supreme Soviet membership is attributable to the fact that there is a relatively small number of highly qualified and trained jurists and legal scholars. There are only six of them: Tonu Anton, Akhti Kyu, Arvo Junti, Juri Ratsep, Tiit Kabin and Sergey Volkov. That is less than six percent of the deputy corps. I am certain that at least 20-25 percent of the deputies in the republic's supreme legislative body should be jurists, including specialists in international law.

The situation is no better with respect to specialists in economics. There are three of them—Tiit Made, Ivar Raig and Ants Veetousme.

We often refer to V. I. Lenin's well-known statement to the effect that even "cooks should know how to govern a state." However, neither in Lenin's government nor in our country's subsequent governments can I seem to recall any cooks.

People should know how to govern a state, and in order to know how, they must study that complex art. The lack of study for deputies is one weak aspect in the organization of the new Supreme Soviet.

I think that our readers will be interested to learn the "vocational" makeup of the present Supreme Soviet. Thus, today our deputy corps consists of 18 executives of all ranks; 14 party workers; 14 representatives of the agriculture; 8 scientific workers; 6 people from education and 6 representatives of the press, radio and television; 4 representatives each of the creative intelligentsia and the Armed Forces; 3 workers and 3 medical specialists; and 2 representatives each of cultural and religious institutions. The Supreme Soviet membership includes one forester (Kaido Kama), one pensioner (Nikolay Aksinin) and one person who is unemployed (Alar Maarend).

Such is the social and occupational structure of our parliament. On the whole, the 12th Supreme Soviet, which was elected according to democratic principles, was not entirely successful, in my view. However, such was the voters' will, and it is supreme. Only one thing is left to us deputies—to justify their high confidence through our work.

Unfortunately, in the first stage of the Supreme Soviet's work we did not avoid organizational mistakes. The main one was an excessively democratic approach in putting together the standing commissions. The right granted to Supreme Soviet deputies to participate in the work and be members simultaneously of two and even three commissions has ultimately resulted in the fact that hardly a single commission can presently operate with its full membership, because commission sessions are usually held at the same time.

Thus, for example, of the 10 members of the International Relations Commission, only Pavel Grigoryev and Sergey Petinov are exclusive "patriots" of the commission, while deputies Goderdze Akhaladze, Khillar Kaida, Teet Kallas, Valeriy Koys, Kheyno Kostabi and Tynis Mets serve on two commissions, and Aldo Tamm serves on three.

I think that along with reorganizing the work of the standing commissions, we must put the proper order into the work of deputies' groups and political factions. The rules that have been approved provide for a deputy to participate in the work of only one commission and one deputies' group.

I am often asked: "Why are you wearing out your trousers sitting there? After all, your opinion is not taken into account, anyway." Today I cannot agree with those who ask such questions, for the course of the recent Supreme Soviet sessions convinces me otherwise. We are listened to, and our opinion has come to be taken into account increasingly often. Without us (deputies in the For Equal Rights and Virumaa groups and the Communist faction), the Supreme Soviet's work would lose the political intensity and sharpness of ideological debate without which the search for the only correct solutions would be impossible.

Of course, for me, who served nine terms on the Narva City Soviet of People's Deputies, there was a great deal that was surprising and incomprehensible, especially in the first days of the Supreme Soviet's work. For example, the fact that there were no competing candidacies in the elections of chairmen of the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian government became a real sensation. In the nominations and confirmations of candidates for 20 ministers, not a single alternative was offered, either.

I could not help asking myself: "Can it really be true that during the years of the Soviet regime the Estonian land has become so impoverished of talented people capable of managing the republic's economy? Or have democracy and pluralism of opinions not yet found fertile soil in Estonia?"

Let us leave behind, finally, criticism of past sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Of course, it is easier to criticize than to work. And to sum up the first stage of our republic parliament's work, I will note that we would not have done what we managed to do if it were not for the efficient work of Ulo Nugis, the Supreme Soviet's presiding officer (speaker). The organization and order in the conduct of the sessions were largely attributable to the speaker's firm will. Granted, his excessive haste and uncharacteristic carelessness in the 8 May voting for adoption of the Law on Estonia's Symbols and the 16 May voting for the Law on the Principles of Temporary Procedures for the Government of Estonia significantly lowered his prestige in the eyes of the deputies of the For Equal Rights group and the Communist faction. However, today I see no better speaker than Ulo Nugis.

In my view, the improvement of the sessions' work was affected by the adoption of the decision to stop direct radio broadcasts from the session's meetings. Organization and orderliness in the conduct of sessions immediately improved. Speeches, replies and questions became more substantive. After all, a deputy's chief work consists not in his speeches at Supreme Soviet sessions, but in his daily work in commissions and deputies' groups, and in his work with his constituents.

How do I see the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet in the immediate future? What needs to be done in order to enhance the prestige, legislative effectiveness and discipline of the Supreme Soviet deputies?

First, new Supreme Soviet Rules must be adopted, and laws on the status of the deputy, the chairman and deputy chairman, the speaker and his deputies, and the Supreme Soviet standing commissions and deputy groups must be discussed and adopted.

Second, the membership of the standing commissions, deputies' groups and political factions should be revised and approved with a view to the Supreme Soviet Rules that are adopted.

I think that it would be a good idea, in order to avoid further complaints by the Estonia Committee and the supreme legislative authority, to establish in the Supreme Soviet, in addition to the People's Front deputies' group, an Estonia Committee group. Supreme Soviet deputies who are simultaneously members of the Estonia Committee will have to finally decide which deputies' group to be on: the People's Front, which numbers 41 deputies, or the Estonia Committee, which has 44 deputies. It seems to me that it is practically impossible to accomplish state deeds while occupying two chairs. The establishment of a separate Estonia Committee deputy's group would give them the possibility of coming forward with a legislative initiative in the Supreme Soviet along with other deputies' groups and political factions.

In my view, it would be politically intelligent for the For Equal Rights and Virumaa deputies' groups and the Communist faction to unite their forces on a communist platform.

The stronger, higher-quality and better organized the standing commissions are, the more effective the work of the Supreme Soviet sessions will be, since the basic drafting and discussion of legislation and decrees should take place in the standing commissions. Of course, the Supreme Soviet's deputies' groups and political factions should not remain on the sidelines.

Readers have the right to ask me: "But just what has the Commission on Internationality Relations done? What sort of prospects are there for its future work?" Let me say frankly that I am not satisfied with my work on such a responsible and important Supreme Soviet commission. We have not done what we should have done. And the main thing is that we have not brought about



discussion in the Supreme Soviet of laws on citizenship and the referendum. The republic's non-Estonian population expects definite and clear political, economic and social guarantees from the Supreme Soviet.

Adoption of the Estonian Republic Law on citizenship in its "zero" version would help relieve political tension and enhance the prestige of our supreme legislative body in the eyes of many thousands of people who live in Estonia. Granted, things have begun to move in this connection. A commission for preparing a draft Law on Citizenship has been formed in the Supreme Soviet under the chairmanship of Maryu Lauristin and including representatives of the so-called "minority": Viktor Andrejev, Lembit Annus and the author of this article. Let us hope that the draft of that law will be presented for discussion by the Supreme Soviet and adopted this year, 1990.

Equally serious work needs to be done on a new law on elections to the republic's supreme legislative body. Right now it is hard to say how much work remains for the Supreme Soviet's present membership; therefore, in order that the new elections not catch us unprepared, we should have in store a fundamentally new law on elections that takes into account the presence in Estonia of about a 40 percent non-Estonian population.

However, this is all about what remains to be done. And just what has been done? The members of our commission have taken an active part in the drafting and discussion of a number of Estonian Republic laws that have been adopted. But these are our first timid steps. Whether by pure coincidence or intentionally, I do not know, the new draft Supreme Soviet Rules do not mention our commission, which, as Elza Payumaa, learned secretary of the Institute of Language and Literature has rightfully observed, should be called the **commission on nationality questions**.

In any case, I see our commission's main task to lie in bringing about a unity of views in the Supreme Soviet, without which we will be unable in the future to discuss and adopt more than 100 legislative acts of our republic. Only unity can ensure us success.

#### **June Kazakh Council of Ministers Session Summarized**

90US1223A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 1 Jun 90 p 1

[KazTAG report from Press Center of Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers: "To the Level of the New Tasks: Commentary From the First Session of the New Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] "Perhaps never before have we had such an urgent need for drastic reforms to improve the people's quality of life," said U.K. Karamanov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, to the republic's new government in his opening speech at the first session. This can

clearly not be achieved without a strong national economy, which will have to be created with the support of the population.

The republic government faces a job of enormous scope and complexity, a basic part of which will be a fundamental alteration of the existing system of management. It is slowly but steadily getting out of control and is no longer capable of functioning in the mode of an artificial combination of fundamentally incompatible administration by command and the [existing] economic structures.

The purpose of restructuring management of socioeconomic development of the republic and its regions is to provide better living conditions for the people through a staged switching of the economy onto the rails of new relations. We must resolutely convert to controlled market relations in order to take it out of its profound crisis today, to give momentum to the advance and achieve real changes. Naturally, such a bold move will entail extraordinary measures whose consequences may involve difficulties. There is no other way, however. The new government, called upon to travel an uncharted route, to analyze the situation soberly and thoughtfully and approach the problems in a deliberated manner, is beginning its work in precisely this difficult situation. The structures and functions of state management and the substance of the work will be substantially reinterpreted.

In the very near future the republic government will begin working out in full detail the plan for converting Kazakhstan's economy to market relations and intends to make a thorough and strict assessment of every component's quality and composition. The trust vested in the new Council of Ministers by the republic parliament carries the obligation that the plan reflect all aspects of what is troubling the people, while at the same time defining the optimal tactics for accomplishing the urgent tasks.

True democracy is unthinkable without either freedom or responsibility, without equality before the law for everyone. This was confirmed again by the discussion on the state of implementation of the law on discipline with respect to deliveries in the national economy. Most of our enterprises treat those interacting with them with respect, take into account their product quality demands and fulfill delivery plans, of course. It is no accident that contractual commitments for deliveries were fulfilled by 99.2 percent in the republic last year, and the figures for this year are not bad.

However, the speakers pointed out, one has to be alarmed by the fact that, against the general background of well-being, these figures still do not reflect the real situation. Many officials whose positions require them to see that the laws are strictly observed frequently ignore those laws. Giving themselves over to narrow departmental interests, they frequently and knowingly cause considerable harm to the economy. The Balkhashmed production association fulfilled the delivery plan last

year, for example, for which it received 300,000 rubles in bonuses. In fact, however, it had not regularly met its quarterly contractual commitments.

An inspection conducted prior to the session also uncovered a number of other significant infractions of delivery discipline. Certain officials cite what would appear to be an objective cause, a lack of resources and capacities, for the failure to fulfill contractual commitments. At the same time they themselves permit the frequent squandering of output which should be delivered under contract. There are violations of the Law on the State Enterprise, which forbids enterprises from selling products at their own discretion until their contractual commitments have been met.

One would expect the consumers to sound the alarm when their suppliers permit disruptions to occur. They frequently fail to use the economic regulators, however. This attests to another weak element, the low level of their legal services. Things are done differently at the Alma-Ata Association imeni Dzerzhinskiy. Rightly demanding that contractual commitments be met by the suppliers, it has for more than a single year received from them approximately 100,000 rubles more than it pays for the products.

Unfortunately, there are few such examples. The enterprises do not want to spoil their relations with suppliers, but then the labor collectives suffer more from this than those in charge. Last year alone the republic's Gosarbitrazh [State Arbitration Board] reviewed more than 4,000 disputes pertaining to delayed or short deliveries and exacted more than 3.5 million rubles in fines. Nor can we forget another matter: Following the chain of logic, the shorting of deliveries results in reduced output. This results in shortages in the consumer market, and the latter, in turn, create social tensions. This is why the society is actually unanimous today in demanding that work be stepped up in all areas, that efficiency and responsibility be drastically increased, that order be established and discipline strengthened. We have reached a point requiring rapid and decisive action, particularly in the economy.

As much discussion as there has been at past sessions about the increased role of the local soviets, which are supposed to be the true masters of their territories, the picture is not changing. They are not doing a thorough job of seeing to it that every enterprise meets its delivery commitments and are not holding accountable those officials who permit breakdowns. These matters are discussed extremely rarely in the ispolkoms.

Major complaints were leveled at the republic People's Control Committee, Gosarbitrazh and Procuracy, which have been advised to step their work in this important area.

The session also discussed additional measures to improve the population's supply of potatoes and other vegetables and fruit from the 1990 harvest and the plan for delivering them to the central pool. The output of

these products must be increased to 1,650,000 tons in order to provide the republic's population with the medically required norms, which is an increase of more than 300,000 tons over the maximum, 1988 figure. The Food Program targets are not being met at the present time. Gosagroprom and the oblast ispolkoms are not taking adequate steps to see that potatoes and other vegetables, cucurbits and fruits are produced in the needed quantities and assortment.

The republic suffers considerable losses and damage each year from having to haul in large quantities of this produce. A total of 100,000 tons of potatoes was hauled into Kazakhstan last year to prevent disruptions in the supply. This could have been avoided, however, if the entire harvest had been preserved. A total of 13 percent of the potatoes and 11 percent of the other vegetables entering the trade system were used for livestock feed last year as a result of extensive spoilage in the process of procurement, transportation and storage.

Low procurement prices were previously cited as one of the causes of the poor development of vegetable production. Vegetable production in open soil was made highly profitable last year merely by partially converting to selling at contracted prices and increasing them with differentiated markups. All of the financial obstacles have now been removed, but there has been no perceptible increase in production. Areas planted to vegetables have even been reduced by more than 6,000 hectares in planting plans in the public sector. One has to be alarmed by the fact that there are already shortages of early cabbages and radishes today.

It was pointed out that the situation is not going to be corrected without a drastic increase in output from the fields and a reduction in losses during transportation and storage. The funds channeled into the agricultural complex will "start working" actively only when the peasants are totally freed of administrative fetters. They have to be helped, and the advanced collectives, the lease system, small-farmer and peasant farms and agricultural cooperatives must be supported. A successful performance by them is the guarantee of adequate food on the table for the entire population. The stimulants for the new forms of management have still not been put into effect, however. Incidentally, every small-farmer and leaseholder would gladly use the earnings from output over and above the plan to acquire a tractor or motor vehicle, of which they are presently experiencing an acute shortage.

Extremely little attention is being given to mechanizing the production of potatoes and other vegetables. This matter must not be underestimated, for there are large reserves here. Only the adoption of containerized shipping of vegetables will make it possible to increase the load per driver to a thousand tons a season, however, which will cut losses in transport by a factor of 5-6.

The time has arrived, the speakers stressed, to get serious about the construction of storage facilities at the production sites, which would also considerably reduce the pressure during the procurement season. In addition, supplying the stores from several bases creates competition, reduces downtime for the transport equipment and ensures stable supplies.

A good grape harvest is developing in southern Kazakhstan. We need to start now to provide for the acceptance and processing of the grapes. Nor should other regions of the republic remain on the sideline. They should establish contractual connections with respect to the harvesting, storage and transportation of the grapes.

The session also discussed other issues.

The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers expressed gratitude to just retired A.Ye. Batsula, V.T. Kazachkov and V.I. Ryabov for their vigorous efforts as former members of the government, to D.Ye. Abdrakhimova and A.I. Bektemisov, who have just begun their work in the parliament, and S.U. Dzhandosov, D.D. Dospelov and A.M. Zaytsev, who have been transferred to other jobs.

#### **Kazakh Supsov Chairman Speaks at 17th Kazakh CP Congress**

90US1223B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 5

[Speech by Ye.M. Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, at 17th Congress of Communist Party of Kazakhstan: "Discussion of the Accountability Reports From the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan"]

[Text] From the speech by Ye.M. Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet:

Comrade deputies: We are living through perhaps the most discordant and crucial phase of the restructuring.

Most people do not doubt its creative force, but they are at the same time increasingly feeling the hardships of the economic crisis. The development of democratic processes and the rebirth of soviet power are undermining the party's monopolistic position in our society. Many people do not feel comfortable with this. The relentless reassessment of the past and the prospect of conversion to a market [economy] have created a great deal of confusion in their minds. Some of them are drawing conclusions without understanding the profound essence of these developments; others are doing so on the basis of certain secondary details. Because of this, the truth is not revealed to either group.

How correctly we are able to assess the situation in the party and the society, to reveal its roots and to define how we are going to get out of it and where we are going will determine our fate for a long time. This is why we are faced with the need to make major decisions both here and at the 28th congress.

The heat of public emotions is making itself felt also in the republic's new Supreme Soviet with its difficult tasks. It will probably be up to this very convocation to shape a system of laws to serve as the foundation for the law-governed society, to ensure that the republic's economic and political structures function according to democratic principles and to give it real sovereignty.

The recent, first session provides a basis for stating that Kazakhstan's parliament will be an effective agent of the popular will. The deputies defined their positions on such socially sensitive issues as the nuclear test range and the Aral. Draft laws clearing the way to more progressive economic relations were passed or taken through the first reading. The institution of the presidency was established, which, in the existing situation, is very important and simply essential for the republic's prestige, for the consolidation of its public forces and the consolidation of executive power.

The elections are a form of referendum and the results cannot be downplayed. They showed that, despite the predictions of the pessimists, the rating enjoyed by the party and the restructuring underway is still high and that the party's platform enjoys great support. More than 94 percent of the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR, almost 78 percent of the oblast soviet members and 52 percent of those at lower levels are Communists. This is a force which is capable of using the mechanism of soviet power for conducting a policy of reform.

But there is also the following circumstance. The efforts of the deputy corps are disjointed, those elected by the people at every level perform their jobs in isolation, without interacting one with another. A people's deputy of the republic frequently does not know what issues deputies of the oblast, rayon or rural soviet are struggling with. This is despite the fact that these people work side by side and for the very same electors.

This is the way it was in the past, and the way it still is. Today, however, the measure of any deputy's responsibility to the electors is so great that they must unite their efforts for the joint resolution of problems of the region from which there were elected. And the party committees could play a consolidating role here.

One other matter: The secretaries of party committees are elected almost universally as soviet chairmen, and presidiums have been set up with their own apparatus and with considerable authority. It was assumed that the secretary's dual status could help strengthen the role of the soviets and their executive and management organs during the transitional period.

In fact, for various reasons the soviets are in no hurry to assume power. As a result, the presidiums have not yet become working organs, and the establishment of a superstructure in their person in the soviets has weakened the executive power. The secretary of a party committee who heads a soviet actually directs it on a volunteer basis, during his time off his regular job, and



the presidium apparatus has begun taking the place of the ispolkom and interfering in its routine work.

A clearly absurd situation has developed at the level of the settlement, village and rural soviets, of which there are 2,688 in the republic. Presidiums are not set up there, and the work has to be organized by the chairmen, who include almost 2,000 management leaders and secretaries of party committees. The rest are specialists in various fields. Because they are busy with their direct duties, they have no time to arrange sessions or to work with the deputies and standing commissions. Once again, the ispolkom apparatus is handling this matter in many soviets. Reality tells us that it is not expedient to combine the positions of chairmen of the soviet and the ispolkom in cities under rayon jurisdiction, settlement, village and rural soviets. I think we need to rethink the institution of presidiums in general. More time is essential for them to be tested by life, but in any case we must draw some fundamental conclusions on the presidiums for building an integral, self-governing system of soviets.

Our local budgets receive only 28 percent of the funds and are bypassed in the spending of the other 78 percent. More than 40 percent of Kazakhstan's population resides within the territories of settlement, village or rural soviets, but these receive only two percent of the republic budget.

Complete power for the soviets cannot exist unless they direct the entire local economy and have a solid financial base for its development. This is why the first session of the republic's Supreme Soviet refused to consider the draft Law on Local Self-Government, which did not accomplish this task, but sent it back for improvements.

This law is especially significant. It will give real substance to soviet power. The Law on Local Self-Government must have direct effect and rule out any sort of departmental norm-setting. The deputies intend to work painstakingly on it, with the extensive involvement of soviets at all levels. It is in the soviets that the draft will undergo its main expert assessment.

I run the risk of not being understood if I say nothing about the economy. All the more, since the work of the republic parliament must focus primarily on the establishment of effective legal relations precisely in this area.

The state of the economy in great part determines the sociopsychological climate in the society and the people's attitude toward the party. The main difficulty is that the problem has turned up everywhere, and nowhere has it been resolved. This legacy has come down to us not because of deficiencies in the socialist concept but because of the crisis of past government, and has become yet another historical confirmation of the fact that the presence of limited people at the top always has regrettable consequences.

The way out of the impasse, as correctly stated in the Central Committee report, lies in conversion to market conditions. This is a complex and painful, sometimes

unpredictable process, but it is the only promising and socially proven one for freeing the people of suffering in the vise of utter shortage and poor living conditions.

We are developing one of the prerequisites for a market [economy], diverse forms of ownership, but this fact has far greater significance than this. The adoption of a multi-structure economy and its separation from the state is a means of freeing people from the status of hostage to the state, which is their status today, and reviving their innate sense of ownership. People will then resolve problems themselves, by their own means, and rid themselves of their former dependency.

A full-blown market is impossible without structural changes, without freeing the republic with respect to foreign ties and granting it sovereignty. Otherwise, we shall not soon emerge from the crisis.

Restructuring the economy is a costly undertaking. Even in the United States, when it spent almost 20 years on this process, foreign investments rose sharply. It is therefore naive at the very least to count on our accomplishing this with our own means and relying on our own base. The nation is experiencing not only an economic crisis but a technological crisis as well, lagging far below the world level in the area of machine building and technology.

In order rapidly to achieve a new level in the economy and in the life of our people, we must bring foreign equipment and technology into the republic, at least for the initial breakthrough. This must be a goal-oriented and not a spontaneous policy, and must be based on a far-reaching concept of relations. And we are preparing such a policy. To gain time we could engage in the buy-out of foreign enterprises as republic property.

In other words, we need to give the republics broad scope for foreign economic activities, which will also benefit common Union interests. And it is important that the land and what it contains be the exclusive property of the republic. I can say that the Supreme Soviet was unanimously of this opinion when the draft republic Law on Ownership was discussed.

The monopolization of the foreign market is hampering the resolution of the problem, I would call it, of enterprises artificially operating at a loss. Because of the price ceilings, many enterprises in the republic's processing industries are operating at a loss or are on the verge of illegality. If they are permitted to export part of their output, to purchase consumer goods with the currency and sell them here at domestic market prices, those enterprises will become big earners. Despite the use of the term "sovereignty," which has begun to grate on the nerves, all the tools for the rational solution of many republic problems remain in the hands of the Union Gobsek [not further identified]. We have been driven to the point at which we shall be forced to make duplicates of these tools here in the republic. This is because people want deeds from us, while we are constrained in our actions and forced to do no more than vow our loyalty to



them. One wonders how long this will continue. We need to put this question point-blank to the federation soviet. We are asked the question at every meeting in the collectives.

N.A. Nazarbayev spoke in his report of the republic commission engaged in a search for conceptually different approaches in management. In addition, it is proposed that we set up as the base component in the new model a technological concern uniting diverse enterprises working toward the same end product into a single system. Such a concern would contain a hidden development spring, because the technologically linked system would itself be forced constantly to unravel the next narrow component restraining the productivity of the system as a whole. This model would create market incentives and competition, because several similar concerns would ordinarily operate simultaneously and generate an interest in scientific and technological progress.

In conclusion, something about the place of the Kazakh Communist Party in the CPSU pyramid. In the situation of the federation's renewal, the party Charter and the work of the CPSU Central Committee must contain a rational combination of the principle of independence for the republic party and the principle of CPSU unity.

The independence of republic parties in combination with republic sovereignty will help to eliminate the paradoxical super-penetrating ability of erroneous, libertarian decisions from the center. As a result of this, as they say, "when a wise man errs, the whole world stumbles behind him." It is still fresh in the mind—and this has been discussed more than once here—how the pointless, uncommonsensical battle against alcohol abuse and alcoholism set the stage for the destabilization and crisis of the Soviet economy, but no one dared to protest. Something better could be desired in the ill-prepared conversion of the defense industries, with its intellectual and material losses.

Decisions made behind the backs of the people and without republic participation are not only unpopular; they are also frequently fraught with serious negative consequences. It is time for us to learn to draw conclusions from the bitter lessons.

#### **Kazakh Presidential Council Meets**

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PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 90 p 1

[KazTAG report: "Session of the Presidential Council"]

[Text] The regular session of the republic Presidential Council was held on 19 June. It was chaired by N.A. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR. Taking part in it were council members N.A. Vdovin, M. Dzholdasbekov, M.R. Sagdiyev, S.S. Sartayev and D.Kh. Sembayev, as well as secretaries of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, deputy chairmen of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, and N. Abykayev, head of the president's cabinet.

The session discussed the work of preparing a new Union agreement, the holding of a meeting of heads of Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, restoration work following the earthquake in East Kazakhstan Oblast and the rendering of aid to the victims.

Telling about the recent session of the USSR federation's soviet, N.A. Nazarbayev stressed the fact that the union of sovereign socialist states for which we are striving calls for the resolution of a number of problems pertaining to the national-state structure of the USSR, and particularly the immediate development and signing of a new Union agreement guaranteeing real economic and political sovereignty for the republics and their effective interaction. The work on these matters has already begun. This document must be the fruit of joint labor by the republics themselves and not the center alone. It will then function at full force and take into account the interests of all parties.

It has been decided to include the following as plenipotentiaries of the Kazakh SSR in the working group of the USSR federation's soviet to help work out the new Union agreement: S.S. Sartayev, president of the republic soviet; Z.L. Fedotov, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet; and K.A. Abdulayev, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic Gosplan.

It is planned to hold a meeting of leaders of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan in Alma-Ata on 22 and 23 June. A number of joint documents will be approved at the meeting for purposes of coordinating the work of developing economic independence for the republics and improving the social conditions for their multinational populations. Among other things, we have to define the priority areas of cooperation with respect to common economic problems and finance and credit policy, international relations, culture, information exchange, ecology and seismology, development of the consumer market and consumer goods production, investment policy and coordination of activities in the area of foreign relations.

It was noted that the jointly approved documents will be open and will conform to the standards of international law. Enterprises and organizations of the nation, regardless of their form of ownership and their departmental and territorial affiliation, as well as foreign partners, may participate in the business cooperation. The purpose of all this is to develop horizontal economic ties and create conditions conducive to a transition to regulated market relations.

The session of the Presidential Council analyzed the situation which developed in East Kazakhstan Oblast following the powerful earthquake. More than 25,000 people were left homeless, and hospitals, schools and kindergartens were destroyed in the oblast. Preliminary calculations set the loss from the natural disaster at 300 million rubles.

The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers was instructed to set up a government commission for repairing the damage done by the earthquake and aiding the victims. Ministries, departments and ispolkoms [executive committees] were reminded of the need to take exhaustive steps to rebuild housing and other buildings and installations in the communities under their jurisdiction before the onset of cold weather.

Commissions on citizenship and on pardons were set up under the President of the Kazakh SSR, and M.R. Sagdiyev and S.S. Sartayev respectively were appointed their chairmen.

#### **Nazarbayev on Kazakh Earthquake Relief**

90US1223D Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 p 1

[Appeal to People of Kazakhstan, and to Republic Soviet, Party and State Organs and Public Organizations]

[Text] Dear fellow citizens:

You have already learned through the press about the terrible misfortune, the powerful earthquake which has struck the residents of Zaysanskiy, Kurchumskiy, Markakolskiy and Tarbagatayskiy rayons in East Kazakhstan Oblast and Kokpektinskiy Rayon in Semipalatinsk Oblast. I recently visited the disaster zone and saw the tragic consequences for myself. The blind elements took the life of a child, dozens of people were wounded, around 8,000 homes were damaged, and more than 25,000 people were left homeless. More than 70 health facilities, 22 kindergartens, 36 clubs and a large number of schools, stores and industrial buildings were also destroyed. Preliminary estimates put the damage at more than 300 million rubles.

No material losses can compare to the human suffering, however. Many of our fellow countrymen lost instantly the prosperity they had built up over the years, and their familiar home sites now contain ruins. Alarm has settled into their souls.

Expressing my sincere sympathy to all the victims, I want to instill hope in their hearts and to assure them that they will not be left without support. As President of the Kazakh SSR, I consider it my duty to appeal to all Kazakhs, to all of the republic's labor collectives, soviet, party and state organs and public organizations on this matter. The rayons struck by the earthquake must receive all-around assistance immediately. Materials and equipment must be sent there in order to provide the people with housing, to open hospitals, schools and preschool facilities and restore a normal life and production within the shortest possible period of time. Local governing agencies should first of all organize medical, trade and municipal services for the people and make skilful and prudent use of the food, medicine, consumer

goods, construction materials and equipment sent there. Special care should surround the children and mothers of large families.

A government commission has now been set up to decide all questions pertaining to the restoration of what was destroyed. The Kazakh SSR Trade Union Council is helping. USSR President M.S. Gorbachev responded fervently to my telegram, instructing the nation's government to provide emergency assistance to the rayons which suffered.

All republic oblasts must participate in the work underway to repair the damage from the earthquake. Each of them should assume sponsorship over a specific village, farm or facility. All ministries, departments and public organizations, without exception, must demonstrate the same kind of concern.

The good traditions of the Soviet people include the demonstration of compassion and mercy, whereby the entire world comes to the support of one in trouble. I appeal to all citizens of the republic to extend a helping hand and show concern for the people struck by the elements. I do not believe that anyone will remain indifferent to this pain in our common home!

Alma-Ata, 21 June 1990

#### **Patriarch Asks Gorbachev Help With Ukraine**

90UN2738A Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition)  
in Russian 24 Aug 90 p 3

[TASS correspondent report: "The Church Resolves Contentious Issues"]

[Text] Moscow, 22 August. The Synod Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church began its work in Moscow's Svyato-Danilov Monastery; the commission is entrusted with studying the proposals of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church aimed at expanding its independence in light of the broad range of historical, canonical, pastorate, and interethnic problems in the republic.

As was reported at the press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists that took place here in Moscow today, a group of the hierarchy, lead by the commission chairman, member of the Russian Orthodox Church Holy Synod Yuvenaliy, Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna, will visit Kiev 30-31 August, where they will have meetings with state, public, and church circles.

The press conference participants told of continuing acts of violence against orthodox believers on the part of Ukrainian Eastern-rite Catholics and representatives of the so-called Ukrainian orthodox autocephalic church. Metropolitan Yuvenaliy stated that the Moscow Patriarchate favors the settlement of church sentiments by means of dialogue and peaceful accords. It was reported that Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, was present at the commission's first session which took

place the previous evening. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church recently completed a trip to the Ukraine. He expressed his concern with the acts of seizure of the Cathedral of Saint Yura in Lvov by Greek-Catholics, and with the seizure of the head Khristorozhdestvenskiy Cathedral in the city of Ternopol by the dissenter-representatives of the Ukrainian autocephalic orthodox church. It was noted that the local authorities had in fact confirmed and legitimized the break-in and forced seizure of the Lvov cathedral by their decision to abrogate their agreement with the orthodox community and transfer the Cathedral of Saint Yura to Eastern-rite Catholics.

In view of this, Patriarch Aleksey sent a telegram to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev requesting intervention in the unfolding situation, as well to the Ukrainian leaders protesting the aforementioned decision. The Patriarch's telegrams emphasize that the actions cited "destroy the principle of regulating the relations of the Orthodox and the Uniates that was formulated during M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with Pope John Paul II. This principle assumes a preliminary agreement on contentious issues between the churches with subsequent recognition on the part of state authorities.

It was reported at the press conference that the results of the labors of the Synod Commission working group being sent to the Ukraine will be considered at the upcoming council of bishops [Arkhieireyskiy Sobor].

#### **Karakalpak Supreme Soviet Chairman Discusses Sovereignty**

90US1239A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
27 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with T.A. Yeshimbetovoy, chairman of the Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent I. Nigay: "I Cannot Imagine Myself Outside the Party"]

[Text] [Correspondent] How do you assess the performance of the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The congress and everything which preceded it, as well as the intense and open debate engaged in at the congress are clear evidence of the development of intraparty democracy. The Communists' forum demonstrated that all the delegates have a profound understanding of the fact that the restructuring is our destiny, an opportunity given to us by history, which we must not miss. Assessing the performance of the congress, I can say that it differed fundamentally from previous congresses. In the intense debates we still succeeded in avoiding erroneous decisions, and reason won out over emotions. In my opinion, the congress justified the hopes pinned on it, provided a fundamental, objective assessment of the times in the nation and pointed out the paths which led to the society's crisis. Despite persistent and deliberate attempts by certain

forces to split the party, the congress succeeded in preserving its organizational and ideological unity.

Yet another positive element for me and my fellow countrymen was the broad response to efforts by our delegates to direct the congress' attention to the fact that the condition of the Aral and the Aral region is in a class with the Chernobyl tragedy, and so little is being done to save the region that there is practically no progress in evidence. We were supported by all the Central Asian delegations. This problem was reflected in many congress documents. The ecological situation of the Aral region was singled out even in Gorbachev's concluding speech on the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee and in the resolution on this matter.

[Correspondent] There was a great deal of discussion at the congress about sovereignty for the republic communist parties. In your opinion, what is the significance of this issue with respect to the autonomous republic party organizations?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The delegates from the Karakalpak Oblast party organization, who were a part of the delegation from the Uzbek Communist Party, supported the new status for republic communist parties submitted to the congress in the draft CPSU Charter. Now, under the new charter, the Uzbek Communist Party has the authority to work out its own program documents and to define the priorities in its political work, based on the opinion of the Communists and republic interests, including our own autonomy, and decides on all organizational, cadre, financial, and other matters of party life. I should probably begin by saying that we shall now be called the Karakalpak Republic Party Organization. This, in turn, gives us authority independently to define the structure of our organization, to work out and submit to state authorities and the population, programs for resolving political, national, social, economic, cultural and moral problems in the region, and to vest in the larger primary party organizations the authority of party raykoms in matters of registering CPSU members, which was previously not permitted. The primary party organizations have been given exclusive authority in matters of accepting CPSU members, and their decisions are final. I want to point out that for the first time the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission now include one member each from the Karakalpak Republic Party Organization. Z. Pirmazarov, a lessee on the Madaniyat Sovkhoz in Karauzyakskiy Rayon was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and G. Khodzhanizayova, a doctor at the Turtkulskiy Rayon Central Hospital, was elected a member of the Central Control Commission.

[Correspondent] One more question about sovereignty: Karakalpakia and its economic complex are now a part of both the Union republic and the USSR.

[Yeshimbetovoy] The previous question was about political sovereignty. I would like to return to it and point out



that political sovereignty hinges on economic independence. The Karakalpak Autonomous Republic must be recognized as the sole owner of its land, the contents of the land, enterprises and everything else located on its territory. Incidentally, the just completed 2nd session of the Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet passed the Law of the Karakalpak ASSR on Land, which acknowledges all of this. The draft Law on Ownership in the Karakalpak ASSR was approved in its first reading at the same session. Naturally, the ties in the economic, national and cultural areas between the autonomous entities and the Union republics must be preserved and further developed. I consider it essential to develop direct ties also with other regions.

We know that for all indicators of socioeconomic development the Karakalpak ASSR lags behind not just the Union but also the republic average. This is first of all a result of the ecological crisis and the preservation of the one-sided raw materials focus of our national economic complex. During the period of transition to a regulated market economy we must therefore have a reliable social protection system and equivalent compensation for the cotton, rice, fruits, vegetables and other raw materials produced. The realistic way to resolve these issues is to work out a new Union agreement.

[Correspondent] The need for a Law on Local Self-Government and Local Management is apparent. What sort of law do you envision for the autonomous republic?

[Yeshimbetovoy] In order to resolve all the problems pertaining to the work and the provision of vital necessities for the population the soviets must have the necessary material and financial means. Unfortunately, however, local state authorities, particularly the lower elements, do not have authority today. The soviets have turned out to be materially dependent in things large and small upon the executive agencies of enterprises and organizations located within their territories.

Many rural soviets in the autonomous republic have actually become adjuncts of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses and are not in a position to make decisions on a single issue of any significance in rural life. The Law on Local Self-Government and Local Management must therefore indicate that the right to local self-government belongs to the community of residents (the territorial collective) and is implemented through representative agencies and other agencies of local self-government. The elected agencies must themselves define their structure and their operating procedure, and must be totally autonomous with respect to all decisions on matters under their jurisdiction. I believe that it would be a good thing for the law to provide for including in the local budget all of the income taxes from blue- and white-collar workers residing within the territory of the local soviet. In my view, such a measure could uplift many cities, settlements and villages with poorly developed economic strength.

[Correspondent] Are the soviet organs being strengthened in the autonomous republic? How are their relations with the ispolkoms, party organizations, ministries and departments, enterprises and organizations set up?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The process of turning over authority to the soviets of people's deputies, the people's agencies, which is the keystone of the restructuring, has begun. This is occurring with great difficulty, however. Its presidiums have been set up with regular staffs in connection with the new structure for the soviets. Most of the executive committees are deciding issues pertaining to materials and equipment support for the soviets, but we still have ispolkoms which have taken advantage of the shaky position of the party organs and newly elected soviets to artificially drag out the process of defining and organizing the work of these apparatuses. I regard the cause as underestimation by the ispolkoms of the role and, most importantly, the constitutional rights of the rayon soviets with respect to the former. I believe, however, that as the level of competence of the local soviets improves and they acquire experience and skills, situations like this will be resolved at sessions of the rayon soviets.

We also have committees which are surrendering authority to the soviets unwillingly, and the soviets do not consider it necessary to take that authority into their own hands more decisively. That is one thing. A second is that we have cases of resistance on the part of the executive organs, which out of habit still want to retain practical authority as well. In short, the establishment of the soviets as real agencies of popular power and the division of influence are proving to be a complex and painful process. It needs to be pointed out that in this situation the party organs as a whole are serving as a consolidating force. Without certain efforts on their part the process of turning over power to the soviets would be even more difficult.

With respect to cooperation with departments, enterprises and organizations, I believe that the Law on General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Management in the USSR should be in effect. Incidentally, however, it does not have direct effect, and a corresponding republic law has not yet been passed. The republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet are therefore presently working hard on the draft of a corresponding law for the Karakalpak ASSR.

[Correspondent] What is your opinion about combining the work in the soviets and party organs? How do you feel about Yeltsin's action at the congress, when he announced that he was leaving the CPSU to enable him to influence the activities of the soviets more effectively? Do the party duties, measures, conferences and bureau sessions not hamper you in your work in the Supreme Soviet?

[Yeshimbetovoy] If you mean the combining of the posts of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the USSR, I consider that this measure

is essential from today's standpoint, since the situation of the party and the nation as a whole is very serious. If there had been a division of duties, the situation, both economic and political, would have been further complicated. If you have in mind the combining of the duties of party organ secretary and the head of the soviet, however, I believe there is no need for this. In any case, however, it is for the electors to say. With respect to the statement by B.N. Yeltsin and other supporters of the Democratic Platform with respect to leaving the party, this naturally evoked a turbulent reaction at the congress, and the reason given by Yeltsin of "having a greater opportunity to influence the activities of the

soviets more effectively" is not convincing. But free men can do as they please, as they say. Do the party duties hamper me? They do indeed take up part of my time. It is beneficial to take part in the party activities, however. One gains a clearer picture of the direction taken in the work of the soviets by being frequently in the midst of various groups of the population and gaining a more complete and all-around understanding of the republic's pressing problems. As a Communist I have party assignments and am a member of an elected organ and of the bureau of the Karakalpak Republic party organization. This is not a burden to me, however, since I made a deliberate choice to become a Communist and cannot imagine myself outside the party.

### Interethnic Conflict in Tuva Detailed

90UN2567A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 3 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kuzmin: "Tuva: Death Comes in the Fog"]

[Text] "Everything is calm in Kyzyl," the local authorities assure us. We would like to believe it. However...

"...Tell us, what can we do?" he asks quietly looking into my eyes. "I am afraid; afraid for my daughter and for myself. At nights we listen to every rustle outside. Are they coming for us?"

There are no tanks on the streets of Kyzyl. At night women walk and children play in the courtyards in the small capital of Tuva.

But it is hardly dark before the walls of houses glow in the flashing blue lights of militia vehicles, and strong young men in gray berets with holsters and gas grenades go on duty. Every day on the Kyzyl-Abakaya Highway dozens of KamAZ trucks haul containers full of the household belongings of people who now call themselves refugees.

In a year and a half 1,500 Russian families, totalling 2,700 people, have left Tuva. Nobody knows the exact figures. However, there are villages where there are only 2-3 Russian families remaining out of the dozens that used to be there. These will not be there for long. Engineers, skilled workers, teachers and doctors are leaving. In a hurry, they leave behind their acquisitions, sell them cheaply or even simply abandon their homes. Many enterprises are threatened by work disruptions, and there are no teachers for the schools. In neighboring Krasnoyarsk Kray and beyond the Sayan Mountains there is not a single house available, not even a decrepit shack. Specialists with degrees settle down and take jobs as milkers, carpenters and watchmen.

It is not so easy to hit the road. Shots are frequently heard along the road and vehicle windows are broken by stones. Drivers refuse to drive their vans to remote areas in the republic. Young people threaten truck drivers hauling in grain and other products to their villages. Sometimes drivers are killed, and outrages are committed against buses.

What is happening in Tuva? There are differing answers to this question. "The rabble is running loose. There is a wild growth in crime," a sergeant in uniform waves his hands. "What, everything is normal," smiles a youth up in a tree. "They are killing Russians," gloomily interjects a man standing in line for containers that will not be available for months at Transgenstvo. "Yes, there is an outflow of the Russian speaking population from the republic, but the main reasons are family problems and poor schools. There is no need to sow the seeds of panic." This, as you can guess, is firmly stated by an official.

Let us try to understand. First, only the facts.

In 1989, 116 premeditated murders were reported in the republic, while 7 months into 1990 there have already been 93. In addition, 50 people have died from wounds. In 1989, 639 people suffered aggravated assault and some died from their injuries. A gang fight that involved several hundred young people in the settlement of Khovu-Aksy, culminated in pogroms and gun shots. A militiaman attempting to control the crowd was seriously injured.

Since that day any fact from the criminal log has lost its statistical anonymity, and becomes a weight on the swaying scales; and with every cup they cry "They are killing our own!" This was not just a skirmish at a dance, but a gang fight between Tuva youth and Russian militiamen. It is not simply, "detained for murder", but—what is his nationality?

Events moved tumultuously. Several homes of Russians in the settlement of Elegest were burned down. A young man in the capital was murdered when, after being asked for a cigarette, he responded in the Tuva language. Immediately thereafter anonymous letters and leaflets appeared in several villages. They threatened: "Get yourselves back to Russia. Otherwise, you will pay dearly." There were cases of mass slaughter of Russians in some regions. There was a fight at night in Sosnovka, when the windows of 11 houses were broken. Again, the victims were people who were not of the native nationality.

The public attended meetings. A truck and bus strike was threatened if the republic leadership did not take decisive measures to repress the violence. In response they tried to persuade the people "Live together peaceably." After the brutal murder of two fishermen and a 14-year old at Lake Sut-Khol, thousands of people at a memorial service demanded the resignation of the CPSU obkom, the council of ministers and the Minister of Internal Affairs. When the electrified crowd threatened, "Smash the obkom!" not a single party worker came to the microphone. The situation was saved by a militia general, not from Kyzyl but from Moscow, who came to Tuva with assurances. He was able to find the right words. Then accusations poured in on him from all the high places in a flareup of national dissension.

Only after furious pressure was a decision made to ask for help. OMON [Special purpose militia units] units came from Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Barnaul and the Buryat ASSR.

#### From the log of Sergeant S. Vasilev:

2 July. An hour after our arrival in Kyzyl the first provocation occurred. An excited Tuva woman came to the hotel where the captain of the local GOVD [Municipal Departments of Internal Affairs] was staying and started to cry. She said that 10 minutes ago in view of several people near the Sayany store we had viciously beaten two Tuvian students with rubber clubs. We went to the site



*of the supposed emergency—No eyewitnesses, no "casualties." The people's reaction was unexpected. They (primarily the Tuvinians) began to shame her and to expose her as a liar. She quickly disappeared. Our equipment, including the rubber clubs, that we had supposedly used to beat these people, was still packed in our baggage! On the streets there were groups of aggressive young men and drunks. We heard shouts: "Punishers!" "Mercenaries!" "You are dressed like SS men!"*

It would be fallacy to imagine that the Tuvinian people are all striving for a mononational society, bristling with with sawed off barreled guns and with knives to use against the "foreigners." Statistics show that many crimes in this crime wave are committed against the Tuvinians. Herdsmen in remote nomad camps, where there is nobody to call for help, elderly people and women are all frequently victims. The Tuvinians should not be painted in the darkest tones of criminality. As a rule the violators are young people from rural areas who have never worked and, consequently, do not have the means to exist. They gather in groups at discotheques, they chase cattle and horses away from kolkhozes; emboldened by alcohol, they burst into villages and holler in the streets. In Kyzyl they gather in groups in the bus station, city market and dormitories. After 10 pm, look out, passersby! They will not ask your name or nationality.

The republic hospital says that in 1989 they received 437 people with knife wounds, 28 of whom died. For comparison, in 1980 there were 202, and in the sixties, 4-5 such cases.

*6 July. While he was on duty Pavel Voytsekhovskiy was approached by an elderly Tuvinian woman who, after showing her identification as a member of the city soviet, asked: "Is it true that you came here with orders to shoot every second Tuvinian? If deputies have such information, what about ordinary citizens? It is not surprising we are surrounded by the wildest and most vicious rumours."*

After the special troops appeared in Kyzyl the crime rate declined by a factor of seven. Then, at all levels, a struggle to get the OMON out of the republic soon began. Informal groups and the Komsomol obkom were especially energetic about this. A general meeting organized by the Komsomol obkom made very unambiguous calls. It passed an appeal. Here is a part of it:

*"We demand that the special units pull out of Tuva within seven days. We think that their presence and activities are directed against Tuva youth, that they inflame relations between nationalities, and that they humiliate people. Also, maintaining them creates difficulties."*

In such cases one asks: "Who benefits?" Who would benefit if the crime rate were to again increase by a factor of seven? Certainly not people who want to live and work in peace, and not those Tuvinians whom I see thanking the special detachments, imploring them "Do not

leave!" There is a rumor that if the OMON attempts to leave, airline pilots will go on strike, hindering its departure.

Rumors, rumors, there are no end to them. Any event quickly becomes overgrown with conjectures and fantasies. Any fact must be verified, because unreliable information, as I myself learned, can come from people in authority.

Widespread reliability and objective information are now needed. However, the mass media are under powerful pressure. As usual, the newspapers publish the names of the guilty in all troubles, but view reports about events as provocations.

*13 July. A very "bountiful" day. During our shift we seized a large number of side-arms. Another thing is surprising: Our reports go into a vacuum; with a delay of at most one hour, the detainees are let go from the city department without any consequences whatsoever. Moreover, we retained three people with firearms; the same thing happened! Proceedings were brought against the last "gunman" (with a homemade six-shooter) only 3 days later under pressure from all our personnel and after a big scandal involving the management of the city department. They answered all our questions by referring to some mythical local conditions and unique features. Which? Pandering to violators of the law and criminals?*

Who will fight this bacchanal of crime? I put these very words to V. I. Kirakozov, member of the RSFSR Procuracy and chief of the department. He assured me that it did not involve just poor work but the complete lack of any solutions to crime whatsoever. "The situation is compounded, not because of not enough people in the law enforcement organs, but because they work so poorly."

Assuming responsibility in Khovu-Aksy, S. Bektenov, the newly designated chief of a village militia detachment, responded concerning his staff: "The collective has practically dissolved. More than half the cases have to be reexamined."

**The local leadership practically does not allow us to work. There is an increased flow of complaints to us, but after investigation not one of them is affirmed. All this takes a lot of time. One gets the impression that some of the leadership does not care that we have restored order.**

Did the signs of danger really appear in Tuva yesterday? For many years even the words "relations between nationalities" were forbidden. After their inclusion into the Soviet Union in 1944, the native people, who had hardly entered the feudal landlord stage of development, were, in an artificial manner, attached to the land. This damaged their national psychology, world views and entire way of life.

It is no use blaming this on the Russians, who were also incorporated into the "new society." The new arrivals taught specialists, were doctors and built cities and

factories. All the leaders had the same attitude. First let us send cobalt and asbestos to the Motherland; then sometime we will train people to intelligently use the land and its wealth. After all, it was much easier to bring in skilled specialists from beyond the Sayan Mountains and give them apartments immediately than it was to be concerned about employing the local population.

At the beginning of the 1960's, the Tuvinians, already totally collectivized, were forced to stop keeping livestock. There was no work at all in the village—only work in gardens, which Tuvinian women did not need at all. The herdsmen were in the nomad camps and the children were at boarding schools, the direct track to professional and technical schools. Everyone was on state support. Their family ties were disrupted, they no longer had a desire to be herders, and in fact had no special desire to work.

So this is how the generation that should have embraced Communism grew up.

According to some data, there are about 6,000 unemployed young people in a republic of 300,000. All barriers have been removed by the cadre department. However, qualified specialists are needed. Where there are jobs, the work is dirty and heavy.

The conviction grew that Russians had the best positions, consumed the best foods and drink, earned huge salaries and had multiroom apartments; everything was first rate for them. What was left for the native of this land?

K. A. Bicheldey, the leader of Interdvizheniye, now agrees. "We have never called for nationality quotas for jobs. Although, of course, our appeal has aroused not only patriotic, but also national forces. All the inhabitants of the republic have one opponent, the old apparatus, which is focused on power, struggling for survival and shunning nothing.

Kaadur Alekseyevich calls for democratization, a strengthening of sovereignty and the reorientation of the economy. He thinks that the source of the outburst lies in social and economic disorder. "It is necessary to give young people a good ideal to work for. This is the patriotic ideal—state and economic independence, a confederation with the USSR. This would make hard-ship worthwhile."

The problem is that many adherents of the Popular Front (Interdvizheniye) have a different interpretation of the same idea. They want to make territorial claims against Krasnoyarsk Kray and Mongolia. They disrupt meetings and voters' conferences, making reproaches against "nonnative nationalities." They distort history and the policies of Solchak Toka, a Tuvinian and the first leader of this republic. In their mouths his authoritative power is transformed into "violence that the Soviet empire inflicts on the Tuvinian people." The audience pays attention to these tirades.

Svetlana Mongushevna Biche-Ool has always struggled to preserve the national traditions, to create a special sector of ethnography and to publish a new edition of "Uchenyye zapiski" [Academic Writings]. She says: "Tuvinians should have an honorable place in the republic; I have always stressed this to students. However, why at the expense of others? Why is it necessary to blame all misfortunes upon the Russians? The artificial inflation of the language question and Lamaism become political when they are used by adventurers. The Tuvinians suffer most of all from this. At all meetings with activists from the Popular Front we warn them that these slogans can be used by unhealthy forces. Alas..."

Everybody we interviewed was always asked this question: Can you find those in the republic who use the instability for specific political purposes? They always answered affirmatively. True, according to the official versions, pogroms are caused by hooligans, while killings, shootings and robbery are purely criminal, with nothing in common. Leafleting and incitement are carried out by solitary individuals.

I want to believe that there is no "conspiracy" in Tuva. Everything is less complicated, but therefore more frightening. There is no underground organization; however, there is a thousands strong army of armed underclass, which, at any time, might join whichever side is necessary. Why work if one can plunder? Why stand in line for an apartment, if, terrorizing somebody, one can move into their house? Why try to get a promotion, if, after handing threatening leaflets to the boss, one can have his job tomorrow?

Yes, there are differences between the various strata of society in the republic. It is necessary to have "round tables" on a state language. There should be discussions about the future of the republic and ways of developing its economy.

However, are discussions possible with a very embittered mob for whom the only argument is guns and knives, with a mob for whom it is not important what it says on your passport but only that you stand in its way?

#### **Diaspora Relations Committee Chairman Views Armenian Interethnic Issues**

90US1256A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
21 Jul 90 p 1

[Interview with K. L. Dallakyan, a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by N. Manucharova: "What Are Our Priorities?"]

[Text] We have already learned to react somewhat more calmly, not without a dose of skepticism, to the various sessions and congresses. Not because we don't care about what is going on in our country—not at all. It's just that behind the verbal fireworks there have been so few concrete deeds. Words are steadily losing their value, unlike life, which gets more precious with each passing day. Very often the words themselves lag sharply behind

the natural course of phenomena, become a kind of postscript to what has already been done. No matter what happens there, however, with all its diversity of opinions and impressions, the 28th CPSU Congress is an event that draws public attention. The media have kept us up to date, but the stories of direct participants delegated to the congress from our republic will undoubtedly help us get a better understanding and feel for the atmosphere of the Communists' forum.

We are talking with K. L. Dallakyan, a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, someone well known to a wide circle of readers. Therefore I will introduce him briefly: Karlen Levonovich, doctor of philology, chairman of the Committee for Cultural Liaison with Armenians Abroad.

[KOMMUNIST] Karlen Levonovich, I have no wish to beat around the bush. Our sore point are the nationalities problems. At the 28th Congress you participated in the work of the section on "CPSU Nationalities Policy." Would you please tell us about this.

[Dallakyan] Contrary to our expectations, very few delegates signed up for this section, approximately 400 people. Whereas the number of participants in the other sections exceeded 1,000. A sociological survey was conducted at the congress to clarify which of the country's existing problems seemed most important to the delegates. In all, only 20 percent said that nationalities issues were the most burning and important. Interesting, don't you think? The rest considered them secondary or tertiary.

[KOMMUNIST] This probably characterizes the congress's attitude toward nationalities problems.

[Dallakyan] Not only the congress's but our whole government, the public's. Nationality problems are irritating and unsettling, and so many people make no effort to penetrate to the essence of interethnic conflicts.

During the section's work, questions were raised about the party's nationalities. There were no special reports. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A. Girenko, and A. Usmanov, accounted for themselves. I must say that these speeches were weak. There was no interpretation or analysis of the basic problems in the nationalities policy, just a list of individual facts and measures. The speeches by the representatives of the national minorities of the Russian Federation, especially the delegates from Checheno-Ingushetiya, were quite sharp. You know quite well about the fate of these peoples. The delegates representing the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic republics spoke out against both independence for the republics as well as their Communist parties. They demanded, essentially, the restoration of the old order, fought for the former totalitarian system in the party structure.

By the way, both in the commission's work on the rules and during the congressional sessions, center stage was held by the 22nd paragraph of the new Rules, which

provides for the independence of the parties and is a step toward federative relations between the Communist parties. So that the representatives from the Baltic, rejecting this point, were trying to prove that, if it passed, all the republics would be in the same situation as the Baltic ones are now. All this, of course, sounded unconvincing. After all, the Baltic itself has arrived at this "situation" under the current Rules. So that's not the point at all. The causes are much deeper. We need to sort out the sources for the appearance of national movements, not ascribe everything to the ambitions of certain individual.

[KOMMUNIST] Accusations of nationalism were heard several times from the congress's dais.

[Dallakyan] Many of its participants were inclined to equate those objective manifestations of national self-expression that can be observed everywhere today to nationalism. The fact is that the process of national liberation struggle for the peoples in our country was artificially curtailed, but history develops according to its own objective laws. Life itself has given impetus to the development of national movements. It is another matter that these process occasionally take on an undesirable aspect, but that is reality, and you have to deal with it.

Making recommendations, hanging labels, is pernicious. As for chauvinism, we have observed it for many decades in the example of the relations between our neighbors and Armenians living in their republic.

[KOMMUNIST] Did the section's work have any concrete influence on the nature of the resolutions passed by the congress?

[Dallakyan] I think they did. Especially the Rules. True, there's no mention of the federative structure of the party. But there are two entries that could serve as a basis for the further development of the principles of federation: the election, according to the regulations, of all Communist party secretaries to the Politburo; as well as the independence of the Communist parties.

[KOMMUNIST] From the media it became known that you spoke out against the formula advanced by the congress—the priority of human rights over the rights of nations. Insofar as I could tell, this also played a decisive role. In any event, in the final version the formula does not sound so categorical.

[Dallakyan] Yes, that's right. In his speech, M. S. Gorbachev strongly underscored his attention to the problem of the priority of the rights of the individual over the rights of the nation. He even proposed proposed a constitutional prohibition against the thesis.

We must guarantee the individual his rights. But we have not yet objectively achieved a level in our development where the problem of priority can be raised. On the other hand, acceptance of this formula could become a point



of departure for the pursuit of national movements. And I have spoken out on good grounds against its passage in the proposed version.

V. Movsisyan spoke very precisely on this issue. It makes no sense to set the two concepts in opposition—the rights of the individual and the rights of the nation; they should be linked. This thought came through in his speech. In its final version the formula was modified. I wouldn't say it was faultless. But still, it manages to avoid the kind of categorical quality that the general secretary at first maintained.

[KOMMUNIST] What do you think, can the congress's resolutions have a positive influence on the situation in our republic?

[Dallakyan] You know, today it's hard to foresee how events will take shape even in the short term. The pace of life is so swift that many resolutions, ideas, not only lag behind but don't even correspond to the current situation. In my opinion, the congress itself was guilty of this. It did not reflect completely accurately the situation in the country, it lagged behind in places. I don't exclude the possibility that under other conditions their resolutions might have been effective, but today I have no cause for optimism. In five years of perestroyka, we have razed the old edifice, we have destroyed it, but the design of a new one has yet to be broached. The same could be said about our nationality problems.

No resolutions were passed at the congress about NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] specifically, but there are entries in the documents about raising the status of autonomies. However, these are resolutions of the party congress. They can go into effect only when they also become a constitutional norm.

Refugees, the disaster zone . . . the congress did touch upon these problems. But what does an entry about eliminating the consequences of an earthquake mean? In essence it's a repeat of the two-year-old Politburo resolution. We've already had all this. And we don't have to go into the state the affected rayons are in.

Strictly speaking, when we were going to the congress, we realized that there was nothing much to expect. Nevertheless, I believe that we have to continue to utilize any chance, no matter how small, any tribune, in short, anything that one way or another could have an effect on the fate of our people. Of that I am firmly convinced. And no matter what happens, I'm still going to believe that better times will come for our people.

I place great hopes on the passage of a new union accord in which all national-government formations, including the autonomous ones, will be equal participants.

As for the Communist Party, it's having a hard time today. Winning the right to the people's trust, and under a multiparty system, and especially with the exacerbated crisis in the socioeconomic system, is not the easiest of tasks.

[KOMMUNIST] Karlen Levonovich, since you brought up the multiparty system, I'd like to know your attitude toward this phenomenon. And also: I think it would not be a mistake on my part if I drew a parallel between the proposed multiparty system in our country and the change in relations with our compatriots abroad representing various national parties.

[Dallakyan] I welcome the multiparty system. With respect to our compatriots I would say one thing: certainly the change in the political situation here in the country has influenced the nature of our relationship with the diaspora. It has become closer and more open. Our committee, as is well known, maintains contacts with cultural unions, and it doesn't matter to us today who belongs to which party. We relate identically to representatives of all parties. After all, there is something greater than party allegiance: allegiance to one nation. And there are interests that supersede everything else: the interests of the people. I think that says it all.

#### **Muradyan Views Progress of Karabakh Movement**

90US1256B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
21 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Igor Muradyan by Ida Martirosyan: "That Same 'Certain' Muradyan"]

[Text] "That's a provocative question! Turn off the microphone!" God is my witness, I had no provocative intentions, nevertheless my interlocutor had a certain right to judging the question so categorically.

The man, whose name until very recently was the equivalent of a Symbol, having passed through the apotheosis of struggle, the peak of worship, the bitterness of schism among like-minded people, having known hope, disenchantment, and . . . finding himself now somewhat alienated and unaccepted, could allow himself his interpretation of my "frontal" questions.

For the central press he was "a certain Igor Muradyan." The "certain" was an attempt to belittle him to the level of a pretender. But despite everything, for those who had made sense of the essence of what was happening, he remained an idol. And suddenly . . .

However, behind every "suddenly" stretches a logical chain of cause-and-effect connections.

#### **'A Dead Point' or . . .**

[KOMSOMOLETS] According to the laws of the detective genre, every investigation begins with the search for a motive: Who stood to benefit from this? Perhaps one day more than one political detective story will be written about our tragic events. Right now, though, let's try to conduct a little investigation in an analogous style, but applied to the situation that has taken shape. However, before posing the question of motive, let's lay out the previous circumstances.

So, Igor, how do you look on the situation in the republic?

[Muradyan] Total confusion . . . of ideas, organizations, events; the compass point, which only recently steadily indicated Karabakh, now spins feverishly. It is not a matter of a decline in activity among people who are disenchanted with the prospects for struggle, who haven't been able to wait for large-scale victories, and so on. It's an effect. The cause lies in the basic political reality of the present day—indifference to the problem on the part of the government, which is carrying out orders from the Center about isolating Karabakh, and an analogous position on the part of the informal organizations and the reorientation of the HSH (Armenian Pan-national Movement) to self-determination for the republic.

[KOMSOMOLETS] A rather explosive pronouncement. After all, Karabakh remains in all the slogans and deputies' platforms.

[Muradyan] It does, but it's not progressing—it's a dead issue. Who stands to benefit from this and why isn't hard to figure out. Above all, the party apparatus. Basically what is that? A rigid structure that expresses the interests not of the millions of Communists but of a specific social stratum that enjoys the privileges of power. Karabakh, with its complex of problems, is a threat to the well-being and stability of this social group.

The second stratum are the "business people," the bigwigs of the shadow and state economies. Despite internal antagonism, on both sides, the blockade cuts off billions in profits.

The third stratum is the Movement itself. The two-year struggle has shown the original idea of unification under the Union to be a utopia. Hence the reorientation toward self-determination.

[KOMSOMOLETS] In that case, it is perfectly logical. Instead of beating your head against the wall of an impasse, try to solve the problem another way, from the position of a sovereign state possessing greater freedom of action and greater opportunities.

[Muradyan] I don't think so. Russia's imperial manner must not be underestimated. The Union is quite strong. There's no future in counting on a constitutional path to self-determination. The Baltic experience is proof of that.

[KOMSOMOLETS] But if even this path leads to an impasse, doesn't it follow that the Karabakh movement was doomed to failure from the very beginning? And the sacrifices made in its name . . .

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Stop! Now let's mentally rewind the tape to the beginning of our material, to the sacramental question of provocation, uttered when we were talking about sacrifices. There is probably no need to say that no struggle

can get by without them. Just like the weightiest counter argument: "We were acting within the framework of the Constitution." Who could have expected in reply such vandalism in a state that pretends to being ruled by law? And so on and so forth.

To which could be replied that the leaders who take upon themselves responsibility for fateful decisions are obligated to foresee all scenarios, right up to the unthinkable, so as to implement the least sacrificial. The "war on a leash" that the center is conducting between the two republics ought to have forced them to seek out other ways much earlier, and so on and so forth. Bearing in mind Igor's opinion that without the "leash" the war could have been even worse, the excursion into the sad past might have gone on much longer. But recalling that we most often analyze post factum (although that too is needed), forgetting the importance of analytical prognosis, we returned the conversation to precisely this channel.

#### The Karabakh-Sovereignty Sandwich

[KOMSOMOLETS] Fine, Igor, let's get away from present-day realities. Accepting the disposition of forces you propose, what prospect do you see?

[Muradyan] A dual one. First, overcoming internal isolation. This requires finely wrought diplomacy. Very recently any material on Karabakh in the West was snatched out of our hands. Now publication costs tens of thousands of dollars. The topic has iced over due to the certainty that there is an agreement about this between the West and Gorbachev. His authority there is indisputable because he managed to bring about in the Union what the civilized world has been fighting for. This is conversion, the removal of "Moscow's hands" from Eastern Europe, the impossibility of the voluntaristic principle of war, and so on and so forth. But the reverse side of this is the rights of man, which they cannot disregard. Especially since the U.N. Human Rights Commission will be examining the Karabakh issue. How subtly and purposefully the Movement is able to play on this will determine the outcome.

Second is the intra-Armenian path. The struggle's emotional fuse, the rallying cry, "Fight! Fight to the end!" has been extinguished (we've already spoken of the causes). Now it is important to interest the people and entrepreneurs with specifics, the resolution of whose problems (instead of the national-patriotic times of the first stage)—of food, raw materials, resources, and so on—Karabakh could help bring about. That is, insofar as it is profitable for the republic and each of its inhabitants from a purely economic standpoint. Here, too, much depends on how constructive the proposals of the HSH, as the leader recognized by the majority, are. No, it's still impossible without a retrospective view. You just asked me whether the start of the Movement wasn't a forestalling of events. No! In place of years and years of unadorned genocide a qualitatively new jump in expansion loomed—virtually total assimilation. We had let it

go on like that for decades, limiting ourselves to regular visits to Moscow and the epistolary genre—unanswered. It would have been criminal to let that moment slip as well. The Movement not only aroused national awareness but brought concrete victories as well. Unfortunately, right now instead of capitalizing on them we're just trying to hold the fort. Our group is basically working in this direction. We are seeking any opportunities to redirect Karabakh's enterprises into union and republic departments. By the way, when I spoke about dual prospects, I ought to have added that their bulwark or guarantee was that Karabakh would hold out till the end. It had no other option. And to wait for independence, like a panacea, means to abandon it to the mercy of fate.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Igor, one might get the impression that you are either opposed to independence or are accusing HSH of gambling on it.

[Muradyan] Nonsense! As an Armenian I can't help but be interested in our common national problems. As for HSH, not only am I not accusing them of anything, but I understand them. If there weren't the problem of NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], I would more than likely maintain the same positions on the question of sovereignty. But there is. After all, there's a blockade, there's the increased level of organization in Azerbaijan, as well as many other factors stemming from the Karabakh epic and complicating the sovereignty issue.

[KOMSOMOLETS] A multilayered political sandwich. Hard to bite into without choking.

[Muradyan] That's why I see that success will be determined by how constructive the proposed solutions are. HSH's, parliament's, whoever's. We have been talking a lot now about the process of democratization. In actuality, what's going on is liberalization. More alternatives and degrees of freedom. Right up to walking through the streets with a gun unimpeded and seizing governmental institutions. Democratization is not the rule of the changing elements or the crowd but the rule of the people. On the basis of the Law. This is why every civilized state is founded not on permanent liberalization but on the bureaucratic (although we have made this word anathema) observance of the Law. So that if we want to truly gain anything, then we have to place our bets on a rule-of-law foundation for the new structure of our society.

#### **If You Want To Survive—Know How To Anticipate**

[KOMSOMOLETS] Igor, now that we've started talking about Law, the element of the crowd, doesn't it seem to you that the closing of many industries was voluntarism on the part of the masses, if I can put it that way? The economic loss from this . . .

[Muradyan] But who's calculated it? Who ever figured that the strategy of the union economy was such that there would be no complex industries, just individual

components? People thought we had a developed machine building industry. Whereas actually our finished product amounts to 17 percent. That is, dependence on others. Our chemical industry does not have raw materials. Metallurgy has folded altogether. Yes, I agree. The Alaverdskiy industrial complex is morally exhausted and ecologically unsound where it is. But my God, there are metallurgical complexes in line with Manchester, Hamburg, Liverpool, Balaton, Switzerland. Industry doesn't need to be turned around but rebuilt to be ecologically clean. The Alaverdskiy complex was the basis for electrical technology, which in turn was the basis for machine building. Can you imagine what it cost us to stop it? And that's only one example. No one did the figuring. Meanwhile, the economy is very concrete. It won't put up with fantasies and spontaneities. It requires a precise accounting of resources and finances. And the most important thing—an accurate prognosis, moreover, with alternative scenarios as insurance. Americans say, with good reason, "If you want to survive, know how to anticipate." Given our disregard for this golden rule, we face the threat of further belt-tightening.

[KOMSOMOLETS] This must be the price of society's stormy politicization: from little to great without considering the absence of professionalism. By the way, don't take this for another "provocation," but don't you think you would have done more good in your own profession? Wouldn't you like to become the author of the plan for Armenia's economic takeoff?

[Muradyan] In the first place, I am involved in my profession, being chairman of the Nagorno Karabakh assistance commission.

As for the other, I don't have any such plan, although many of my computations, which were once looked upon as ravings, are now being confirmed. Honestly speaking, I would be surprised to learn that someone had proposed a "miracle" here. That takes a serious scientific foundation, which we lack. And again, as long as we remain a structural unit of the Union's economy, a miracle like that is hardly practicable.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Yes, the blockade of Lithuania. . . . The Union's number one claim—the capital invested in the republic's development. But we have a certain advantage. Forgive my dilletantism, but once the union investments and in the republic the return were calculated, couldn't Spyurk cover the debts? A payoff, not as a charitable act but as the right of a preferential and privileged business undertaking?

[Muradyan] But what criteria are the calculations to be made on? There aren't any analogies. At the present state there are no grounds for declaring a total break with Moscow and, therefore, with all its subordinate subjects, say, a federation.

[KOMSOMOLETS] The people are not only tired—they're hungry. The next stage for the crowd, which has been roiled in animosity, will be an even more terrible,



indiscriminate closing of enterprises. And understandably so. All parties say they are the nation's saviors, but in fact so far the situation has only gotten worse. The people and the parties are accusing each other of promising everything and doing nothing. Well, what if they would just propose an open competition of economic plans. Would this be a policy problem?

[Muradyan] It's not a matter of being a problem but again of the legal basis providing guarantees for any steps taken. And more—a matter of power. What that power will be like and to whom it will belong—our rights truly depend on it.

#### **Don't Throw an Ashtray at Me**

[KOMSOMOLETS] If we've already gotten as far as power, don't throw an ashtray at me, please, for my next "provocative" question. Isn't the cause of many misfortunes hidden in the thirst for leadership, in the desire of anyone the least bit intelligent to organize his own party? Isn't what's going on right now in fact a struggle among authorities, a struggle for power?

[Muradyan] That is inevitable, as are democratization and liberalization. And the role of the leader should not be underestimated. As for power, to me the office of deputy—maybe someone else looks on it this way, too—is a tribune from which I can be heard and, I hope, understood.

[KOMSOMOLETS] You've mentioned the time wasted several times already. Maybe now is the time to act individually in the name of society?

[Muradyan] In my youth I used to go to the public bath. The public rooms were cheaper and the beer was the same. Everyone was naked and equal. A private room cost more. But it was separate with all its attendant goods. A joke.

[KOMSOMOLETS] And seriously? If right now is the moment for consolidation?

[Muradyan] Next come universal rights and nonbinding attempts . . .

[KOMSOMOLETS] No, if we allow a concrete proposal?

[Muradyan] Then I would propose my own.

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[KOMSOMOLETS] Here, if you please, I'll press "Stop," ending our conversation in the hope that there is a formal (even if only for the start) readiness. In order to disperse any possible pessimistic mood among the readers and once again emphasize the fundamental goal of the material, I'll tell a story.

Once, they see, Igor saw some girls who had staged a sit-in on the stairs of a government institution and yelled to them: "What are you sitting there for?! You should be getting married and having babies." The liveliest among them was not at a loss: "So why don't you have some of your own?" Igor, they say, didn't have to dig around for a response: "Who says I don't?! I've got eleven—illegitimate." Too bad there wasn't a wit there to draw the bottom line: "Maybe it's time for wayward relatives to unite! Since everyone is already fighting for that on such a large scale."

### Freedom of Association Draft Law Reviewed

90UN2670A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA Parliamentary Correspondent  
V. Dolganov: "After the Repeal of Article Six"]

[Text] Yuridicheskaya Literatura Publishing House has published on the author's initiative the draft Law on Social Civic Associations (on Freedom of Association) in the USSR.

From both the ancient and recent history of man it is well-known that the health and the level of true democracy in society is determined by the very presence of and active participation of various parties, organizations and civic associations. Thus it is easier for people to defend their political and civic freedom; thus it is simpler for them to struggle for victory at the polls—if, it goes without saying, this or that organization, party, or civic group makes achieving power its goal, and not, for example, collecting stamps or breeding cats.

We probably do not need to be reminded that until very recently the CPSU Central Committee would not have sanctioned even the very thought of the possibility of such organizations, which were considered an encroachment on the "foundation" and "stability of the ranks." And so we paid our dues, obediently, without exception, the entire country, whether to the Life Guard's society (and until recently for a major water reservoir of 500 kilometers), or to the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR], or the Red Cross or some other such association, headed at the center and in the localities and zealously guarded and directed by a vast army of "volunteers for wages"—an army of the kind of completely unneeded functionaries, which are in great abundance even today in many offices large and small.

"Voluntary" societies, into which we were driven by the millions, without asking our consent, were quite prolific. And they required considerable sums for their existence. That is to say, in a country experiencing, among other shortages, yet a shortage of books, a professional bibliophile's association was formed; that is to say, under conditions already approaching a dry law, a teetotalers' bureaucracy sprang up.

And only when truly voluntary civic associations appeared in the country (many of which moreover set for themselves goals which are purely political) did it become clear: truly social organizations, and at times even parties, have become a fact of life among us too.

And this meant that it was necessary to take the next step as well: Having acknowledged the existence of such organizations de facto, we must think about legislation which would regulate, as in all civilized countries, the principles for creation, registration and operation of such organizations. The vital necessity for creating such a law was mentioned at the first Congress of USSR

People's Deputies. But only after the repeal of Article Six, did work begin on a draft law on social associations and organizations. Only in recent days did the third session of the nation's parliament finally examine it in the first reading.

Then why did the Yuridicheskaya Literatura Publishing House, after the first reading had already taken place in parliament, publish at the expense of the INDEM [Informatics for Democracy] Center for Applied Political Research an authors' initiative draft of the Law on Social Civic Associations (on Freedom of Association) in the USSR, prepared by Doctor of Juridical Sciences M. Fedotov, Candidate of Juridical Sciences S. Soldatov and Candidate of Historical Sciences S. Stankevich? The answer to this question is provided in the foreword by USSR People's Deputy S. Stankevich. He states, specifically, that the official draft created in the offices of the Ministry of Justice, in spite of in-depth critical examination in the parliamentary committees and commissions, is not free of repetition of the errors of the old political and legal thinking, and that the shortcomings of this document are of an organic, conceptual nature. And that means that no finishing work of any kind can help it. Therefore, the authors of the draft have created an alternative legal act.

In this document, principally different approaches are designated to the formation of social associations and their relationship with government and other social organizations. The authors propose their own variant for all the links in the complex system of membership, international ties, property, and production-economic and financial activities of social civic associations (societies). Of interest are the principles of control over the actions of these associations, the procedure for discontinuance and the procedure for appealing decisions on discontinuing the existence of the formations—which up to now have been called unofficial, although at times these are actually parties, with their own press organs and developed administrative structures. Also extremely important is the article which defines the disposition of property upon the liquidation of one organization, party or union or another.

We would point out that the present publication is not the first instance in which the Yuridicheskaya Literatura Publishing House has taken up educational functions and has acquainted the readers with laws which have already been adopted and which are in effect, helping them to grasp the essence, spirit and letter of the law.

### Moscow Judges Protest Selection Process

90UN2568A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 31 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by S. Blagadarov: "Femid Is Under Suspicion: What Does Mossoviet Not Like About Moscow Judges?"]

[Text] Several hundred capital judges, essentially representatives of all of Moscow's rayon courts, have gathered

at Moscow's Krasnopresenskiy Rayon People's Court Conference Hall to protest the decision of the first session of the Mossoviet's new personnel. The meeting was conducted with emotion and with strong feelings. This would have been impossible to imagine in another setting.

But their fate was being decided here. The fact is that the first session of the new Mossoviet adopted a decision on May 29, 1990 about early and gradual election of judges. Many capital judges perceived this innovation as an undisguised form of pressure and an attempt to eliminate the old corps of judges, having formed a new corps that, in the opinion of a narrow group of deputies, is appropriate for work under new conditions.

And really in many cities, new Soviets have decided to delay elections of judges right up until June 1992 when the legal term of office of all people's judges expires. That is what has been done in Leningrad. And in Moscow Oblast, people's judges have been reelected for 10 years without a degrading or subjective preliminary procedure.

Mossoviet followed a different path. A special commission was established here and each potential judge passes through its sieve. And this would be sound if everything was done competently and for the good of the cause. If previously (and this standard of law theoretically exists until the present time) all judges have been elected by the population according to place of residence for a period of five years while working quietly and independently for this entire time, now this commission's "approval" has to be obtained to be able to work while being in a suspended and nervous state for each minute of two years: Will they elect [me] or will they not elect [me], as some deputy looks at some judicial decision.

Today this commission "is not passing" the overwhelming majority of candidates being nominated for the position of judge. As a rule, no reasons are given for rejections and there is no professional conversation in the commission because non-professionals are judging professionals. The consequences of this for the capital are sad—today judge positions are not fully manned in practically all Moscow courts. If we add to this the fact that half the people's assessors have not [been appointed] by the present time, you can imagine under what kind of conditions we are being forced to administer justice in the capital.

Well, judges have been gripped with uncertainty about tomorrow and constant anticipation of the troubling unknown that is paralyzing normal work. In fact, where are the guarantees that if a judge renders a decision that does not suit some of the Mossoviet deputies that will he not be reelected "in gradual elections" at any moment?

And there are alarming examples. Frunzenskiy Rayon people's judges were frankly told that many of them would not be reelected because they had not tried cases "just so" on violation of the decree on the procedure for

conducting rallies and demonstrations. Chairman Mednikov was not elected for a new term [of office] at Proletarskiy Rayon Court. They did not approve a man who had worked in the courts for more than 15 years without waiting for the results of an RSFSR Ministry of Justice competence commission inspection and without clarifying what specifically prevents Mednikov's election to a new term.

These trends particularly trouble experienced judges who have worked for many years. And they are not really hiding the fact that Mossoviet's new personnel do not need "old" judges. Communist judges, who do not wish to cease their membership in the Party and which is contrary to Mossoviet recommendations, feel uncomfortable.

But is it really impossible to understand that we are inflicting irreparable damage on justice in the capital by tearing down the old judicial corps, breaking the continuity of generations, and leaving the courts without experienced personnel. These experiments with early and gradual elections of judges are particularly inappropriate precisely with the sharp increase of crime. The current corps of judges is already choking under an avalanche of cases and what will occur in the future?

It is no coincidence that at the meeting of capital judges it was said that many court collectives are withdrawing their agreement to early elections and that a large number of judges, while anticipating a negative outcome, have already written statements of refusal to participate in the elections. Thus, the Moscow court manning situation could become simply catastrophic in the near future.

Yes and right now there is no way that we can talk about any kind of court independence under a permanently existing threat of their non-election. Direct pressure of individual deputies also exists and there are many examples of this. But is deputy pressure on justice really better than the Party [pressure] that the new deputies so aggressively oppose? The principle of judges' independence must be absolute no matter how political competition in the capital and in the country as a whole develops.

Meeting participants adopted a resolution by a majority vote that is the basis in which judges' nonconcurrence is expressed with the Mossoviet session decision on early and gradual elections and it pointed out that far from all experienced personnel are burdened by the load of old approaches and, on the contrary, many of them are competent jurists. Moscow people's judges have been elected by the city's residents and they have their power to carry exercise justice from them right up to June 1992 and there is no justification to subject them to any type of preliminary examination at this time.

Many see the fundamental solution of the problem not in electing people's judges but by designating or confirming them through an RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree.



**Moscow Detective Agency Fights Industrial Espionage**

90UN2670B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
16 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with "Aleks" Detective Bureau Director V. Kosyakov by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Korneyev: "Protecting the Firm's Secrets"]

[Text] Private detectives in the capital are waging a struggle with industrial espionage.

"We are protecting the legitimate interests of citizens and organizations," stated Moscow's Aleks Detective Bureau Director Valentin Kosyakov, a member of the International and British Detective Association, in an interview with IZVESTIYA correspondent Korneyev. "Among the orders which we fulfill, there are also those associated with the struggle with industrial espionage, or as it is otherwise known, accounting for information containing a commercial secret."

At present many organizations are being set up in the country, which possess high-quality technology, especially in the areas of petrochemicals, metallurgy, machine-building, and software. In a word, by all those which are capable of earning considerable profit. It is understandable that these organizations are interested in assuring the protection of their commercial secrets. But you see, they frequently do not know how to do this, and they do not possess people with the appropriate training. In short, they need professionals.

"We can detect people selling the secrets of their firms on the side (after which they are simply fired, since, unfortunately in our country there is as yet no criminal liability for selling industrial secrets)," explained "Aleks" director. "In addition, we are conducting an investigation of technology: after all, industrial espionage is usually carried out by technical means. For instance, information can simply be 'picked up' from a computer located in a neighboring building.

"Therefore we are also carrying out work on expert analysis of technical means and are providing them protection from unsanctioned reception of information. We also have the cadre and technical ability to do this."

Joint enterprises and major cost-accounting firms are turning to the services of the bureau.

Incidentally, at the bureau they cited the following—quite vivid—example: A joint enterprise asked "Aleks" to find out which of the enterprise's employees was taking the very costly computer programs it had developed and selling them to cooperatives. The bureau went out to a cooperative which had hired programmers, and asked it to place an ad in the press which would sound attractive to a certain type of specialist. The detectives were present at the interview for those seeking the job... And this was enough, so that by the end of the second week after the order was taken, they had met the SP

[standard program] employees they were seeking, who had taken their firm's programs to sell.

**Chairman Views Future of Armenian People's Control Committee**

90US1266A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian  
26 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with G. Martirosyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR People's Control Committee, by an Armenpress correspondent: "People's Control: Yes or No?"]

[Text] Rapid changes have recently been taking place in the political life of our country. The organs of people's control have not remained apart from this. In this connection, an Armenpress correspondent met with the chairman of the Armenian SSR People's Control Committee, G. Martirosyan, and asked him to respond to a number of questions.

[Correspondent] The processes of renewal of the federation, which are taking place within the country, the acquisition by the union republics of ever increasing sovereignty, and the introduction of the principles of a regulated market economy necessitate a fundamental change both in the structure of economic management and in the form of control methods. In each union republic these questions are being decided on the basis of the social and economic conditions that have developed within them. Thus, in Kazakhstan and in the republics of Central Asia, sessions of the supreme soviets have found it expedient to preserve the organs of people's control. In Estonia and Lithuania, the people's control committees have been transformed into organs of state control and in the RSFSR, Belorussia, and Moldavia, they have been abolished. Which path, in your view, should our republic follow on this question?

[Martirosyan] We also discussed abolishing the people's control organs at a session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet in January of this year.

In my view, one cannot agree with the view that it is inexpedient to preserve the organs of people's control within the Armenian SSR. What do I base this on? A complicated socio-political and economic situation has now developed here, with us, one that is distinguished in many ways from other republics. Problems connected with lack of resolution of problems connected with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), the devastating earthquake, the extreme difficulties connected with receiving and settling hundreds of thousands of refugees, the prolonged blockade of rail and motor vehicle roads by the Azerbaijan SSR, the breakdown in fulfilling plans for restoration and construction operations in the earthquake zone, and the departure from there of a part of the construction organizations that had been brought in, have led our national economy to the brink of a deep crisis.

As our examinations (proverka) indicate, there has been a sharp drop in executive discipline within the republic.

Many laws of the Armenian SSR, acts of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and decisions of the republic's government remain unfulfilled.

But now, judge for yourselves, is it possible in these conditions to weaken control, to eliminate one of its basic aspects? I think that it is not. But to reach a final decision—this is the prerogative of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] How do you assess the work of the Armenian SSR people's control organs? In what do you see its basic shortcomings?

[Martirosyan] A majority of workers in the republic's city and rayon people's control committees, together with non-staff activists and people's control groups, have been operating under complex conditions and have been working intensively. During the past year and a half, 1989 and the first half of 1990, the republic's people's control committees, and we have 55 of them, reviewed the results of more than 3000 examinations conducted in various sectors of the national economy and took measures to eliminate significant shortcomings that were uncovered. There is no doubt that this work has helped to prevent many other mistakes and shortcomings and to strengthen state discipline.

For various violations of state discipline, the committees were forced to call more than 3,500 persons to account, to remove 57 of these from their positions, and, in partial reimbursement of damage caused to the state, to recover a total of 150,000 rubles from guilty parties. Of course, not everybody likes this.

During the past year and a half the attention of the republic's control organs has been directed toward those urgent questions which have defined our reality: control of how operations are going in the earthquake zone and of how the republic's special purpose programs are being fulfilled—for production of consumer goods, the energy program, the food program, and the housing program. A significant place has been given to questions of monitoring the fulfillment of the plans and tasks for the republic's economic development, the struggle to preserve socialist property, the course of freight operations at railroad stations, and other questions.

Checks by people's control committees are uncovering a large number of instances of serious violation of Soviet laws and state discipline, which are causing great harm to the public, the workers, and the collectives and which do not help the republic to get out of the crisis situation.

We received appeals from 9641 citizens 1989 and 3438 during the first half of 1990. Of these, 2508 and 930 respectively were written petitions. Not a single letter or a single appeal from a citizen goes without attention.

Of course, it is not possible in this short interview to completely cover the nature of our work. I should only note that necessary measures are taken on the basis of all our checks and that we monitor their fulfillment.

What kinds of shortcomings do I see in the work of the republic's people's control organs?

Certain decisions of the committees, including that of the republic as well, are too liberal and the degree of guilt of officials who commit one violation or another is not being matched by the punishments imposed upon them. This is the fault of the people's control committees.

Often, they are unable to stand up to the party committees and the directors of economic organs who have tried under all kinds of pretexts to absolve individual officials of responsibility. Their "nomenklatura" protection and the timidity of the committees in the face of it also has not helped to eliminate liberalism in evaluating the activities of individual officials.

There is an extreme lack of glasnost in the work of people's control organs. We need it not only so that working people will know about the activities of a control organ, but so that others can learn from the mistakes of some. Finally, glasnost is a powerful means of influence on all those who do not respect the laws and norms of our society.

[Correspondent] What ideas do you have with regard to restructuring the organs of people's control?

[Martirosyan] Many years of experience have shown that the word "people's" does not entirely correspond to the essence of the work which a committee carries out. There is a view that it would be correct to transform the union-republic organ—the Armenian SSR People's Control Committee—into a republic-level Armenian SSR State Control Committee, into an Armenian SSR Goskontrol. Such a system, in our view, should consist of an Armenian SSR State Control Committee, formed by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and, working under it, of city and rayon state control committees, formed by the corresponding soviets of people's deputies and working under their direction.

Organs of state control should be independent of political organizations and should be guided only by the laws of the Armenian SSR, decisions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and the Law on State Control in the Armenian SSR.

The Armenian SSR organs of state control should develop their work in close contact with the commissions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and of local soviets of peoples deputies and should monitor fulfillment of the laws of the Armenian SSR, of the decisions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and of state programs for social and economic development approved for the republic, while paying special attention to the earthquake zone and also to decisions of local soviets of people's deputies.

The composition of a state control committee and its apparatus should be decided on an elective and competitive basis following the principle of providing alternate choices. Maximum time periods for holding positions

connected with control activity should be established for workers within the state control system.

We have submitted these proposals to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. In our proposals we also point out that, within the republic, there is a large number of various control organs that are carrying out interdepartmental control and therefore that measures should be developed aimed at considerably reducing their number. The goal: to concentrate the efforts of control organs, to eliminate parallelism and duplication in their work, and to reduce the number of examinations to a reasonable minimum.

[Correspondent] You haven't said anything about the public control which people's control groups carry out. What proposals do you have with regard to their future activities?

[Martirosyan] During the fourth quarter of 1989, a report-back election campaign took place within the people's control groups and posts in the Armenian SSR. It was recognized as expedient to abolish the people's control posts and to reduce the number of groups.

At the present time, 3,963 people's control groups, comprised of 47,500 people's controllers, have been established within the republic's enterprises and organizations. They exist in almost every labor collective and represent a considerable public force in the struggle against shortcomings which, unfortunately, exist in large quantity. What should be done with them? How should the force of their public influence be rationally utilized under the present conditions of enterprise independence? We think that this question should be left to the examination of the labor collectives. It would be correct to have public control groups functioning at enterprises and organizations and working under the direction of the labor collective council.

[Correspondent] There is a current view among many people that in countries with a developed market economy they get along "without any control."

[Martirosyan] I hope supporters of the idea of no-control will not be offended by my sharpness, but the arguments they cite testify to their lack of competence. There probably is not a single country where a control organ is not available: public, parliamentary, presidential, or state. It is apparently known to few that there is a world association of supreme state control organs—"Intosai [International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions]." Representatives of 150 different countries belong to it.

The control and auditing organs of foreign SPSN [not further identified] exercise control mainly over the utilization of state funds and property. They examine expenditure by ministries, departments, and other administrative organs of the monies allocated for their maintenance and for carrying out state programs.

The United States, the country with classical market relations, for example, has such a control organ as the Presidential Council on Honesty and Efficiency in Government, which comprises more than 5,000 persons. Its main task is to coordinate the activities of all control and auditing organs in the struggle against various kinds of abuse in carrying out federal programs.

Austria's control organ is empowered to examine not only the entire state economy but also financial activities connected with charitable and other funds and institutions, management of which is carried out by organs of the federation.

China took the path of economic reforms and the establishment of market relations and did not have organs of state and public control. Consequently, following an increase in abuses and corruption, primarily within the state apparatus, organs of state control in China were reestablished.

I think that they will also eventually come to this where a decision has been made to eliminate people's control organs.

The national economy cannot be without control. Tax, financial, or any other kind of control, cannot replace state control of the economic development of society. Especially for us, with the level of development of the republic today, with our limited resources, when we need to count every kopeck, every gram of raw and other materials. And therefore, before destroying the system of people's control organs, we should think about what to replace it with.

[Correspondent] Advocates of liquidating people's control use the argument that abolishing it will help to reduce the republic's expenditures for maintaining the apparatus.

[Martirosyan] There is a certain delusion in this judgement. And here is why. There are a total of 59 responsible workers working in the republic committee and only two apiece in the city and rayon committees, and the pay of all workers, including technical workers, came to a total of 661,000 rubles in 1989. Two factors should be considered here. First, the republic's people's control organs are still supported by the all-union budget at the present time and, second, we are not "living off" the state. Judge for yourselves. In 1989, as was noted earlier, the people's control organs recovered losses suffered by the state totalling more than 150,000 rubles. Besides this, the people's control committees, together with certain other control organs with which they conducted examinations, uncovered considerable losses of state funds through shortages, embezzlement, theft, losses as a result of poor management, which, in our view, repay with interest those expenditures which the state has borne in maintaining the people's control organs. According to approximate estimates, these amounted to 4.4 million rubles in 1989.



### Media Officials Review Changes in Soviet Journalism, Politics

90US1277A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 7, Jul 90 pp 2-5, 12

[Interview with Media Officials by I. Petrovskaya: "People's Deputies From USSR Journalists Union Report"]

[Text] Yuriy Lyapunov's observations entitled "Where Do You Stand, Colleagues?" were published in the third issue of ZHURNALIST. The author asked questions of the People's Deputies from the USSR Journalists' Union on how they were defending the interests of their constituents before the nation's Supreme Soviet, and what sort of practical questions they were trying to resolve. It has, after all, been more than a year since the time that dozens of our colleagues were issued their deputy's mandates. How has this year in their lives passed; what have the journalist-people's deputies succeeded and not succeeded in doing? Answering these questions today are the following:

#### 'Chas Pik' and Much More

Anatoliy Yezhelev, USSR Supreme Soviet member and board chairman of the Leningrad journalist organization:

In the last year, 1989, everything in my life has changed. It all began with the fact that the plenum of the Journalists' Union elected me a People's Deputy of the USSR. At the Congress I became a member of the nation's parliament. And soon everything entered the normal track of deputy activity, which—you can't put it any better—resembles the endless running of a squirrel in a cage-wheel. In the course of a week—Supreme Soviet sessions, work on the Glasnost Committee, and on Friday evening a train to Leningrad, where meetings with constituents and colleagues were already arranged. Monday morning, once again in Moscow, where in debate added to the session, every point of the draft Law on the Press was discussed in a working group; then a break-in period with my colleagues, often at night, and those rotten formulations. And so on without end...

Last winter while I was compiling my pre-election program and making speeches at meetings with journalists in various regions of the country, I could not even conceive of the events to come in my native Leningrad. But there, in connection with the fact that then-Leningrad Journalists' Union Board Chairman Andrey Varsobin had sent a collective letter to the USSR Journalists' Union Plenum where the election of deputies was taking place, opposing my election, three primary journalists' organizations raised the question of lack of confidence in Varsobin, and a change in leadership in the Leningrad Journalists' Union organization. Other collectives supported this proposal as well. Actually, it was not a matter of me as a person, nor of Varsobin's personal blame. The times demanded restructuring in our professional organization. At the extraordinary conference held in June I was elected chairman of the board. A program was adopted which envisaged raising the political role of the journalists' organization, supporting

its economic independence, and measures for the legal and social defense of press workers.

A year has passed. And I can declare with all confidence that the journalists' organization of Leningrad has become a more influential force in the process of democratization, and in the reformation of life in the city and the oblast. Occasionally we have backed down, which is natural when the road is rough; but on the whole, both the state and party organs have been forced to deal with us. I must say that a most intensive struggle for the mass information media among various forces began in Leningrad before it did anywhere else. The party obkom bureau decided unilaterally that it was the sole owner of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA and to give VECHERKA to the Lensoviet, and the oblast Soviet was in general left without a newspaper. The secretariat of the Leningrad organization of the Journalists' Union demanded that this decision be reversed. Would such disobedience not have been unthinkable before?

I do not attribute all the changes to my account alone; I am proud of my colleagues and fellow-citizens of Leningrad, and I am glad that our actions are in harmony. We have also been trying to solve certain social problems: beginning this year we have introduced supplementary payments to the pensions of those veteran-journalists here whose pensions are less than 100 rubles. As you know, no one allocated that extra money to us. We earned it ourselves. How?

Since the spring of last year we have been publishing a digest called 24 HOURS, which has already brought in considerable sums; and now we are publishing our own journalists' newspaper, CHAS PIK [Rush Hour]—and this is also providing additional funds.

It goes without saying that CHAS PIK is not a commercial enterprise, but mostly a political one. The newspaper is frank and politically acute, with an independent position, and is in great demand even though it costs 40 kopecks an issue. For now it is operating under enormous difficulties in the material-polygraphical part, but CHAS PIK Editor Natalya Chaplina will have to tell the readers about that some other time.

And one more bit of news: Soon the Leningrad Journalists' Union organization will publish its first little book at its economically-accountable publishing enterprise, which is also called CHAS PIK. Whereas the newspaper tries to solve political problems, the publishing house aims at economic and commercial problems; for our political independence is closely associated with the economic.

None of this, it goes without saying, was in my pre-election program. And therefore it is hard for me to distinguish between carrying out purely deputy's responsibilities and that of resolving other problems which I consider no less important. But I will return to the question of what I, as a people's deputy from the USSR Journalists' Union, have managed to do during this year.

The pamphlet from my pre-election program consists of two parts. The first is purely declarative, where I sketched out the most important features: the priority of law over power, the priority of common human values, the development of genuine self-government in all social structures, a respectful attitude toward the interests of the minority, and defending the rights of citizens and collectives... The second part is more subjective. Here, for example, is point number six: a subject of special concern—the draft law on the press and other mass information media, which was in a state of preparation. I sketched out the following points for myself: to immediately strive to establish a special group for preparation of the draft law, with mandatory representation in it of members of the USSR Journalists' Union, certain other creative unions, as well as scientific and social organizations; and, to insist upon publication and examination of both the basic draft Law, and its possible variants, prepared on an initiative basis, if the working group determines that it is principally different from the original...

The program was compiled, as I recall, in February of last year. Today I can say that on this point, practically everything has been realized. And most important—each of us, the members of the working group—contributed his share to the draft law, and hastened the birth of this law, so important for the whole of society. Now even those who are not at home in our kitchen know how difficult the debate was in the Supreme Soviet. I have described this to the readers and TV viewers more than once.

And nevertheless... At present hardly anyone would be so bold as to declare that they have accomplished everything they set out to do. In our society of today, one can observe a continual demand for changes—hence new tasks. I dream of introducing for the examination of the Congress a draft Law on Popular Initiative, which would call for mandatory examination and in certain instances implementing suggestions from citizens, supported by means of gathering signatures. This idea was in my pre-election program, and I am not rejecting it now; only it must be put into an acceptable form.

Yes, one would like to do more than one can actually do, for now, in the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, since May something new has entered my life, of which I could not even dream before—they have asked me to become chairman of a subcommittee on human rights. There has not been such a mechanism in our parliament before. I agreed without any reservations: defending human rights is a sacred cause, no matter where one is—in a large city, in a desolate village, or in places of incarceration. And all the more so this concerns my own colleagues: our, alas, defenseless journalists quite often need protection as well...

As for myself, I have decided that if during my activity as a deputy I manage to put a progressive Law on the Press into operation and a subcommittee on human rights, then I will not have spent five years for nothing...

### I Have Come To Know Life Better

Ivan PANOV, chief editor of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA:

Life has turned out to be more complicated than we expected in pre-election times. A multiparty system has become a reality, and hundreds of newspapers are being reproduced on copiers [kseroks]. While disputes go on about a regulated goods market, a spontaneous information market is tempestuously alive. Such are the changes which we did not even expect, as we entered the elections last year. But even today, I do not reject a single thesis in my pre-election program. All my promises were genuine, although it is true it has proven impossible to carry them out in a year. Work must go on.

In my program, I proclaimed: "The Law on the Press must not become a law against the press." Together with other deputies from the Journalists' Union, I was a proponent of an initiative draft, which in fact lay at the basis of the Law on the Press adopted by the parliament at the first reading. I insisted, in order that it not be thrown overboard at the Spring session, that the limitation on the right to criticism be removed from Article 26. In the discussions on the variants and proposals for the Law on the Press, I frequently took part in the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Glasnost, and those of the Board of the Journalists' Union. I consider it an important obligation as a deputy to establish conditions that greatly favor the Law on the Press. For the sake of this, I did not let an opportunity pass to speak out, not only in the parliamentary committee, but also in the newspapers, magazines, at meetings with my constituents, and on radio and television—specifically in broadcasts of "Vzglyad" [Viewpoint], and "Dobryy Veher Moskva!" [Good Evening, Moscow!], which were dedicated to the Law. And I shall continue to resist those who created the myth that the Law on the Press would permit journalists to do exactly as they please.

I do not have a sense of complete satisfaction for what I have done. While the Law was being discussed I did not receive the floor—there were other, more lively speakers there. But, in trying to convince my colleagues in the corps of deputies, and finding allies among them, I have to a certain extent exerted influence upon them in working out a clear-cut position with respect to our Law; this is work that is invisible to the eye, however it too is very important.

The most critical questions are associated with the legal and social protection of journalists, and especially workers in the local press. A few things have come together along the lines of the legislation: the approach to pension calculation was changed, as well as that for average wages, and the wage "ceiling." It seems to me that the complaints of certain of our constituents—that we, the deputies from the Journalists' Union, are doing a poor job of defending their rights and interests—are naive and premature. We have already adopted over 30 laws, and almost all of them concern journalists in one

way or another. But there has been a cardinal change in the situation, namely with respect to putting new laws into effect.

We the deputies have received our mandate: to strive to achieve transition to economic accountability for publications. Economic accountability will come, and here and there it already exists. I, for example, have advocated for open sale of military newspapers in Soyuzpechat kiosks. Many newspapers have strengthened their material situation in this way. Instructions here will do no good; the initiative and the defense are passing over to reader support.

A journalist's position in accordance with the Law on the Press will largely be determined by the legal and economic relationships among the founder, the publisher and the editorial collectives. It will be necessary to fight for the establishment of a mechanism of contractual relations in favor of the journalist. In my opinion, it would be to the advantage of every founder and publisher, that the editorial collective operate independently and on its own initiative. Today there are still many instances in which "the powers of this world"—party committees and executive committees—grossly interfere in the activities of the mass information media. But the times have decreed that practically every such interference is brought to light, and the party committees and ispolkoms are coming out the losers, and are losing the confidence of the people. After becoming a deputy I have dealt with quite a few such conflicts. However, I am convinced that the reformed USSR Journalists' Union should play the main role in the defense of journalists. Leaving the creative aside, it should transfer the center of its concerns to the social and professional sphere. A strong journalists' fund, publishing entrepreneurship and an energetic legal service are needed. The Moscow, Ukrainian and other organizations have accrued interesting contemporary experience. I think the forthcoming congress will radically reorganize the structure and the nature of the Journalists' Union; in any case I shall strive for this (I was included in the working group for preparations for the congress).

Yet another component of my deputy program is connected with military questions. Here my deputy affairs are combined with my official affairs. I cannot say that everything that has been printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA over the last year-and-a-half unilaterally reflects my own views. However the noteworthy, in the opinion of many readers, changes in the newspaper in favor of openness, criticism, and polemics testify to the fact that the editorial collective supports the position of the chief editor, and supports his election platform.

I am often asked, is it not hard to combine editorship and deputyship, and whether I am up to the burden that I have shouldered? It is very hard. But on the other hand, thus far I have the feeling that this has enhanced both my life and my work. I have learned to know life better in my old age. I have seen people from a different viewpoint. And yes, I have even seen myself differently. And it was

during the time of perestroika that I became editor. That I might also have refused—it is hard to be an editor today. And it is hard to be a deputy as well. And nevertheless I am not complaining. It is a risk, but not an escapade.

#### Hope Only for Oneself!

**Mikhail POLTORANIN**, chairman of the board, USSR Journalists' Union's Moscow organization:

Oh, how I remember and share the sadness of the innocent thoughts of our colleague Yuriy Lyapunov. In truth, one can simply go no farther. Our system has reduced Russian journalism to political information-mongers, and over the decades it has forced it, in the words of F. Dostoyevskiy, "to put laurel wreaths on lice-infested heads," and to turn ordinary journalists into low-caste people who possess no rights.

I do not attribute to myself the reproach for lack of initiative with which Lyapunov appealed to the deputy corps from the USSR Journalists' Union. And it is not a question of the level of self-criticism here; one must look at everything objectively. From our "Deputy Dozen, Anatoliy Yezhelev and I, having entered the working group, have been working for nearly a year on the text of the Law on the Press, while analyzing suggestions for it during the period of nationwide discussion, and beating off attacks on the draft law from the bureaucracy. I also had to work on the Law on Social Organizations, and carry on business in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Glasnost... Finally I appealed in a lengthy note to M.S. Gorbachev, where I proposed transferring one of the CPSU Central Committees sanatoria, gratis, to the USSR Journalists' Union. I would like to use this occasion to thank our President: in spite of his vast array of concerns, he gave the necessary instructions, took this matter under his purview, and has already twice personally contacted me to inquire about the solution of the problem. On the whole our deputies vary. But if the election from the USSR Journalists' Union were repeated, I would once again vote for Anatoliy Yezhelev, Lyudmila Batynskaya and Valeriy Kucher, who are representing the interests of their colleagues with distinction and not the fussy party apparatus. But I must return to the essence of our conversation.

We have become accustomed to expect favors from the party apparatus. But, as practical experience shows, it is concerned chiefly for itself: it appropriates our intellectual property, exploits the labor of the journalists, surrounds itself with privileges—raising its wages, and furnishing itself apartments and dachas. Thus there is no point in expecting favors any longer. We must depend only upon ourselves.

The Law on the Press? We have done everything so that it would permit us to manage ourselves independently; so that we would not be threatened with the knout of censorship; and so that we would strengthen the material-technical basis of glasnost, and live like normal people. But the effective performance of this Law will



depend on us, ourselves. It will depend only upon us, that this law is not overturned by various instructions. Enjoying the "laws" of monopolism, the bureaucrats can do quite a bit—inflate the price of paper, raise the cost of services by the Ministry of Communications, and so on and so forth. And this prognosis, I fear, will be confirmed in the very near future. Therefore, if we truly want to establish the fourth estate [4-y vlast]—the estate of the press—and come up to the level of civilized countries, we must band together on a professional basis, using commerce in the most active manner for the creation of the material-technical basis of this estate. Today we already have the capability to establish joint enterprises for the production of our own paper, printing machinery, and office equipment, in order not to have to beg for all this from functionaries and bureaucrats when opening new publications. Therefore, I call upon my colleagues—we must count on our own efforts, on the efforts of our Union. Incidentally, numerous trips abroad in recent times permit one to come to the conclusion that one can also make use of the assets [nakopleniya] of the International Journalists' Association, which is taking on new life.

If one were to sum up the actions of the deputies from the USSR Journalists' Union, they could be expressed as follows: We have set ourselves the goal, that the journalist himself would have the ability to earn and enjoy the results of his labor—this is the essence of the draft laws which we are creating today.

I would also like to speak about something that especially disturbs me. I see how many journalists have divided up into camps: some serve the conservatives, and others are helping the nationalists find the enemies of "hempen" traditions. It is very advantageous to the partocracy, that we hurl ourselves at one another, for under all this noise it is easy to manage their own affairs. Let us nevertheless join together for the defense of our own journalistic values—for achieving true freedom of speech, for the spiritual development of the individual, and for the rebirth in Soviet journalistic practice of the civic virtue which was destroyed by the bureaucracy. Gertsen somehow said: "We know that popes and monks are never more truculent, than on the eve of the fall of the church." We also know, that on the eve of the collapse of the power of the partocrats, that they will do and are doing everything, so that journalists will not get up off their knees. But we shall get up, and one can say that we already have!

#### **Information Must Be Open**

**Leonid Kravchenko, TASS General Director:**

[Petrovskaya] Leonid Petrovich, a little over a year has passed since the day of your election as a USSR People's Deputy. But the voters are already demanding a report: What have you personally done during this period?

[Kravchenko] While preparing for this meeting, I re-read my pre-election program. Then, a year ago, many of its points appeared to be too specific, especially against the

background of the political declarations of other candidates for deputy. But then I had in mind primarily the position and role of TASS in the system of the mass information media and in the life of our society.

Here is one of the main points: A unified information service must be set up in the country. Today there is no facsimile communication between TASS and PRAVDA or between TASS and IZVESTIYA. And frequently, in order to reduce the journey of especially important official materials to the editors we make use of the very oldest method: I personally call the leaders at the editor's office; the latter send couriers; the couriers manage to make the round-trip in 15 minutes, and the material arrives at the editors. That's absurd! And thus, in my pre-election program I raised the question of setting up the most modern service for receiving and transmitting information in the country, the basis of which would be—a satellite antenna system.

And today, a contract has been signed with Contel, an American firm, which is selling us a central system and as many transceiver stations as we want. The project costs 5-6 million dollars. We have already found the first 4 million, as hard as that was. It is proposed that TASS transceiver stations be installed at the press building in the country's major cities, so that in the future we will be able to give up teletype and landline telegraph communications. The satellite antenna system will permit us to guarantee direct transmission of information, the most rapid kind possible. And we hope that all the mass information media without exception, right down to rayon newspapers, will make use of it.

Secondly, and inseparable with the first part of the project is—the establishment of a national data bank and a memory bank, which, possessing the code, one could freely enter and receive the necessary materials. It is proposed that the bank collect the most varied information, including commercial, economic, scientific-technical, legal... We have already set up such an information system for the Supreme Soviet and are sending various kinds of materials to their monitors.

[Petrovskaya] Leonid Petrovich, pardon me, but for us, the ordinary journalists, and the moreso for our colleagues in the interior, one cannot always get access to even a typewriter, not to mention tape recorders and computers. Therefore your plans seem fantastic and are rather remote from the routine of our daily lives and practical experience...

[Kravchenko] I am proceeding from the fact that all kinds of information must be open. And the sense of this information system is that there would be absolutely free access in our country to any information, without any middlemen, and without censors. It will be ideal when I, a journalist, scientist or businessmen, have a personal computer and with it can freely enter the TASS data bank, which will have in its memory an enormous amount of information, continually coming in from 120 countries in the world. I am convinced that this part of

my program is completely realistic, and we believe that the first transceiver stations will be installed in our country in 1.5-2 years, and that our press will receive access to TASS information. This will be a genuine revolution in the information sphere.

The second point of my program is—to decisively improve everything connected with the transmission and use of official information. This is a question of improving the work and way of life of journalists, and the workers at printing offices and the Ministry of Communications. In recent years the volume of official information has increased sharply. In my view, a problem has arisen for society. Newspapers have begun to resemble one another in greater degree than before. In the past resolutions were adopted more than once on improving the procedure for publishing official materials, and on reducing their volume. But these resolutions produced no results whatsoever. As a rule, the most important information begins to arrive at our agency late in the evening, and in large volume at that. And a great many newspapers are forced to wait a long time, which makes them late in publishing the next issue. And the worst kind of self-deception results: we constantly try to ram through the most important information today, but the issue for tomorrow gets to the reader only toward evening, or else does not arrive at all. This causes the greatest dissatisfaction both among the readers and among the journalists and printing plant workers, who cannot at all understand why the material cannot be provided tomorrow and why it is necessary to work nights, and pay so-called night rates—which on a nationwide scale is an enormous sum of money.

I have done everything to re-examine this practice and to strive to achieve a decision by the highest political authorities. And today I am holding in my hands a document entitled, "Procedure for Publishing Materials of an Official Nature in the Mass Information Media." One very important section in it is the one on regulation of materials. The deadline for receipt of major official materials at TASS, intended for publication in the next issue—is not later than 16:00 Moscow time. And for the local press—not later than 14:00. Shorter versions can arrive later, and in this case we will make a footnote: For a detailed report, see one of the following issues.

Our entire press now has the right to independently decide when to publish official materials.

[Petrovskaya] Leonid Petrovich, our colleagues, journalists, have long awaited the adoption of the Law on the Press. And it still has not come to pass. Even now the Spring session of the Supreme Soviet is coming to an end, but our Law is almost the last item on the agenda, and it is quite clear that the resolution of this question will be put off until Fall...

[Kravchenko] The Law on the Press, working out a new view toward our press, and the democratization of the press—all these questions are also part of my program.

Here, I as a People's Deputy, together with other journalist-deputies, have been doing solid work.

A large number of entries made in the draft are just as I formulated them. We hope that in spite of the colossal difficulties with the examination of top-priority laws in the Supreme Soviet, this year our draft will nevertheless become an operating legislative act. I look upon it as most important for journalism, and for the democratization of our entire society.

In this connection, an unusually important question for me was the question of the work of TASS, which in our country and the entire world as well, is customarily considered a conservative organization and a government mouthpiece. Unfortunately, everyone judges the work of TASS on the basis of official materials—and they comprise no more than 10 percent of the total volume of the information which we are preparing all the time. According to our estimates, TASS produces approximately 750 columns of various materials every 24 hours. When TASS is authorized to announce something, the caption, "TASS Announcement" appears. But the fact of the matter is that these are in fact materials which we do not even edit. We are merely acting as relayers of the official point of view. But if someone does not like something in these materials, the protests are addressed to TASS and to our journalists. Together with my colleagues I have analyzed this practice and have learned that such activities—announcements and reports in the name of TASS—were never stipulated by any decisions. But they had gained a firm foothold in actual practice since 1939.

[Petrovskaya] One of the recent cases in which TASS was once again subjected to sharp criticism was—the analysis of the 4 February meeting of democratic forces: in the TASS report it was characterized as extremist...

[Kravchenko] But this was the very instance in which TASS journalists had worked least of all! It was then that picketers assembled near our building in protest, demanding the departure of the general director. I cannot be a dishonorable person and reveal the true sources of the information, but this event served as a serious political lesson for me. And I appealed to the government and to the party Central Committee in a document in which I proposed changing the practice which has evolved. I take the stand that the absolute majority of materials be signed by the journalists or authors, who must have the right to express their personal point of view. And in those instances in which we are relaying information, it must be clearly stated from whence it comes, and who is its source. Then we are simply carrying out a technical mission, that is, we are disseminating materials and documents through our own channels, for no one else has such channels.

[Petrovskaya] But we may very soon find ourselves in conditions of a multiparty society. And when various parties and political organizations and movements begin

to operate, it is possible that they too may demand dissemination of their materials via TASS channels. Is TASS prepared to do this?

[Kravchenko] I believe that we will be occupied with this, but on a commercial basis—with respect to all parties without exception. Today, relations with TASS are also being built on a commercial basis. But not with the government, because we are part of its budget; it has created all the channels, and has invested millions of rubles and an enormous amount of cash in them.

Thus, a concept is being established for democratization of TASS and our journalism, with the aid of TASS. If everything is combined—a unified information system, a national data bank, democratization of transmission of official information, and the Law on the Press—I think that this combination of efforts, which I too have undertaken as a People's Deputy, will be sufficient so that I will be able to feel a certain amount of satisfaction, and acknowledge that the year was not spent in vain. It is another matter that not all this has been brought to a conclusion, and I and my collective are still faced with hard work.

The final point of my program consisted of doing everything to improve the material situation of journalists. We are reproached by our colleagues in that we, the People's Deputies from the USSR Journalists' Union are doing a poor job of defending their interests. And nevertheless, during discussion of the fundamental laws in the Supreme Soviet, we have been defending the appropriate points which concern journalists—these are questions connected with pensions, hospitals, benefits and so on. But a great deal of work remains to be done on reorganizing the USSR Journalists' Union: it must have a more reliable system for social and legal protection, and more modern conditions must be created for recreation and treatment of journalists. Construction of boarding houses and visiting writers' homes—all this is part of the program of the People's Deputies from the USSR Journalists' Union, and it will be decisively defended before the government, and the ministries and departments on whom the adoption of the decision depends. The Union must receive the rights of a trade union, and in turn the right to social protection as well.

[Petrovskaya] In many countries, journalists are forbidden to take part in political activity. It is considered that a journalist who becomes a politician cannot be objective, and that he will wittingly or unwittingly reflect the views of this or that political group or faction in his articles and dispatches... But we, as always, are following our own path. Journalists are more and more being elected as deputies. Especially demonstrative in this sense is the example of the latest elections to the Russian Parliament. What is your analysis of such a situation? Do you think that it is a temporary phenomenon, while our country becomes genuinely civilized?

[Kravchenko] In a number of countries, journalists are indeed an independent, outside power. We have a different tradition, and it is not for nothing that ours is called a people's press. And I believe that it has made what is perhaps the most powerful contribution to strengthening glasnost. And the people, to give them their due, have noted that it was not by accident that certain publications were in the public eye, and their journalists—among the people's deputies. Well, for example, it is altogether unique that ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is represented by five of its employees in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and that the majority of the leading figures of VZGLYAD were also elected People's Deputies of Russia. Readers and viewers, thus, have voted for their journalism. Perhaps later, when passions die down, we will come to a different conclusion, that journalists and the leaders of the mass information media should not be involved in politics. But today that is a fact of life.

I have become convinced that as before, people's deputies are trusted more than anyone else. I am trusted more as a people's deputy than as general director of TASS. Not long ago at meetings in Smolensk Oblast I was, as TASS general director, subjected to excruciating criticism—as if I represented the party and the government—which was completely unexpected for me, because today I occupy no party post whatsoever. But when I described my activities as a deputy, I saw a completely different attitude toward myself. The people are placing great hopes on us. And you see, if we do not fulfill their hopes (and in only two or three years they will seriously hold us answerable), then disappointment in us will be dangerous. But for now I have a sense of satisfaction for that which I am able to do, to be able to help specific people.

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#### Writers Union Chief Protests Burlatskiy Plans for Weekly

90UN2628A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 33, 15 Aug 90 pp 1-2

[Letter from USSR Writers Union Board First Secretary V. Karpov: "As the Pages of the Issue Were Being Composed..."]

[Text] The text of "An Appeal to All Writers' Organizations and Members of the USSR Writers' Union" published below arrived at the editorial office on Monday, 13 August, just a few hours before the issue was signed to press—with a request to publish it today, and only in the very place in which the "Chief Editor's Column" was published in the preceding issue. We are complying with this request.

The article, "The Future of the Writers' Newspaper" was published in the Chief Editor's Column in the 08/08/90 issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The premises of



this article demand clarification and more precise definition on the part of the Secretariat of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union.

The article states: "In 1988 and 1989 the Secretariat of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union, by its decisions, took from us for its own needs 50 million rubles in addition to the 35 percent [for the state budget]. Our money, earned through the decades of labor of the LG [Literaturnaya Gazeta] collective and the writers' aktiv, has simply vanished." It is not hard to detect in this text an accusatory tone—What a nasty exploiter that secretariat is! In order that the readers do not gain such an impression, the secretariat will report for which of "its own needs" the money from the aforementioned sum was spent: 17.6 million went to construction and upkeep of guest houses for writers, polyclinics, housing, the Central House of Literary Figures and other socio-cultural-domestic purposes. Every year several million rubles are paid out in the form of material assistance to writers and supplements to their pensions. Six-and-a-half million are spent for creative-vocational purposes: this pays for business trips, for holding plenums, conferences and seminars, and for international measures. And 1.6 million are spent for the Literary Institute.

In addition, significant sums were allocated for charitable purposes (aid to earthquake victims, refugees, Afghan War veterans, the Soviet Cultural Fund, the Lenin Children's Fund, and so on). Finally, it must be made clear, that only half of the 50 million rubles went into the "common pot" of the USSR SP [Writers' Union]; the other half—25 million—was deducted for the national state budget, in accordance with Council of Ministers' Resolution No 825 of 12/07/88, "On Regulating the Rates of Authors' Remuneration" and was spent for raising the honoraria of the nation's writers.

Is it really possible to assert that all these expenditures are for "our own needs" at the USSR SP Secretariat? The secretariat, just as any administrative organ of any functioning system, carries out distribution of assets, without which the normal work of the system is simply impossible. This is a general rule, which operates in any society and under any regime. Therefore, the money did not "vanish," as was asserted in the article: it went to support the lives and activities of writers as stated above.

question at once arises: Why disinform the writers' aktiv in this way, and cause such an attitude of ill-will, to put it mildly, toward the Secretariat of the USSR SP—and toward the entire Writers' Union as well? The answer, in our view, is found in the claim which officials of the LG editorial office submitted to the State Committee on the Press on 7 August (on the eve of the publication of the article), in which they request, on the basis of the Law on the Press which went into effect on 1 August, that they (the working collective of the editorial office) be registered as the founders of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. And in order that writers would not perchance guess that they were purely and simply

walking off with—or to put it even more bluntly—hijacking the newspaper, the editorial collective brought out the camouflage, which is very fashionable in our days, of an appeal to create a joint-stock company, where the stockholders would be all the writers and editorial officials, foreign partners and so on.

We have already been the owners of "our common national property" for over 70 years. It is now proposed that writers would be such co-owners of their own LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. When everyone owns something, that means no one does. And most important, it is the editorial collective (which comprises very few members of the Writers' Union) that is proposing all this, practically trying to declare themselves the owners of that which several generations of writers had acquired and accumulated over a period of many years. But the more than 10,000 writers in the USSR and their secretariat are interfering with the execution of such an ultra-modern design. And therein lies both the answer and the explanation of the ill-will and the text, and the sub-text—on the millions, spent by the secretariat, for "its own needs."

The "editorial collective" has unleashed a storm of activity; it is even trying to prove that "Litgazeta" is not the property of the Writers' Union. Here is how it is: For more than 60 years, the writers have been the owners of their own newspaper (and there are legal documents to prove it). But today all of a sudden some "good people" have come to enlighten us: It seems that henceforth it is they, those who work in the editorial office, who are the owners of LG. There is nothing wrong with the desire to create a new newspaper. The Law on the Press permits both submitting an application, and opening a new newspaper. Only why "count on using someone else's belongings" to do so?

If the collective has "matured enough" to establish a new newspaper—please: take out a bank loan, rent some facilities, and conclude an agreement with a printing plant and with paper suppliers and so forth. And think up a new name (this the Law on the Press also provides for)—and print to your heart's content, earn your wages and invite some writers, if your joint stock company will actually have a literary inclination.

But if a joint stock company is set up on the basis of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, then it would be entirely possible and useful in the present situation for the stockholders to be, in our view, the writers' unions of all the republics, and not a lot of fat cats with thick wallets. Writers' unions, with their declaration of independence, will badly need assets for their work in the new conditions. And so let them earn them, from buying a stock portfolio. As far as foreign partners are concerned—welcome to the company: Who would object to organizing publishing work on a higher plane, and providing more modern printing technology? Moreover, foreign exchange (from distributing the newspaper abroad) would not hurt the republic unions. And well, finally, the "editorial collective" of course, should be a

full-fledged stockholder, should own a certain amount of stock, and should receive a profit from it. And so you see, all of us together, all the interested parties, can improve both the quality and the income of our newspaper. We stress—our newspaper, the writers' newspaper.

The second argument in the chief editor's article concerns taxes. And it is also devoted to proving the necessity of separating LG from the Writers' Union. The article states: "...over us hung the threat of dual taxation of the press. As opposed to other newspapers, we would be obliged to pay, in addition to the 35 percent to the state, a like sum to the USSR Writers' Union." And in another place in the article it is stressed that: "Now we have officially received notice that we must pay twice—both to the state budget, and to the USSR SP."

In actual fact the USSR Law "On Taxes from Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations" stipulates that all cost-accounting enterprises of creative unions—enterprises which place the moneys they earn at the disposal of their unions—are exempted from paying taxes. Let us turn to the law: "For social organizations, the following are exempted from paying taxes: g) profit from cost-accounting enterprises of creative unions, directed by them to the indicated unions for carrying out their official activity" (Chapter I, Article 6, Point 5). A similar benefit is stipulated for the turnover tax as well (Chapter III, Article 16, Point 1).

Thus, the public has not been informed entirely accurately: the state levies a 35-percent tax only on that portion of the profits which the newspaper editors keep for themselves. The more money the editors direct toward the development of literature and the material-domestic support of writers, and for other official purposes of the USSR Writers' Union, the less they will have to pay to the state. Where then is the "threat of dual taxation of the press"? If the editors are truly concerned about the interests and needs of the writers, they can give the USSR SP not one-third, but three-fourths of the profits, and the state will claim only 35 percent of the sums remaining at the disposal of the editors; that is, of one-fourth of all the profits. But if the editors wish to use all the profits for the interests of their own collective, they they would pay to the state treasury 35 percent of the total amount of profits. Thus it is completely clear: the new Law on Taxes, just as the previous resolution, operates in the interests of the press organs of creative unions, and does not provide benefits to "separatists."

With all respect for the successful labor of the officials of the LG editorial office, and with great respect for those who work there today, and those who for many years had nurtured the prestige and popularity of our newspaper over the long years of its existence, the secretariat of the USSR SP, for the reasons cited above, cannot agree with the arguments of the article published in the "Chief Editor's Column" on 08/08/90.

Certain other newspapers, for example ZNAMYA (which has also submitted a claim to Goskompechat), are also raising the question of independence, and in fact separation from the USSR Writers' Union. All of them are forgetting the fact that, if the Writers' Union is not their founder, and if they are not a publication of a creative union, the publication will lose the privileges designated for creative unions, and their taxes will be assessed in the amount of 45 percent [sic] of their total profits. How do the plan to operate in conditions of multiple price increases for paper, for printing operations, for postal services, and also higher percentages of deductions for distribution of printed products to Soyuzpechat and book trade organizations?

With the inevitable price increases for newspapers and magazines, there will be a sharp reduction in the number of subscribers, and consequently, in the circulation of the publications as well. And this entails loss of profits for publications and even operating at a loss. It is very unwise in such a situation to subject any magazine or newspaper to danger. We must not separate, but unite under the wing of the Writers' Union, to which the Law on Taxes offers benefits; moreover, owing to the assets earned by all writers, the union is able to support its publications in times of trouble, even when they are operating at a loss. Life will be especially hard for republic magazines.

In spite of the widespread false impression that writers are "fed" by the Litfond, their material well-being is provided on the whole by means of the publishing activity of the USSR Writers' Union. In connection with the transition to market relationships, and in case of the separation of certain publications from the USSR SP, a real threat arises of closing down magazines which are unprofitable (but which are necessary for the development of literature), the cessation of supplemental pension payments, the dismantling of nationwide and international measures, and a worsening financial situation for writers' guest houses, hospitals, polyclinics, and so on.

Under these conditions the secretariat of the board of the USSR SP is taking steps at the level of the Supreme Soviet and Government of the USSR, to alleviate the consequences of transition to market relationships.

By means of this letter, the working secretariat is informing all members of the USSR Writers' Union of the complex situation that has come to pass in the areas of finance and publishing activity of our union. Do you agree with the separation of leading press organs, including LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, from the USSR SP? Perhaps it would be expedient to convene an extraordinary plenum of the board of the USSR SP on the questions we have discussed? We ask that you immediately report your considerations to the Board of the USSR SP, 52 Vorovskiy St., Moscow, G-69.

### From the Editors

The publication of the "Appeal..." of the working secretariat of the board of the USSR SP, which was done at the request of its first secretary, V.V. Karpov, requires explanation.

First of all it is necessary to cite the decision of the 3 August 1990 meeting of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editors' working collective:

"The working collective of LG expresses its will for the writers of the USSR to become the founders of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and for its subsequent transformation into a joint-stock company with the participation of the working collectives of the LG editors, publishers and printing plant; the USSR Writers' Union and the republic writers' unions; USSR Litfond and republic Litfonds; all interested members of the Writers' Union and other organizations; and also foreign firms. The working collective believes that just such an organization will permit the newspaper and the USSR Writers' Union to strengthen their financial position in the conditions of a market economy, and to truly become the newspaper of all the writers in the USSR.

"The editorial working collective authorizes the editorial leadership and the trade union committee to prepare with the help of legal experts an application to USSR Goskompechat, 'on registration of the Literary Newspaper of the writers of the USSR' in the name of the editorial working collective of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA."

A vote was held: 208 voted "for." No one voted "no," and there was one abstention.

This decision is in complete accord with Article 7 of the Law on the Press and other mass information media and cannot be refuted by anyone whomsoever, regardless of whether they like it or not. It is our profound conviction that in the present-day situation it is the wisest and most well-founded method of preserving LG, in accordance with the interests of the USSR Writers' Union, the republic unions and other writers' associations, the LG collective and the publishing house. Creation of a joint-stock company with the participation of all 10,000 Soviet writers will permit not only preserving the traditions of a writers' newspaper, it will also make every literary figure a co-owner of the newspaper, guaranteeing him a part in its administration and distribution of income, as the experience of joint-stock companies in civilized countries attests.

And this was the basis of the idea of the "Chief Editor's Column," as approved by the LG editorial board; and it was not by chance that it was entitled: "The Future Writers' Newspaper." In the application for registration itself, it is indicated that we are talking about the "Literary Newspaper" of the writers of the USSR. From this it is obvious that there are no grounds whatsoever for the allegation of an attempt to "carry off" or even "hijack" the newspaper from the writing public. The

actual fact of the matter is completely to the contrary: A much more expedient form has been found for uniting the interests of all writers around their own newspaper in conditions of an intensely competitive struggle for survival. Only in this manner will it now be possible to preserve the newspaper, to multiply its income and thereby provide the conditions for the continuing support of writers and all their organizations.

Incidentally, the incorrect tone of "An Appeal..." aside, it contains acknowledgment of the possibility and usefulness in the contemporary situation of creating a joint-stock company, the stock-holders of which "could be the writers' unions of all the republics"—and of every individual writer as well—we add on our own. Moreover, at a joint session of the LG editorial board and representatives of the working secretariat of the board of the USSR SP held on 2 August, preliminary agreement was achieved in this very spirit. The process of debate on this, a cardinal problem for the newspaper, was continued within the walls of the USSR SP, between its leadership and representatives of LG. Therefore it is completely bewildering, why it was necessary, in the course of the on-going debate, to issue such an appeal, unprecedented in both form and content, to all the nation's writers, which completely distorted the essence of the problem?

The question as to who is the founder of the newspaper has no relationship to the question of property, nor to the question of taxes. The transformation to a joint-stock company signifies that the owners are all the stock-holders; that is, above all the writers' unions, their members, the working collectives of the editors and the publishers, and interested readers; thereby, the inevitable disputes and conflicts with respect to property are forestalled.

While providing this explanation we once again express our conviction that the leadership of the USSR Writers' Union will calmly and deliberately deal with the new situation, and will return to businesslike discussion of the problems which crop up, while bearing in mind the main factor—the necessity for a solicitous attitude toward the prestige of the entire SP and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in the eyes of the readers.

We have no doubts that a solution will be found and agreement will be reached. But one thing we cannot help but mention in the name of our collective. "An Appeal..." unambiguously invites the workers on the newspaper to abandon it and to print "to their heart's content" in another place. This is the same as if a ministry had proposed to the working collective at an enterprise which is switching to a new form of work, to get out of there and find themselves another occupation. We hope that this was said in a fit of temper, and that common sense will surface once again.

It would be very important for us to know what the writers and all our readers think about this.



### **Zalygin Details NOVYY MIR 1991 Publishing Plans**

90UN2569A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with NOVYY MIR Editor in Chief S. Zalygin by TRUD Correspondent V. Kazakov: "NOVYY MIR Shares Its Plans"; date, place not given]

[Text] The program for publications of the magazine NOVYY MIR has been determined for the coming year.

[Zalygin] Although the regular issues of NOVYY MIR have been held up, we have formulated our long-term plan.

[Correspondent] Alas, because of that same non-issuance of NOVYY MIR, the readers cannot familiarize themselves with that plan...

[Zalygin] In the mean time, interesting encounters await them on our pages. Encounters, for example, with the novels of Viktor Astafyev, "The Cursed and the Killed," Vasilii Belov, "The Year of the Great Breakthrough," Andrey Bitov has offered us his novella "Japan As It Is," and Vladimir Maksimov, "And I Shall Give It." We are proposing to print the work of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "The Oak and the Calf: Sketches of a Literary Life" in a new author's edition, as well as "April 1917." New works of Ch. Aitmatov have been promised to us ("Our Lady in the Snows") as well as those of V. Bykov, D. Granin, F. Iskander, S. Kaledin, A. Kim, M. Roshchin, T. Tolstaya, and young, previously unknown authors.

[Correspondent] What names have been introduced in the popular section, "From the Literary Heritage"?

[Zalygin] The names of M. Bulgakov, B. Zaytsev, Ye. Zamyatin, O. Mandelshtam, A. Platonov, A. Remizov, I. Shmelev, and D. Kharms...

[Correspondent] NOVYY MIR has always been famous for the publishing the works of publicistic writers...

[Zalygin] That tradition will be continued. In particular, there will be a conversation on the topic of the ecology—why, who is to blame, and how to ameliorate the aftermath of catastrophes such as the Aral Sea and Chernobyl.

According to our plan, "Journey" will continue for a long time. But I would like to direct your attention to this: In 1991, a new rubric will appear in the magazine—"Religion and the Modern World." As previously, we will include diaries, memoirs, and letters here.

### **OKTYABR Chief Editor Views Journal Under New Press Law**

90UN2569B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with OKTYABR Editor in Chief Anatoliy Ananyev by V. Vologdin: "The First Summer of the New OKTYABR"; date, place not given]

[Text] The USSR Law on the Press and other mass information media entered into force on 1 August. And applications for the registration of newly instituted newspapers and magazines were accepted starting that very morning. The magazine OKTYABR opened this list at the Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Information.

The magazine's editor in chief, USSR people's deputy Anatoliy Ananyev, said that "The labor collective itself is acting as the founder. It is granted such a right by the law on the press, in which we see the guarantee of freedom of speech, freedom of creation, and freedom of views. This day means a great deal for our editorial board. It will probably bring new concerns and new responsibility. And this is the price of creativity.

[Vologdin] Is it a coincidence that it is OKTYABR that is first in line for this new freedom?

[Ananyev] In any case, we did not keep watch all night and write numbers on palms. But we did think a great deal about the future of the journal. The letters of its faithful readers have been and continue to be a major support of OKTYABR. It is specifically in the readers' interests that the magazine is now established as "independent of political parties, social associations, private individuals, and organizations." In doing so, OKTYABR remains a Russian publication, advocating humanistic values of public and world culture.

[Vologdin] A new subscription campaign is coming, in which the freedom of speech must undergo trial by free market. Is it frightening?

[Ananyev] The only reason why it is not frightening is because culture has not bent, and at the most difficult times, the people have not allowed this. And moreover, in the final analysis, there is the state, there are sponsors, since culture is in need of support throughout the world, and receives it from them. Yet something else is also just. The psychology of dependents and hangers-on is deadly for any cause. We see OKTYABR as a magazine aspiring to have a demand, responding to the requests of its reader and covering all its expenses. True, it is proposed that the subscription price for our journal almost double. We realized that this will not suit everyone, and thus we will reach more acceptable valuations. In connection with this, the idea expressed by Russian Minister of the Press and Mass Information M. Poltoranin seems quite sensible: The former price of the newspaper and magazine remain over the course of the first 6 months of 1991, and starting with the second half of the year, the price should be leveled in accordance with the forecasts of the market price of paper, printing, and postal services. If we do not make haste with the inevitable arbitrary and approximate price increase today, we will arrive at a more realistic resolution of the problem of price formation, without picking the consumer's pocket. Whatever happens, we have all already begun on a path from which we do not plan to turn. In the complex and at times dramatic history of the journal OKTYABR, one more page has been turned and a new page has been opened.

# **Pravda Publisher's Deputy Director on Increasing Periodical Costs**

90US1278A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 7, Jul 90 pp 30-31

[Interview with Mikhail Troshin, deputy director of Izdatelstvo Pravda, conducted by ZHURNALIST correspondent: "Why the Press Is Getting More Expensive"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, there has been talk for a long time now about how hard things will be for our press under the conditions of a market economy. But somehow after this talk one fails to see any significant changes either at the publishing houses or on editorial staffs. And now lightning has struck. Journalists today are worried about one thing—will their newspaper, magazine or bulletin be shut down? Just what has suddenly happened?

[Troshin] Well, as for whether a newspaper or magazine will be shut down, that question is not being raised. At least for the time being.

The point lies elsewhere, which cannot help seriously worrying publishers and journalists. Since a changeover to new wholesale prices is planned starting in 1991 (for all intents and purposes, such prices are already in effect, without having been officially raised), the prices for publications are also supposed to be doubled or tripled. Otherwise they would simply operate at a loss.

What grounds do we have for this? First of all, the draft wholesale prices that have been worked out by the ministries, primarily the Ministry of the Wood Processing Industry and Ministry of Communications. Preliminary calculations show that price of paper will rise 80 percent and, for certain types of it, even more. As for rates for communications services and the distribution of periodicals, they will rise from eightfold to tenfold.

Incidentally, we already have proposals from paper enterprises, including the Kondopoga, Krasnoyarsk and Kama combines, to raise the prices of their products. The Ulegorsk Combine wants for us to pay for thirty percent of the paper it ships in first-class hard currency. The communications production and technical administrations agree to expedite our publications only if rates are raised within the aforementioned limits.

In short, without waiting for the official approval of new wholesale prices, enterprises in various industries that provide publishing houses with paper and materials and render services in the distribution of periodicals are for all intents and purposes being guided by the new prices. They rely on the right granted to a production collective to independently conclude contracts with customers and to set contractual prices.

[Correspondent] What has caused this increase? And where will it lead?

[Troshin] Prices have not been revised for a long time. And the new prices, naturally, reflect current economic realities—the changeover to cost accounting, and the reliance on profits.

Under these conditions, practically all our publications will become money-losers. With the exception of individual, highly profitable ones. PRAVDA, OGONEK, RABOTNITSA, KRESTYANKA, and others will all cease becoming profitable publications and become money-losers.

[Correspondent] And who will defend readers' interests?

[Troshin] Readers' interests may be defended by the future Law on the Press. Moreover, a great deal depends on the selection of people. Journalists will feel more keenly than before the feedback whereby readers, when making their subscription lists, will decide which publications they like, and which they can afford.

[Correspondent] The publishing houses, finding themselves in a difficult situation, will probably try to rid themselves of money-losing newspapers and magazines. Will anyone help these publications?

[Troshin] Of course, by the laws of a market economy the publishing houses are forced to undertake a price increase. Because money is needed for the modernization of production facilities, up-to-date equipment must be purchased, and a system for the decentralized printing of newspapers and magazines must be developed. Finally, publications' physical facilities and equipment must be improved.

It is understandable that a significant price increase will have a negative impact on publications' circulation.

But as for the fate of money-losing newspapers and journals, under the conditions of our publishing house, it is not for us to decide that fate. I think that for the time being they will be preserved.

On the one hand, it is seemingly impossible to raise prices. It is an unpopular measure in a situation of perestroika and glasnost. And on the other hand, a publishing house, like other enterprises, cannot operate at a loss. And here is what must be kept in mind. The price jump will have a certain effect on the economics of the newspaper and magazine publishing houses. Their economic situation will drastically deteriorate. After all, they depend on subscribers more than the book publishers do. And of course, many publications will lose them.

An optimal solution to the problem—in principle, a "golden mean"—must be found. We are afraid that uncontrolled market forces will overwhelm us. There is no avoiding a price increase now, but prices should be reasonable.

[Correspondent] And so, the struggle for subscribers will intensify?

[Troshin] Unquestionably.

[Correspondent] But perhaps a publication might be sold at the newsstands at a new price, but be sold to subscribers at a discount, something like the favorable prices offered to wholesale buyers?

[Troshin] The problem is that we aren't in a position for newsstand sales at the present time. There is not enough paper to fill subscriptions.

[Correspondent] Colleagues are saying that glasnost and freedom of the press require a solid material base. Since there is none, both the monopolistic departments and the rich cooperatives may impose their will on the editorial boards. In order to gain independence from the paper "kings," the Moscow Journalists' Organization is thinking about joint enterprises for the production of paper. The paper shortage and the resale of paper to cooperatives are making the situation worse. What can be done promptly to ensure the publishing houses' survival?

[Troshin] I don't know how feasible that is—joint paper enterprises under the name of the Journalists' Union. The publishing house is thinking about establishing a joint enterprise with a paper mill. But we work with practically all the country's paper combines. In terms of both assortment and quantity. The shortage of paper of all grades for this year amounts to more than 100,000 tons at Izdatelstvo Pravda alone.

The combines cannot realistically increase paper production in the next two or three years. Since there has been no increase in their production capacity. And developing that capacity is a long-term matter.

At the same time, many cooperatives are receiving paper produced above plan from the combines. Because they do not buy it but, as a rule, exchange highly scarce building materials, equipment, etc. for it. In some respect this problem could be solved by giving enterprises equal rights with the cooperatives.

[Correspondent] In other countries there are flourishing publishing concerns that own not just publications but both paper mills and printing facilities. Is this experience appropriate for our publishing houses?

[Troshin] Of course it is. A number of publishing houses, including ours, are taking part on a shared basis in the development and reequipment of the paper industry. This year 9 million rubles was transferred to the Kondopogumprom [Kondopoga Paper Industry] Production Association.

We are conducting negotiations with the Balakhna Combine about a joint enterprise. It would supply us with newsprint. And the Balakhna enterprise would get part of the publishing house's profits.

But the difficulty is that we use numerous types and grades of paper. In order to operate normally, we must organize a concern including all the paper enterprises.

And if you consider that RABOTNITSA, KRESTY-ANKA and a number of other magazines are produced on imported paper, even a grandiose concern could not supply our publishing house fully with paper.

The negotiations with the paper combines about cooperation, and the transfer of 9 million rubles to Kondopoga in the name only of good relations are only attempts to get out of the crisis situation. Yet the matter requires a fundamental solution.

The branches and departments with which the publishing houses are related have a good many major problems—technical, raw-materials, transportation, financial, personnel and other problems. No one can get around them; they are standing in the way; and they cannot be put off until tomorrow or the day after.

But it is also impossible to solve our problems at someone else's expense—at the expense, for example, of our partners in the common business of producing and distributing the press. We need intelligent compromises, mutual understanding and mutual assistance. And, of course, patience, because the difficulties that have accumulated will not be surmounted in any day or two. And here, in my opinion, the journalists can help the publishers—by writing analytical articles, and by taking a serious attitude toward the editorial and publishing problems that have now arisen.

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#### **Nenashev Ponders Aspects of CPSU Ideological, Media Work**

90US1254A Moscow PRAVDA (Second Edition)  
in Russian 8 Aug 90 pp 3-4

[Article by Mikhail Nenashev: "Is Propaganda Always Guilty: Thoughts Not Spoken at the Congress"]

[Text] The acuteness of the political situation within the party and the country, the demarcation of social forces, the bitter polemic concerning party platforms—all this placed the 28th CPSU Congress in a complicated situation. People expected considerably more from the congress than it could objectively give under these conditions, expected that it would provide answers to all questions and would resolve all problems.

The complexity of the congress also lay in the fact that broad public discussion within the country and pointed commentaries by the mass information media—the press, radio, and television—had formed the alarming conclusion that there is a crisis within the party. And of course this very difficult and very important question could not be left unanswered at the congress: What are the reasons for the party crisis and how should we escape from it? If the participants in the congress did not answer this, then those who have insistently planted in public opinion the idea (and there have been many statements in this regard in the press) of a natural rejection on the



part of perestroika, with its democratic processes, of the Communist Party as the political vanguard of society would have been proved correct. Events in Eastern Europe provide sufficient material for such judgments, which pursue definite objectives.

What then are the reasons for the crisis?

First and for certain, there has been a definite loss by the party of the people's trust. The sources of this loss lie in both the distant and the recent past of the party. In the meantime, neither disappointment nor indignation about how this could happen will help. What is needed is an understanding of the fact that this is the inevitable price of mistakes and miscalculations, of serving the people badly and being cut off from them, the price of the party's self-satisfaction and arrogance. For many years, specifically this built up that inflammable social material which is today feeding not only mistrust, but also, in some people, an unfriendly attitude toward the Communist Party.

And now, when we are attempting to understand these difficult problems, we cannot fail to think about the main one—why the party was unable to resist the processes of socialism's deformation and, at the critical turning points in history, when it found within itself the strength to resist and tried to overcome the negative processes, when it designated constructive programs, steps taken were restricted solely to changes from above. Along with the human tragedies, the modern generation most of all cannot forgive the loss of the past 30 years. These lost years have turned out to be the most difficult to make up for today—our lag behind the civilized world is so great.

It has to be acknowledged that the processes of stagnation, about which so much has been said and written, the degeneration of a certain part of the party and state workers, is also in the final instance tied to deformations in the party itself. Indeed, it cannot be denied that concentrations of decay and degradation of leadership personnel in Uzbekistan, Krasnodar, and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], known to all, would have been impossible if Rashidov, Medunov, Shchelokov and people like them had not been representatives of the party and had not been acting in its name.

After the 19th CPSU Conference, it had already become evident to many that the party has seriously lost the initiative and is in no hurry to display it. And it is not only a matter here of the personal responsibility of the party leaders, as was very sharply discussed at the 28th Congress. Without in any way absolving the members of the Central Committee and Politburo of blame, we need to see the main thing, and this main thing is that since the time of Stalin the party has been built and organized for obedience, for subordination, for an expectation of commands and directions from above, which it also continues to expect today.

The party crisis has undoubtedly been influenced by the many years that members of the party have been removed from participation in the formulation and

implementation of its policies and by a breakdown of ties between the party center and the party periphery. This breakdown was also unavoidable in connection with the inability of the existing party apparatus to work independently, without direction from the party leaders in the center. We are now complaining a particularly about how poor we are in leaders and in party cadres that are capable of working in the new style. Meanwhile, there generally is no point in complaining. A lack of talented workers that take initiative and of real leaders is inevitable because the time of stagnation, the time of obedience and thoughtlessness, was simultaneously a time of triumph for mediocrity from top to bottom throughout the entire party hierarchy. What kind of new talented party cadres, what kind of new leaders can we talk about now if mediocrity reigned at the very peaks of party power. At that time, I know from my own experience, obedience was valued above everything else among party workers at the local level and people with initiative and with their own opinions were a cause of great watchfulness and intolerance. Much could be told about the absurd and laughable rituals and the procedures of walking one behind the other, about the arrogant rituals for seating first, second, and other oblast party committee secretaries in presidiums, rituals that are worthy of the pen of Saltykov-Shchedrin. These rituals and traditions of party rank-worship are not so inoffensive, for they served both as shackles on thinking workers and as a support for arrogant members of the party hierarchy.

I speak with passion about this because, perhaps, the greatest fault in the ideological work of the party and those who served it, to which I myself belong as well, lay in the fact that it has involved neither the strengths, nor the capabilities, nor the people who could, even during the first years of perestroika, tell people openly and directly the entire truth about the party, about its ailments and its problems, who could say this frankly and with compassion, so as to dampen offense and evoke an understanding of all the complexities and contradictoriness of the processes in which our party has lived and functioned.

I admit that, like many others whose activities have been connected with party ideological work, I felt extremely uncomfortable at the 28th CPSU Congress. This discomfort was unpleasant, but understandable. Indeed, at its base lay your own personal guilt for the state of ideological work and this had turned out to be a subject of merciless criticism at the 28th Congress. So merciless that, I think, it often even lacked objectivity, for, by its own essence, this merciless criticism and the possibility for it were a living manifestation of precisely that glasnost, of that freedom of thought, which had also been a clear victory and a direct accomplishment of the present stage of the party's ideological activities. And in this sense perhaps, even if it did not deserve a kind word (it is difficult to hope for a good word, especially during this time of general bitterness), then it least one could hope for an objective acknowledgement of the what actually has been done during the years of perestroika.

Take the activities of the mass information media: the press, radio, and television. With all the unavoidable costs, have they really not deserved general recognition in recent years? At the same time, I confess, the more than modest assessment, and I don't understand to whose benefit it was, of the activities of newspaper, magazine, radio and television journalists in the Central Committee's political report at the congress looked extremely strange. Perhaps what was manifested here was the long known stereotype that the work of the mass information media cannot be evaluated positively because there are always those who are dissatisfied with their activities. Well-known stereotyped thinking as well as an old-style approach were also manifested in assessment of the ideological activities of the party as a whole.

To continue our discussion about the shortcomings of ideological activities during past years, which predetermined its failure to keep up with the demands of the times, the fact occurs to me that, to a large extent, this was a consequence of our usual administrative and ideological sybaritism. What do I include within this complicated concept? Having during the years of perestroika proclaimed pluralism as an ideological directive, party functionaries have decided that everything else will come by itself, as formerly, on the basis of the usual canons. But pluralism, by its nature, is not simply an exercise in elegant words, not simply a search for the truth, but a clash of opinions, and it does not end with fraternization, with agreement, but most often with a struggle for leadership, a struggle for power. It should be frankly acknowledged that we never trained the party's ideological professionals, accustomed to issuing orders, for this struggle and, sitting in their comfortable political education centers and offices solely for edification purposes, they turned out to be totally unprepared for this. Therefore, the party was not enriched with experience from one election to the next, became increasingly perplexed, and lost one ideological battle after another.

Among the most widespread arguments in the negative assessment of the state of ideological work at the 28th CPSU congress was the thesis that there has been poor management by the party committees and the mass information media; that supposedly as a result of this poor management, the mass information media were totally unleashed, that they have taken advantage of this, and that they have become the principle villain in all the problems and difficulties that have come to confront society.

The question of criticism in the mass information media is one of the most critical ones. And it is necessary to be totally open and recognize that among a certain part of the party workers, as a rule, the directors, even today the opinion exists that we should fundamentally reduce the amount of this criticism, that we should dose it out. Although it is obvious to any healthy thinking person that the essence of the matter in no way lies in the amount of criticism, but in its content, in its direction, in its goals and intentions. We will not hide the fact that, under the conditions of this time of democracy and

pluralism of opinions, subjectivism and sometimes even group prejudice are characteristic for our press.

And, nevertheless, I am convinced that this is not what determines the content and results of the activities of the mass information media and that this is not why certain party workers and directors of soviet and economic organs are dissatisfied with the work of newspapers, journals, television and the radio. We will not hide but will say frankly that anxiety regarding criticism in the press and on radio and television is to no small degree connected with the inertia of the old distrust of people, that, supposedly, they are incapable of understanding all the things that these glib journalists may write, that criticism is of course necessary but it should be strictly regulated, strictly dosed out, and that would be best of all if, in general, it were issued by our own hands and under our control.

There have recently been a particularly large number of critics on television and radio. The increase in their numbers is understandable because these media have the leading role among the mass information media today. It is also understandable that this criticism is in a way similar to that from the distant past, when they used to cut off the head of a messenger who brought bad news, it never occurring to the executioner that the courier was not to blame for the news, but was only its victim. I am coming to the point that there can not be two levels of openness and truth on television and radio. One level when, for example, there is a direct and complete broadcast of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies or a party congress, full of passions, clashes of opinion, and criticism of all and everything, in which rudeness and coarseness are not avoided. And all this becomes the property of the entire country. And, after this, it seems to certain of our critics that another level is possible, that this congress, seething with passions and full of conflicts, can be presented on radio and in television commentaries, in an interview, completely differently, as benevolent, calm, conciliatory. I want to make it absolutely clear that such a second level is simply impossible today, because everything that, as a result of live broadcasts, has become the property of people directly from the mouths of party congress deputies inevitably becomes and necessarily must become the subject of commentaries, interviews, reports, assessments and judgments by journalists.

I do not want to be in the role of advocating the shop interests of my own department or of one who refutes our critics. I acknowledge honestly that criticism on television contains much that is justified and provides a great deal to reflect upon, to evaluate, and draw useful conclusions. Among the critical evaluations that need to be thought about, I would include the, not isolated, judgments by our own and the foreign press and by television with regard to certain of our social and political broadcast series. The essence of these remarks is that serious study should be given in Russia to the phenomenon of universal political psychosis, which is consciously and in an extremely organized way being

planted and sustained by the forces of radio and television. The originators of these judgments note that prolonged (weekly and monthly, up to 2-3 hours a night) broadcasts of congresses and sessions of top soviet and party organs have come to replace the well-known Kashpirovskiy and Chumak. The view is expressed that a special laboratory clearly should be established to investigate how such television presentations of important social and political events affect the human psyche. It is being proposed that such innovative experiments by television and radio not only build confidence or intensify disappointment, but also introduce a serious disturbance into the consciousness of people, that they sow uncertainty and, against the background of economic disorder and general shortages, increase the irritation of the television viewers, many of whom want to watch something entirely different, to enjoy themselves, to relax.

These judgments require thought and conclusions from us because, in general, they reflect truly the current bias of Central Television in favor of social and political transmissions. Our only justification is the fact that this is not the fault of television, but its misfortune, because it only objectively reflects those biases that are today characteristic of our social life, which is politicized to the degree that there is no place left in it for literature, art, and culture.

Having joined the leading ranks of those who have taken upon their shoulders the heavy burden of perestroika, of the struggle against bureaucracy, conservatism, and of stagnation at the stage of propagandizing and carrying out economic reform, the press, radio, television, and those who serve them have done a great deal and, at the time when radical political transformations were beginning within society, passed through the two acute phases of the democratic elections of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet and republic and local soviets and the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. In the process of this struggle, the mass information media were greatly enriched with new experience in influencing the public; however, they did not get away without losses as well.

Observations show that, to a large degree, those daily, everyday production concerns that make up the conscious activities and ordinary life of society have disappeared from the pages of newspapers and the broadcasts of radio and television. The exemplary leading production worker [peredovik] and the Communist labor shock-worker are gone, but those who today, in these complicated conditions of perestroika, are feeding and clothing the country—the modern worker and peasant, the renter and the cooperative member—have not arrived. Individual materials on this theme and with these heroes are only the exception and not the rule. In this connection, there has also been a change in the main hero; the political reformer, the subverter, and the accuser have firmly assumed this role. I do not want to view this tendency exclusively as a negative one, because it is a reflection of those processes which are taking in our real life, but I clearly see how

criticism is increasingly coming to prevail in the mass information media and the layer of good, creative work is becoming increasingly thin. I think that, by this, we are not conveying optimism to Soviet people, a certainty in the success of the great matter started in April 1985, and meanwhile the country finds itself not only in an alarming situation, but also expecting good changes for the better.

With this tendency, there is another one that is directly connected. It is expressed in the fact that, on the basis of the authority acquired during the years of perestroika and enjoying the enormous influence which the mass information media possess today, in the content of a certain and, we acknowledge, large part of the materials of the press, of social and political broadcasts by radio and television, a desire is increasingly manifesting itself to edify, to teach, to impose opinions on society, and sometimes even to exert pressure on it. I think that also connected with this are manifestations of subjectivity and group bias which are characteristic today of certain newspaper, journal, radio, and television editorial staffs. Our journalistic pretensions to fulfill the functions of a fourth estate also stem from this.

These notes do not pretend to present any kind of analysis of the modern state of our propaganda and information. They are only an attempt objectively and critically to evaluate the situation within this complicated sphere in order to facilitate the search for paths to fundamental renewal of ideological activities under the conditions of our emerging democratic society.

#### Editor Ponders Media Reorganization Needs

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[Article by Yu. Ponomarenko, chief editor of the newspaper VOZDUSHNIY TRANSPORT: "Do We Need a Murdock?: Continued Discussion of Restructuring the Press"]

[Text] My thoughts today are dictated by life itself but the immediate occasion for them was an article in PRAVDA on 28 May by the dean of the journalism faculty at Moscow State University, Professor Ya. Zasurskiy, entitled: "Can't We Learn From Murdock?". The warning which shows through in this article is unambiguous: if we do not have our own Murdocks, Ersans, and Springers in our press, the western kings of the mass information media will, under market conditions, claim their rights to us and buy everything that they like. If we let the situation go on, we won't even know what happened later.

Well, this is indeed a fact: His excellency Rupert Murdoch has already made the rounds of the editorial offices of the East European countries in his "golden chariot" and, with no trouble at all, has bought up a dozen publications at cut-rate prices. He is now carefully reviewing and launching them using his own multi-colored, flashy, and inviting polygraphic and political



techniques. Murdock, I think, is satisfied with his purchases. But what about the Hungarians, the Romanians, the Poles?

We have a serious concern today—to survive! But among our feelings, there is not only a thirst for and envy of independence, of the possibilities of the business [delovoy] person (probably of a good organizer), but also a deep regret that we do not have such a specialist who could provide some sort of guarantees of the survival of the press under the new conditions and who could fight against such phenomena that are advancing on us as the increased cost (or total absence) of paper, increased costs for distribution, and the collapse of lead-zinc printing shops.

Incidentally, until recently we were convinced that we had such master specialists. Shown in large letters above the title of every publication, they were majestically identified as some a committee or, for example, ministry. But before we knew it, it became clear that our "masters" had turned out to be failures on both a financial and an organizational plane, and moreover that not everything was in order with regard to our ideological leadership, as we had earlier proudly maintained. Even PRAVDA experienced certain discrepancies (according to the opinion of our readers). Well, and as regards such newspapers as GUDOK, VODNIY TRANSPORT, and our own, then the "masters" of these papers did not invest even a kopeck in the name of [ensuring] the basic existence of their own papers.

And so, for certain of us, a pressing question has now arisen: Do we need our own Murdock? Others (and I am with them) say very categorically: we do need our Murdock! And I think that these differences in the statement of the problem are producing tensions now and that, even tomorrow, we will come to feel the entire burden of our indecisiveness.

A year and a half ago our editorial offices made a rough outline, using appropriate calculations (and applying our own, albeit not great, experience) of the structures of association for sector [otraslovyy] newspapers. This is not, of course, a Murdock-style corporation, but is something like it in miniature, where cost-accounting principles have been established and where the creation of general funds, the issue of stocks, and the organization of a common board of directors and of a joint advertising and business unit, and much more, have been proposed.

I was very happy when all the chief editors of the sectoral newspapers said at once (and without any abstentions) that this is the first step toward a guaranteed publishing organization and is very important for the transformations in our economy. But after this, I tried to reach the then chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union council (VTsSPS), S. Shalaye, by phone for months, without result...

Let no one think that my grievances are just one more stone in the garden of our deathless bureaucracy. No. I

want to say that, even with the bureaucracy, with its vitality (and perhaps, precisely because of it), we need to seek our own solutions.

I repeat: we do need our own Murdock! But where should we look for him? Entering into a discussion with Ya. Zasurskiy, I risk the assertion that, with the present system of training publishing and newspaper personnel, we will not need a future Murdock at any journalism faculty in our country. And we do not know how to learn from the real Murdock. He, to our great misfortune, is not inviting us to come see him and is not revealing the secrets of his powerful empire.

There is one extremely instructive example. About two years ago, several publications surged ahead and took readers away from many newspapers and journals. Our own aviation newspaper was also dealt a blow. We were taught an important lesson, thank you. And the question has become as follows: if you have lost your profitability—then disband. The strongest, and the smartest, will survive.

We found one firm [firma] that nobody had heard of at that time and calculated that, if it were given a little push and were advertised, this joint enterprise would rise to the world. We politely invited its president and the director of the bank to our editorial offices and spent many hours "over coffee and tea."

Speaking honestly, even our experienced publisher, A. Golovchanskiy, advised: Do not ask for more than fifty thousand for advertising; this is entirely sufficient for you to ride the crest of the wave.

We asked for two hundred thousand, based on our word alone. The president turned out to be a real businessman. He gave us two hundred thousand rubles. I repeat: without "iron" guarantees from us.

The result of this, our first commercial deal, exceeded expectations. We spent rubles from our above-plan earnings account only after we earned them, we paid all our debts, we embarked on the second model of economic accountability (jointly with the publishing house), and we created surpluses. They did not even remind us of our debt, but—in commerce, one must be a gentleman. We settled our accounts.

Our problem was that we were too quick to become reassured, dozing without fully understanding the laws of the market and how merciless it is toward someone who wants to live well.

One unpleasantness after another rained down on our heads: an increase in the cost of paper, in printing expenditures, and in circulation costs. How to survive? They gave us simple advice: raise the price of the newspaper. And what does this mean? The Ministry of Communication interjected: instead of twenty kopecks for every ruble of subscription, it is possible [for it] to take

even eighty (the figures are round ones). They did not ask our agreement (when they slaughter a sheep they do not ask its consent).

And our glorious journalistic union not only did not take up the struggle on behalf of the newspaper business, but even lost, in my view, an elementary sensitivity to injury. It has not even reacted to the fact that the fundamental laws of our country do not even mention our union among the organizations. Thus, in the Law on the Provision of Pensions, it is included in the "and others" category.

Mr. Murdock has already added fuel to the fire with his buying and selling deals... "Who is going buy us?" the journalists are asking their chief editors. There is a sense of panic. Reporters are running around to cooperatives, sometimes ones that have little to do with journalism, wanting even if at some risk but to be paid, to obtain equivalent work; to take a short rest from our race, to survive the instability of relationships within their native profession...

For the time-being, there also is no active concern about us on the part of scholars in the field of Soviet journalism and the party committees, in the words of our own PRAVDA, have remained in the trenches.

Meanwhile, small-scale Murdocks are making underground marches in Moscow with samizdat papers, glib youth are selling ATMODA, UTYUG, or SOVETSKAYA MORALKA for a ruble a copy on the Arbat. Oh what a pity that real journalists are poor and cannot buy themselves a newspaper!

How then is our ordinary editorial office surviving in the chaotic situation? In great agitation! While I am finishing writing these lines, people our commercial section has been visited by people who have carefully examined the its well reconditioned walls, the furniture. This is how and only how an experienced customer examines a product that interests him.

The guests came to call: a very well-known and reliable firm with solid deposits in our and foreign banks. As is customary in the dealings of business people (for whom time is money), the meeting began with a proposal. A business one. The guests can create an founding fund for our newspaper and initially deposit two and a half million rubles and dollars in it. What was required from us was insignificant: to somewhat change the profile of the newspaper...

I admit: I was interested. In the first place, I had only now, after many years of work at the newspaper, learned its purchase price: 2.5 million plus or minus a hundred thousand. And second, with my own eyes I became convinced that we do have our own, Soviet, Murdocks and that they have not been asleep, that they are setting a price...

What did we do? In rough terms, we looked for a more reliable purchaser. We turned to the sector's council and

asked: and could aviation enterprises, that is aviators themselves, create an founding fund of two and a half millica rubles? In order to preserve the only great aviation newspaper in the world? Indeed, as the senior aviation journalist in our country, Yevgeniy Ivanovich Ryabchikov, said to me, before the October Revolution, when only the Wright brothers were flying, the fantastic aviation figure, Utochkin, also took to the air. There were 14 aviation publications in Russia. And the every issue was sold out, a free market was child's play to the journalists.

What did the aviators answer? We were supported by the new minister, but, as happens on a real market, we had "our hands slapped" by the members of the council. Life goes on, and we plunged ahead, full of hopes that, together with the "Vozdushniy transport" publishing house, even this year, we will begin to "go out with" with a "VT" edition printed in six colors. Together with our partner, we laid the foundations for our own small library attached to the publication (with the rights of a annex).

Yes, life goes on. Although at this moment, when I am completing this article, extremely unpleasant news has come from the "Gudok" printing house. The presses have stopped, there will be no issue of "VT": the paper has been lost enroute...Lost?

### Wave of CPSU Disassociations Sweeps Volgograd Regional Newspapers

90US1253A Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition)  
in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA Volgograd correspondent Valeri Kornev: "Newspapers—to the Soviets"]

[Text] As of 1 August, there has been a change in the status of local newspapers in 33 rayon centers and the city of Volzhskiy in Volgograd Oblast: their dual subordination has been abolished.

From now on, their publication data will not show that these are organs of the rayon and party city committees. All 34 publications have now become newspapers solely of the rayon and city councils of peoples' deputies.

The new status of the regional press has been formalized by a legislative act issued by the local authorities. At a session of the oblast soviet, following a thorough and somewhat stormy discussion, the deputies approved a document entitled "On measures for implementing the USSR law On the Press and Other Mass Information Media' within the territory of Volgograd Oblast."

Well, does it turn out that the oblast soviet has, in effect, expropriated the party press in all the rayons of the oblast? Is this not arbitrary rule? Is this legal? Such judgments have been expressed. There is an obvious ignorance of the situation here. In practice, things have developed in such a way that the large newspapers, those which show a profit, have been connected with the party through financial relationships. VOLGOGRADSKAYA

PRAVDA, for example, has an annual profit of 700,000 rubles. But many rayon newspapers are operating at a loss and are surviving on account of subsidies. At the same time, they have no financial ties of any kind to the party. All funds for their publication and even for paying the salaries of journalists, down to the last kopeck, are paid out by the management of the publishing houses, the printing houses, and the book trade—management that is subordinate to the oblast soviet.

Here is the system: the money comes from the state budget, but the newspaper—let us tell things as they are—is at the disposal of the party committee, which has both editorial personnel and the content of the publications under its control. But even this is not all. If the command style of management has been manifested particularly clearly anywhere, then this is in the relationships of the party committees with the local press.

About two years ago, in an article entitled "A word on Economic Accountability," I talked about the establishment of a cost-accounting publishing house, "Rayonnaya gazeta," in our oblast. The new director of the board, Yu. Nekrasov decided to change the procedures that had existed there, to organize things so that the newspaper would get out of debt, so that the money it earned could be used to modernize printing equipment and to provide the editors with office equipment, to improve conditions of work.

A good thing. But the party committees had objections. How can an increase in the space devoted to advertisements in the paper be squared with its ideological role? And indeed the publication of advertisements received from "private individuals" was, at first, generally perceived as a violation of the canons of the party press. But the cost-accounting publishing house pursued its own line and the number of unprofitable newspapers declined.

According to the results from last year, this publishing house, which has now taken the name of "Periodika," earned almost 600,000 rubles. During the first seven months of this year, the publication of advertisements brought it earnings of 1,340,000 rubles. And from "private individuals," who had been the subject of sharp debate, the treasury received 370,000 rubles—twice as much as during all of last year.

Besides modernization of the printing plant, what else is the money being spent for?

"To acquire motor vehicles for editorial offices," we were told by S. Planskaya, the deputy director of the "Periodika" publishing house. "Thus, last year, three additional vehicles were purchased. For the construction of housing for journalists. On account of profits, the bonus fund doubled—it now comes to 300,000 rubles for 34 editorial offices.

"And still another important nuance. Management is naturally concerned about the upcoming increase in prices for periodical publications but considers that they will bear this blow more easily than others for two reasons. In the first place, because of experience that has already been acquired in management based on cost-accounting principles. In the second place, because people now have a heightened interest in the independent newspapers of the soviets, which have emerged from under the dictates of a single party system [odnopartiynost]. The editors will now be approved at sessions of the soviets."

Well, and if a rayon or city party committee still wishes to have its own press organ?

"The conditions are the same for all," answered the chief of the directorate of publishing houses, printing plants and the book trade, Yu. Nekrasov. "We will print the newspapers of the Communist or other parties if possibilities permit, if there is sufficient paper, and, as stands to reason, at their own expense. One more condition: the publication must be registered in the oblast soviet."



**Students To Work Radioactive Fields**

90UN2738B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 35, 29 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Staff Correspondent A. Kozlovich: "But Send Students There..."]

[Text] On 1 September, a dangerous surprise awaits Belorussian students now returning to their places of study.

The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education published the order "On the participation of student youth in agricultural work in 1990." By this order, based upon the recommendations of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, students over age 18 are brought into agricultural work on territory with radioactive contamination of up to

15 curies per square kilometer. The republic parliament established "hazard" pay of R15 per month for all the residents of these territories starting 1 August, yet the minister just appointed by the parliament is sending youth there. True, the minister adds that the students should not work in places "where there is elevated dust particle formation." But tell me, who has seen farm work not accompanied by dust? Who, and with what apparatus, is going to measure its level? The republic parliament has resolved to complete in 1991 the relocation of people residing in territory with radioactive contamination of 15 or more curies per square kilometer, but the order just cited graciously permits students to labor there, if they themselves so desire. The order says nothing of a stimulus for the students' self-sacrifice in the Chernobyl fields. And apparently, not in vain.

### Moldova Political Public Opinion Poll

90UN2623A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 2 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by A. Zavtur, director of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Sociopolitical Studies, Moldavian USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member, and G. Entelis, head of sector, Institute of Sociopolitical Studies, professor: "Public Opinion Confirms"]

[Text] Following the closing of the proceedings of the 28th CPSU Congress, in the middle of July 1990 the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Sociopolitical Studies conducted a survey of the population in seven republic rayons (Ryshkanskiy, Sorokskiy, Feleshtskiy, Keushanskiy, Kakhulskiy, Streshenskiy and Khyncheshtskiy). A total of 1,218 people were surveyed. Their ethnic breakdown was as follows: Moldavians, 81.1 percent; Russians, 7.9 percent; Ukrainians, 7.6 percent; and others. The age breakdown was as follows: 29 or under, some 30 percent; 30-49, 60.7 percent. Education: higher training, 21.5 percent; secondary specialized training, 32.8 percent; and general secondary training, 33.6 percent. Occupation: workers in industry, construction, transportation and sovkhozes, 43.8 percent; kolkhoz members, 16.8 percent; intellectuals and employees, 23.2 percent; specialists employed in the national economy, 13.9 percent, etc.

Reactions to the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress varied. This even applied to the slogan that the CPSU is becoming the "ruling party in opposition." People well-known in the country and the republic began to leave the party; forces trying to remove the CPSU (and in Moldavia, the MCP) from the political arena were energized.

Naturally, the true assessments of the 28th CPSU Congress will appear in the course of the implementation of its political programs. Nonetheless, what did the survey show? A satisfaction with the work and resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the fact that it justified their hopes was expressed by 44.4 percent of the respondents (including 237 workers and 218 specialists and employees). More than 29 percent expressed their dissatisfaction while the others left the question unanswered. There were also those who were indifferent, for 6 percent showed no interest whatsoever in the work of the congress.

One out of four respondents (24.1 percent) considered that the CPSU would be able to lead the country out of the crisis; one out of five (20.3 percent) expressed the diametrically opposite view. The remainder were were not sure about either. Against a background of general uncertainty concerning the future, this should not puzzle. The communists must regain the trust of the people through their activities and specific actions.

Now as to the attitude toward the Moldavian Communist Party. Some 53 percent consider it an influential and reliable political force, while 30.2 percent disagree with this view. The readiness of the MCP to cooperate with all movements was supported by 35 percent of those polled; one out of four doubted that the sociopolitical organizations and movements would accept such cooperation. The documents of the Second NFM [Moldavian People's Front] support this viewpoint.

A dialogue is always constructive. Wherever a multiplicity of political organizations and groups begin to function, also needed is a mechanism which would guarantee interaction among them. Unfortunately, not everyone understands this. Thus, about 17 percent of the respondents did not support the course of cooperation charted by the Moldavian Communist Party. Furthermore, more than 30 percent, i.e., almost a third, believe that in its desire to achieve a consolidation, the MCP Central Committee would gradually surrender one position after another. As we can see, a conservative way of thinking was characteristic of both sides. Intolerance and mistrust are not easy to surmount. Nonetheless, the course charted by the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee toward consolidation and achieving a national consensus on the basis of the priority of universal human values and human rights is gaining an increasing number of supporters.

Question: "How do you assess demonstrative resignations from the CPSU and attacks on the party?" (in percent)

Breakdown:

Condemn: 43.6; Indifferent: 20.0; Do not condemn: 20.2; No answer: 15.5

Interethnic conflicts, separatist aspirations, and nationalist and chauvinistic appeals are not diminishing. All of this is intensifying social tension.

Question: "In your view, could aggravated interethnic relations lead to the failure of perestroika and democracy?" (in percent)

Possible: 47.3; Yes, interethnic conflicts hinder the resolution of the crisis in the republic: 25.6; Disagree: 13.9; No answer: 12.6

The appeal of the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress for consolidation on the basis of a political consensus, and the appeal of Ion Snegur Mirchi, Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet chairman, to put an end to confrontation and to secure peace and tranquillity for the Moldavian people should be heard by anyone who cares for the Moldavian land and who wishes its people well-being and blossoming.

**RSFSR Death Rate Figures Compared**

90UN2606A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*  
in Russian No 31, Jul 90 p 4

[Article by V. Golovachev: "Russia's Demographic 'Temperature'"]

[Text] The level of most indicators describing the republic's demographic situation in the past year was the most unfavorable in not only the last four years, but in the last two decades.

RSFSR State Committee for Statistics Data			
Thousands	1980	1986	1989
Births	2,203	2,486	2,162
Deaths	1,526	1,498	1,580
including those below 1 year old	49	48	39
Natural growth	677	988	583
Marriages	1,465	1,418	1,384
Divorces	581	579	583

Of particular concern is the sharp drop in the number of women in the 20-29 year age group: by 350,000 compared to 1988. The number of births also dropped by almost 180,000. The drop in the birth rate was evident republic-wide. Moreover, in the overwhelming part of the RSFSR the birth rate does not even ensure simple reproduction of the population.

In the mid-1980's, the total death rate in Russia declined noticeably. But beginning in 1987, this indicator began slowly growing. The number of deaths from accidents, poisonings and injuries has grown sharply.

Death is always a terrible grief, no matter when it occurs. But even so, the public is most concerned about the growth in the number of murders. For example, in the last year their number for the RSFSR as a whole grew by 30 percent. Sad "leaders" in the growth of deaths by murder were: Sakhalin oblast, up by two times (from 66 to 124); Belgorod oblast, by 1.8 times (from 75 to 136); Karelia and Dagestan, also by 1.8 times (from 57 to 100 and from 49 to 90, respectively); Ryazan oblast, by 1.7 times (113 and 187); Moscow, by 1.6 times (361 and 580); Tuvinsk ASSR, by 1.6 times (126 and 204); Tomsk and Tyumen oblasts, also by 1.6 times (from 102 to 161 and from 375 to 590, respectively); Kemerov oblast, by 1.5 times (575 and 871).

RSFSR Death Statistics		
	1986	1989
Total deaths (thous.)	1,498	1,580
Including those from:		
circulatory illnesses	857	882
neoplasms	261	280

accidents, poisonings and injuries	150	185
Of which:		
accidental alcohol poisonings	13	13
suicides	33	38
murders	11	18
respiratory illnesses	91	86
intestinal disorders	39	41
infectious and parasitic illnesses	21	19

The ongoing process of "aging" of the population also has a substantial effect on the death rate. For example, in the Pskov, Novgorod, Kalinin, Ivanov, Ryazan, Tula, Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk and Tambov oblasts almost every fourth resident has reached pension age.

But there are also bright "spots" on the republic's rather somber demographic picture. The few positive items include the drop in 1989 over 1988 in infant mortality. For the RSFSR as a whole, it fell by 6 percent. In only 15 oblasts, krais and ASSR's (out of more than 70) did the infant mortality rate stay at its previous level or increase slightly.

But nonetheless, one "swallow" does not make the weather. The facts stubbornly indicate: the natural population growth in the RSFSR dropped by almost 200,000 persons in the past year and was the lowest since 1945. In 1987, a natural population loss—the surplus of deaths over births—was observed only in the Pskov oblast; in 1988, it was joined by the Ivanov, Kalinin, Tula and Tambov oblasts; in 1989, to this list were added the Moscow, Ryazan, Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and Moscow city. In rural areas, this situation exists in 24 of the republic's territories.

**Urbanization Problems in Uzbek SSR Explained**

90UN2606B Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
18 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by A. Saliev, doctor of geographic sciences, head of the USSR economic and social geography department of the V.I. Lenin Tashkent State University, and A. Sadykov, candidate of economic sciences: "The City and Citydwellers"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR currently has 124 cities and 97 city-like villages. About 41 percent of the republic's population lives in them. The number of cities in Uzbekistan has tripled in the last twenty years alone (there were only 42 in the 1970 census).

The network of cities in the republic is increasing at an unprecedented rate. And a natural question arises: did there actually occur in this short period such a dramatic growth in the republic's productive forces? After all, as a rule the growth of cities and of the urban population is directly dependent on the development of production and is an indicator of overall social and economic progress.



In fact, the sharp increase in the number of cities during the 1970's and 1980's resulted from command-administrative policies. In 1972, a decree of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet reduced the standard for the population size required to classify populated areas as cities (from 10,000 residents to 7,000). After this legislative act, the number of cities on our republic's map began to increase sharply. But that is on the map... On the whole, this process did not always correspond to reality. This is because the transfer of rural settlements to the status of cities was done mostly on the basis of quantitative indicators: the population numbers (and not always in this manner; for example, Marzhanbulak was classified as a city with two thousand inhabitants), and not qualitative ones; i.e., the structure of employment, a populated area's functional profile, the possibilities for its further growth, etc. It is easy to list dozens of "new" cities which can only formally be considered as such. By level of social and economic development and provision of public services they are the same as typical rural settlements.

The sharp increase in the number of cities did not result in an increase in the proportion of the urban population. This is because in the Central Asian region the urban and rural populations are growing equally fast, whereas for the USSR overall not only is the proportion of the rural population diminishing, but its absolute number is declining as well.

As is well known, in the country's industrially developed economic rayons and oblasts the proportion of the urban population is 75-80 percent and more. This does not mean that we should routinely adopt the attitude that we must have the same high indicators. The urbanization process must not be artificially accelerated, since it has negative consequences in addition to its unquestioned benefits.

It should be recalled that the structure of our republic's economy is primarily agro-industrial. In view of modern agro-industrial integration, it can be assumed that the urbanization process will take place somewhat differently here, without repeating the traditional path of regions and countries where urbanization resulted primarily from the development of heavy industry. The manner in which the social-economic and demographic situation developed in Uzbekistan must also be kept in mind. A large role was played here by the use of the land and water resources and the development of labor-intensive irrigated agriculture. As a result, in the overall picture of the geographical structure of productive forces there clearly stand out separate areas with a solid social-economic and demographic potential, while vast areas of desert wasteland are sparsely populated and have a low level of economic development. For example, the population density by oblast fluctuates from 7 persons per square kilometer in the Karakalpak ASSR to 420 in the Andizhansk oblast. In some regions of the Fergana

Valley and the Tashkent Oasis it reaches 600-700 persons. A tendency is also observed towards greater population density in the urban area along main infrastructure lines.

Of course, we are not against urbanization in general, but against fictitious, artificial urbanization at the economic and moral expense of the village, where 60 percent of Uzbekistan's population lives. Our republic unquestionably needs cities; without them, scientific and technical progress and social-economic development are inconceivable. And various types of cities are needed: large, medium and small; multipurpose, industrial, scientific, agro-industrial, etc. It is thus necessary to create and develop cities of varying types and sizes in all the republic's regions, especially in industrially underdeveloped oblasti.

Improving the population's geographical organization presupposes its optimal distribution not only between urban and rural areas, but also within them. The republic has 16 cities with a population of over 100,000; seven of these are medium-sized (i.e., with 50,000-100,000 residents), the remainder are small. Over 26 percent of the republic's total urban population lives in Tashkent, with an equal number in oblast centers. Thus, more of the urban population lives in the 11 administrative centers than in the remaining 113 cities and 97 urban settlements.

In many of the republic's oblasti, the strongly pronounced multifunctional cities are primarily their administrative centers. The oblasti's second cities, in terms of population size and all indicators of social-economic development, lag behind the administrative centers by a factor of several times. For example, Andizhan and Namangan have over 300,000 residents each, whereas "second" cities such as Shakhrikhan and Chust have 50,000 each. The industry and infrastructure of small cities are underdeveloped. They account for slightly more than one-fourth of gross output, about 20 percent of basic production funds and over 10 percent of industrial workers. Yet in large and very large cities these indices are 56, 62 and 75 percent, respectively. Over 20 percent of the republic's gross industrial output is produced in Tashkent alone. This all points out the serious disproportion in the geographical structure of production and in population distribution.

Stimulating small and medium cities, "pulling up" the level of their social-economic development, require situating in them industrial enterprises and branches of large production associations, and creating light industry facilities, since many of them have become cities without the corresponding urbanization and social foundation. Deconcentration and decentralization of industry and improvements in the geographical organization of production and the service sphere help to solve a number of important and complex social-economic tasks. This is of special importance in the area of fuller and more efficient use of labor and reduction of ecological and social stress.

But situating industrial enterprises must take into consideration many factors. In a number of cases, our planning of the construction of new enterprises considers "surplus" labor resources. A "gross" approach, so to speak, is applied to the unemployed portion of the working population. Of course, it is very tempting to create jobs for everyone at one stroke. The planning and design stage must carefully study the actual situation, it must create the necessary conditions and infrastructure for situating new industrial facilities and their branches. Training of skilled workers from among the local population must also precede enterprise construction. Under conditions of democratization of society, when more rights are being granted to local soviets, the question of planning and situating new enterprises of various union ministries and agencies must be approved above all by the local executive committee, and take into consideration the native population's opinions and needs.

A paradoxical situation presently exists in the republic: with a huge army of persons unemployed in social production, many industrial enterprises are experiencing a shortage of skilled workers. This is felt especially in branches of enterprises in the aviation, electrical engineering and electronics industries in small and medium cities. The bitter truth is that despite the decades that have passed since the beginning of industrialization of the economy, we have still not learned how to train local skilled workers. It is just this factor which retarded the development of heavy industry during the prewar years of industrialization, and it remains a brake on speeding up social and economic development.

Shortcomings in the geographic organization of production necessitate a comprehensive approach to problems of developing populated areas and situating productive forces in them. In this regard, it is important to work out a regional concept for population distribution and urbanization, and the long-term development of a network of populated areas and their systems. Man, his true capacities and needs, must serve as the main precondition when planning the development and geographic organization of productive forces.

#### MVD on Prostitution in Sochi, Runaways

90US1263A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by TRUD social correspondent G. Bochkarev: "Rashen Gerlz: "What They Are Looking for in Sochi"]

[Text] When all Soviet newspapers printed tales of the "1,000 and one nights" of Sochi prostitutes three years ago, hordes of young girls rushed there. The girls built plans for a beautiful future. They dreamed, here she comes to Sochi, "calculates" for some Finn or Swiss out of an Intourist hotel, goes up to him in the hard currency bar, and while having a "martini" with crushed ice smiles charmingly at her foreign Michael:

"Ay lav yu. But it costs 100 Finnish marks, or 50 Deutsch marks, or 30 U.S. dollars..."

And the intoxicated Marty or Steve will just be "dying" from her Voronezh English. And he mumbles,

"Pe-re-stroyka!"

And then there will be the cozy room with a view of the sunny sea... And as a reward, 100 Finnish marks, or 50 Deutsche marks, or 30 U.S. dollars.

**Presentation of the Department of Criminal Investigation, UVD [Internal Affairs Administration], Sochi gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], to the director of the hotel "Zhemchuzhina":** "On 18 May 1990, the doorman at the main entry of the 'Zhemchuzhina' became acquainted with two underage girls. He sold one of them to four men for R200."

**Telegram to Nizhny Tagil (from the criminal investigations dossier):** "Mama, get me out. They are keeping me by force near Sukhumi. Tell the police. Lena."

Young Lena also left home to have a good time and changed her mind about going back. She ran away to Sochi. She dreamed of finding a hard currency client, and wound up in the sticks. For eight months. One comfort—Lena was sure that for the first 20 days her new friend was a Turkish citizen...

At the height of the season, the resort's "night market" is overloaded with prostitutes, but they keep coming and coming. They run away from home, and somewhere off in the distant city of Omsk, the militia is searching for a 15-year-old Lyuba who "disappeared without a trace." And during that time, Lyuba is on duty in a Sochi hotel, hoping to buy her ticket to the good life. And dollars. But it's not so easy to get "set up" as a hard-currency prostitute in Sochi. There are only two hard currency hotels in the resort city, "Zhemchuzhina" and "Dagomys." From the day of his arrival, any foreigner with a convertible wallet is surrounded by the care and attention of the "Zhemchuzhina" and "Dagomys" staff girls, under the unremitting surveillance of a brigade of pimps. All places in the foreigners' beds are long since taken, and the new little girls go out on the domestic market.

"We are seeing a very alarming picture today," says V. Terentyev, deputy chief of the Criminal Investigations Division of the Sochi gorispolkom. "Prostitution is getting younger. All the more frequently, underage girls from other cities are winding up in Sochi hangouts, getting into private cars with Soviet citizens. The prices for the girls have dropped sharply. Now, for example, a night with a 15-year-old costs only 10 rubles. For a couple of hours, that can be gotten down to a fiver. Or even three. And some clients are paying only for a meal in a cafeteria. After that, is it worth being surprised that a girl is prepared to sell herself to four men at once for 200 rubles, or to set off on a prolonged "honeymoon" for three meals a day..."

It's a good thing (although what good is in it, really) when the trip south ends up with going back to mama. It turns out otherwise, too.

A receiving facility for minors is located across from the Sochi Pedagogical Institute. A concrete fence. Bars on the windows. Visual media on the first floor: "Smoking is harmful," "alcohol is poison," "AIDS is the plague of the 20th century."

Young thrill seekers wind up in this facility. They shake them out of private cars, take them away from the hangouts, rescue them from the restaurants. And then the unconverted girls lick envelopes in the special receiving facility. At least it's some money earned.

"Almost all these runaways left their homes enthralled with the rumors of the Sochi "hookers," sighs V. Sapelkin, director of the receiving facility. "What can you say; there didn't used to be such mass arrivals of young prostitutes. We must send the girls to a venereal disease clinic for observation. Some 90 percent are found to have, so to say, professional diseases..."

The Sochi facility is getting ever more underage girls. As for life style, these are loose women. As for their character and psychological maturity, these are difficult teen-agers. The motives for running away from home are always the same—a scandal in the family, a mother has divorced her husband and is drinking, or a desire to "taste" the good life. And to earn money. But where can you get a 1,000 rubles a month, and hard currency, if you don't have a profession? On the street. In the perception of certain girls, Sochi is an enormous brothel..."

I do not intend to read morality to the girls from the facility, to discuss the role of the family and school in the formation of the moral principles of the young generation. To try to find out why these types run off to the street, and not to a tailoring and sewing circle at the Pioneer Palace?

But why the discussion when a young thing with extreme frankness expounds her conclusions favoring the oldest profession: "Mama and I live together. Mama earns 120 rubles. We need money. So I came to Sochi..."

The girl is putting out right and left to save up for a pretty brand-name dress.

"A total of 65,000 teenagers in Russia have run away from home," says A. Akhmetshin, associate of the department of prevention services of the RSFSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Many run south, where they get involved in various criminal groups. The number of runaway minors has increased sharply over the last two years. Hence the growth in teenage crime. The girls get into hangouts; the boys steal. Only a strong state program for youth affairs can break this trend."

Maybe a program to save youth can also save someone from the street. But even this program will not protect girls from debauchery.

Pornography is prohibited by law in the country, but step into a video bar during an evening show, and it's wall-to-wall porn. In China, people are now being given

extreme sentences for such films. But here nobody even pays a fine! They say that the court practice is lacking...

There is in the RSFSR Criminal Code an article "For sexual relations with a person who has not attained sexual maturity." So what? Do you think that anyone in Sochi has been convicted on this article? No one. The hotel doormen sell girls for 200 rubles; the juvenile facility is stuffed with underage women who were dragged away from adult men, and there's nothing terrible about it? This is normal?

And if a criminal rape case is instigated upon the complaint of a victim, then "sexual relations with a person who has not attained sexual maturity" must be proven. But how? At age 12, some girls look 16, and at 15, they already have a rich experience of "maturity." So no [Megre] can prove an incident of debauchery. So you can wrap 15-year-olds around your little finger. They do not have the rights of a grown woman. There are responsibilities. Girls must listen to their elders...

It is now fashionable to propose nonstandard solutions, radical measures, and untraditional approaches. Here is what the bright ones are proposing: It is time to legalize not only the shadow economy, but open prostitution. Let the hookers stick it to the foreigners with an ispolkom [executive committee] patent, and let them pay taxes not to the pimps but to a fund for maintaining law and order. Then, they say, we will manage to keep underage girls away from the street as well. A universal inventory and control will be established. The morality police will be in charge of this. Shall we hide a policeman under every bed?

God knows, the police won't save our morals of the times of blessed perestroika. Nor will the militia save them. For the time being, the demand for debauchery will grow, and morals will ripen in inconvertible poverty...

### Church Administered Hospital Opens

90P50094A

[Editorial Report] Moscow TRUD in Russian on 14 September 1990 carries on page 1 a 100-report by D. Lenina on the consecration in Leningrad by Patriarch Aleksey of the first church administered hospital since 1917. The hospital is designated to treat the elderly exclusively. It is noted that American churches from Seattle helped in organizing the opening of the hospital.

Patients of the hospital will be able to partake of communion, confession and extreme unction. The Leningrad city soviet permanent committee on medical care and city health helped in founding the hospital. Leningrad city soviet ispolkom representative A. Shchelkanov took part in dedication ceremonies.



### Religious Sect's Relocation From Georgia Viewed

90UN2531A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 28, 22-29 Jul 90 p 15

[Article by Dmitry Dmitriyev: "Dukhobors Have To Uproot Again"]

[Text] The Dukhobors (spirit wrestlers) are a religious sect formed in Central Russia in the late 18th century. They did not recognize or train priests, saying that Christ rejected intermediaries between God and Man. They did not recognize the cross, the Bible and icons for "in Christ's time they did not exist, nor did he teach about them." They built no churches or went to them: "Our churches aren't built of logs, but of our own ribs." They lived in communes, the way the first Christians did. They didn't resist evil with violence, but wrestled against it by use of the Holy spirit within them.

Damned by the Russian Orthodox Church and Paul I, they were first exiled from Central Russia in 1801 to the Sea of Azov, and cruelly persecuted. In 1841, Nicolas I deported them even further south, to the forbidding mountains of Dzhavakhetia in the Caucasus, the outskirts of the Russian Empire. But the repressions against Dukhobors continued even there.

After dozens of Dukhobors were shot at the close of the 19th century for resisting conscription and for burning their weapons, a considerable number of them left for Canada in 1898. Leo Tolstoy rose in defence of the remaining Dukhobors. He wrote: "In their life there's something resembling a fairy tale." In the 20th century some 4,000 Dukhobors settled in Georgia, the Caucasus.

Dzhavakhetia is a region in Georgia, bordering on Armenia and Turkey. The village with a Russian name of Kalinino is in the foothills of the Mokrye Gory, the highest central range in the Lesser Caucasus. There's a deserted street, boarded up homes. Men with blue eyes and purely Slavic features, rarely seen nowadays in the heart of Russia, are loading furniture into a truck outside one of the houses. Greeting them, I said I was a Moscow reporter. "So you are here, at long last! Where have you been the past 150 years?" one unexpectedly cut me short in an angry tone tinged with tears. "Too late. Our feet have become stuck to this land," he waves his hand despondently and close to tears as he lays his hands on another piece of furniture.

This was the fourth time the Dukhobors have had to move their homes.

The most efficient collective farms in the Bogdanovsky District of the Georgian Republic are found in the villages of Dukhobors—Gorelovka, Spasovka, Orlovka, and Kalinino. Good homes and households. Their mode of life of more than one century is set and sound. There, in the mountain country I suddenly saw the Russia I had been looking for and not finding.

They have presented all the customs, rituals and habits. During festivals they gather to sing psalms, each knowing

by heart at least three hundred psalms. They weave their own fabrics for their traditional clothes. Bread, salt and water—the symbols of life—are constantly on the table in each home. They love all children, their own and not their own. There are no orphans. There are no thieves or drunkards. They have preserved that village spirit of giving a hand to each other helping to share misfortunes and to sing in joy.

The unique Dukhobor choir I heard singing in a yard in Gorelovka didn't sound happy: "Kind people, believe me that parting's worse than dying." The family was leaving to Zaporozhye having sold their house. Their neighbours packed off to the Stavropol Territory. Another family was leaving for the Tula Region.

I witnessed one of the last islands of genuine Russia disintegrating. Why? Who's making them leave? They lived in peace with their neighbours. The local authorities are against their leaving: Dukhobors are only nine per cent of the population and their collective farm accounts for 30 per cent of all that is produced in the district. The Republic's authorities also don't want them to leave, according to the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, Givi Gumbaridze.

So why the tears? Why more refugees?

Praskovya Zubkova, head of the Rural Soviet (village council) of Gorelovka: "The people fear that Georgia will secede. How shall we live then? The newspapers are now calling us 'lodgers' and 'colonists.' It has been rumoured that now that Georgia has passed the Law on Language, our village schools will be forced to teach our children Georgian. People have started leaving one by one. Armenians and Georgians are moving into the vacated houses. The situation is tense. People are scared by the events in Transcaucasia. A short distance away is the border between Turkey and Armenia, enmity between which has existed throughout history, and adds to our worries. The people are nervous and weary from tensions."

Maria Uglova, former head of the collective farm in the village of Spasovka:

"The houses of the people who are leaving are being bought by the Fund of Merab Kostava (a noted human rights activist who died in a car crash in the summer of 1989—D.R.) and turned over to victims of last year's natural disasters in Adzharia and Svanetia. Armenians try to buy these houses, pleading that if Adzharians settle there, it will be hell for those who remain. So we've decided to move to the Tula Region near Tolstoy's Yasnaya Polyana. But construction of housing for us there is moving slowly and people are hurrying to leave for such places as the Stavropol Territory, Zaporozhye, Krasnodar, and Smolensk."

Can one believe that? Members of Georgia's independent public organizations in particular Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the most popular Helsinki Union party devoted to public polls, say that they are against

the resettlement of Dukhobors—a small community who are hard working and not asking for any autonomy—who are guaranteed all rights in Georgia anyway. In addition, the ousting of Dukhobors would be yet another (especially after the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian clashes) circumstance turning the national liberation movement into ethnic conflicts. This is very well understood by the leaders of the Armenian independent public organizations who don't want to see further deterioration of the already tense situation in Armenia. Maybe the causes of resettlement are different?

Vasily Krasnikov, Party organizer of the village of Gorelovka: (The five Dukhobor villages have a total of 300 Communist Party members. They have not quit the Party, saying that real communism is what the Dukhobor faith is all about...) "We have been living here 150 years in exile. We always wanted to go back. Only today we are allowed to do so. All around us is a strange language, a strange nature, the people want to go back to Russia, their own land. The climate here is harsh. We have no social amenities, we are far away from everything. Our young people don't have schools, jobs. They are departing from the faith, leaving the place. So instead of leaving one by one, we've decided to leave all together. We've filled an application with the USSR Council of Ministers. In May, we received the decision 'On Voluntary Resettlement of Individual Citizens from the Georgian SSR to the Chern District of the Tula Region'. So we are now leaving. A total of 100 families have already left."

Well, that's it. Russians are leaving for Russia, their own country. (There is no knowing though what reception awaits them there where they were once rejected, how the Canadian Dukhobors who are planning to come and settle in the Altai area will be received. But this is the subject of a separate report.) These industrious people will revive the abandoned Russian villages. The driver of the truck in Tula smiles: "They'll take root here. We need hard-working folks." Dukhobor girls laugh: "What shall we do? you ask. We'll build housing. We'll study at higher schools in Tula." Why be sad? Why do these people cry on departing from Georgia? Why do the old women, wearing their brightly painted traditional kerchiefs, pause sadly before leaving?

At first they wouldn't answer my questions. They turned away from me when I tried to take their picture. Then they start talking all at once.

"How can we leave? Our ancestors are buried here. Who'll take care of their graves?"

"Up there in Tula, priests will again try to persuade us to join their churches. We know we are dangerous for them, people leave them to join us."

"Here we leave fine houses. Up there we'll have to spend twenty years to get really settled in. What will we use there for building materials? There are neither woods nor rocks."

"You ask what danger there is here? For 150 years we've lived together: Turks, Armenians, Georgians. No one has ever killed anyone."

"Who is driving us away? The folks have got mad. One person left, and all the rest have followed him."

"It would be good if they all were leaving for the same place, but they aren't. The Dukhobor faith is crumbling."

Vladimir Kuznetsov, director of the Museum of History and Ethnography of the Dukhobors in Gorelovka:

"I'm not leaving, and not taking the museum along. What are they going to do up there without their history. We've formed a firm bond with this land. Nobody is driving us away. One of our teachers wrote a letter to Dukhobors in Canada: 'Be in the strange land in your body, but strive in your spirit to be in Russia.' With us it's different: In our body we are moving to Russia but our souls remain here. But if we should leave after all, we should do as Christians ought to. We shouldn't bang the door, blaming anyone, reproaching anyone. Thanks to this land, to the Georgians who gave shelter to us, to the Armenians who lived side by side with us."

So who is driving away the Dukhobors after all? Who is edging them out? Alas, or better, thank God, there is no one specifically to point the finger at. It's circumstances that are compelling the Dukhobors to leave. Perhaps it is their destiny to return to Russia?

Nearly one thousand families still remain in the Dukhobor villages. But the resettlement process seems to be irreversible. Dukhobors weep, but leave. Possibly no trace of them will be left here in Georgia in another ten years. What can be done for them? One might try and step up the construction of housing in the Tula Region, so that they could settle more closely together, so that the Dukhobor community doesn't finally crumble. What conclusions can we make? The main painful conclusion is that ethnic conflicts often hit those not directly involved in them.

I feel I must mention one more thing. I've said that crumbling with the Dukhobor community is one more piece of real Russia. But Dukhobors are not exclusively Russians. There are many Ukrainians, Poles, Gypsies and Mordovians among them. They maintain that Dukhobors aren't a sect, aren't a nationality, not a restricted circle of people, but a community open to all God's children. Their native land isn't a specific territory, but the whole earth. It's not Russia that's crumbling, but the Christian Spirit....

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